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Compensation is an area of research rife with debate among experts.  These debates are 
primarily concerned with the effectiveness of pay-for-performance.  The pay variation and 
performance relationship is a subset of this research where disagreement and inconclusive 
findings are common.  Is pay variation conducive to higher performance or is pay compression 
ideal?  This study contributes to the pay variation and performance debate by focusing on 
performance-based pay variation and addressing fundamental assumptions of prior work.   
Past research has treated pay variation as a proxy for allocation rules and incentive 
intensity.  Separating these two constructs rather than confounding them provides a more 
comprehensive treatment.  This study addresses the effects of these two policies, incentive 
intensity and allocation rules, as separate, independent influences on performance outcomes.  
Incentive intensity is treated as a range of potential pay outcomes, whereas the allocation rule is 
an approach to distributing rewards either based on individual contribution or equally to 
members of a group.  While theories predict individual level performance is affected by pay 
variation, tests of these theories are typically at the organizational level.  In this study, the effects 
of pay variation policies are tested at the individual level using an experimental design.   
In addition to testing the relationship between payv riation policies and individual 
performance, expectancy theory as an explanatory framework is explored.  Allocation rules and 
incentive intensity are predicted to affect the motivational mechanisms described by expectancy 
theory, which in turn influence individual motivation and performance.   
Results of a real pay/real effort experiment provide evidence that allocation rules affect 
objective individual performance while changes in incentive intensity are not significant in 
predicting objective performance.  Objective performance is significantly higher in equity 
 
 
allocation rule conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions.  In addition, expectancy 
theory components are affected as predicted; these components are positively related to 
motivation, and motivation is positively related to b th subjective and objective individual 
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CHAPTER 1  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Human behaviors indicate that money matters to people.  Examples abound.  Around 50 
percent of Americans play the lottery each year (Kearn y, 2005, p. 2274), hoping for a large 
monetary windfall.  Enron executives deceived investors for money (Sims & Brinkman, 2003).  
Money is instrumental in fulfilling physiological needs through the purchase of goods and 
services; it is also viewed as a measuring stick for success.  Interestingly, pay is especially 
meaningful to people.  Devoe, Pfeffer, and Lee (2013) conducted an experiment on the 
importance of money, finding that the importance of m ney increased as pay increased for labor, 
but the importance did not differ as pay increased when payments were randomly determined.  In 
studying the performance effects of pay, Nyberg, Pieper, and Trevor (in press) reported that pay-
for-performance increased future employee performance.  The accumulated evidence provides a 
strong argument that money, and specifically pay, hs important implications for human attitudes 
and behaviors.  The way a firm chooses to allocate money through pay (i.e., the firm’s 
compensation policies and practices) is likely to have meaningful effects.  Understanding these 
effects represents an important area of the human resou ces management literature. 
It is surprising, then, how little is known about pay.  Findings are inconclusive and 
rigorous empirical tests are missing in many of the most important compensation areas (Risher, 
2012).  This lack has led to substantial ongoing debat  in the field of compensation.  For 
example, Gupta and Shaw reviewed the accumulation of research on pay, and stated “Financial 
Incentives are Effective!!” (1998, p. 26) while Kohn (1998) responded that paying for 
performance was “behaviorist dogma” (1998, p. 27).  This debate continues with Daniel Pink, 
from a well-known TEDTalk on financial incentives (Pink, 2009), arguing that pay is an 
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ineffective motivator and scholars writing rebuttals to his assertions (Gupta & Conroy, 2013; 
Ledford, Gerhart, & Fang, 2013).   
The nature of the relationship between pay variation and performance has also been at the 
center of an ongoing academic debate in the compensatio  literature. Pay variation is the extent 
of pay differences across employees and jobs in organizations, and is commonly measured as 
pay dispersion or pay range (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012).  
Scholars working in this area of research have proposed competing arguments to explain pay 
variation’s relationship with firm performance.  On the one hand, it has been suggested that pay 
must sufficiently vary based on performance across organizational members to encourage 
desired behaviors, indicating that greater variation has positive effects on firm performance 
(Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009).  On the other hand, it has been argued that 
high levels of pay variation lead to feelings of deprivation and other negative employee 
reactions, meaning minimal differentiation is superior for ensuring high performance outcomes 
(Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).   
Published evidence supports both views.  Some research indicates that pay compression 
has a positive influence on performance outcomes (Bloom, 1999; Ensley, Pearson, & 
Sardeshmukh, 2007) and other work reports pay dispersion is more desirable (Firth, Leung, & 
Rui, 2010; Heyman, 2005).  Thus, empirical evidence has not sufficiently provided an answer 
regarding the influence of pay variation on performance, reporting both negative (e.g., Martins, 
2008) and positive (e.g., Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008) relationships.  This unresolved debate has 
important implications because it leads to inconsistent practitioner guidance and disparate 
evidence for pay applications of theoretical frameworks. 
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A thorough review of the pay variation literature points to several existing assumptions 
that limit progress (Conroy, Gupta, Shaw, & Park, in press).  One issue is that pay variation has 
been confounded with concepts of equity and equality.  Specifically, equality and equity 
arguments have been applied to explain pay variation’s relationship with performance.  This 
confounding has occurred in various ways.  A common approach is to suggest that pay variation 
represents an equality to equity spectrum, such that low pay variation represents equality and 
high pay variation represents equity (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).  Initial theorizing about pay 
variation invoked equity (i.e., distributions of pay to employees based on individual contribution) 
and equality (i.e., distributions of pay to employees based on group membership) allocation rule 
arguments, hypothesizing differential effects of high and low pay variation using these 
arguments.  The allocation rule logic applied was that when equity allocation rules were in place 
(operationalized as high pay variation), individuals would be more individually focused than 
when equality allocation rules were in place (operation lized as low pay variation) (Pfeffer & 
Langton, 1988, 1993).  An implicit assumption that is made when applying this argument to pay 
variation is that pay variations are based on individual contributions (e.g., individual 
performance).  This assumption is flawed in that pay variations are certainly not always based on 
individual performance.  For example, Kepes et al. (2009) reported that some pay variation was 
politically-based.  
Another approach to confounding pay variation with equity and equality concepts is the 
treatment of pay variation as an indication of inequity, such that increasing the size of pay 
differentials is an inequitable practice.  In other words, this approach suggests that creating large 
differentials creates feelings of inequity among employees.  This is also problematic.  If pay 
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differences are based on performance, individuals are likely to view high pay variation as more 
equitable than low pay variation (Werner & Ones, 2000).   
Together, these examples illustrate that equity and equality should not be confounded 
with pay variation.  The confounding of equity and equality with pay variation is a serious 
problem (Trevor et al., 2012).  Disambiguating equity and equality from pay variation may allow 
for theoretical progress in explaining pay variation’s effects on individual and firm outcomes.  
This represents one of the purposes of this investigation.    
Another limitation of prior work is that cross-level issues have rarely been addressed in 
detail theoretically or empirically.  Specifically, the pay variation and firm performance 
relationship is tested most often from a single leve  perspective (Conroy et al., in press).  Defined 
as the pay differences across jobs and individuals, the construct itself is typically measured at the 
firm level (Gupta et al., 2012).  For example, researchers assess the pay of multiple jobs or 
individuals in an organization and combine these values into a firm level measure, such as the 
gini coefficient (Bloom, 1999), the coefficient of variation (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), or the 
range (Kepes et al., 2009).  Based on this construct definition and measurement approach, pay 
variation represents a firm level construct.   
The firm level pay variation construct is tested to assess its effects on other firm level 
constructs, with the ultimate dependent variable of interest being organizational performance 
(e.g., Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002).  But this firm level relationship is explained by applying 
individual level theories.  This represents a mismatch between theoretical and empirical 
specifications.  For example, equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and motivation theories (e.g., 
expectancy theory, Vroom, 1964; tournament theory, Lazear & Rosen, 1981) are used to explain 
the organizational implications of pay variation.  That is, it is proposed that pay variation 
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influences individual motivation and attitudes (e.g., Kepes et al., 2009).  These individual 
reactions are then assumed to be additive from the individual to the firm level to explain firm 
performance. The theorized causal relationship is pay variationindividual 
performanceorganizational performance, but the empirical test is often simply of the pay 
variationorganizational performance relationship.   
 Despite the use of individual level theory to explain this firm level relationship, there is 
little empirical work in the management literature addressing what is happening at the individual 
level in response to pay variations.  The economics literature has some work in this area.  For 
example, Harbring and colleagues asked participants to choose their level of “work intensity” or 
“effort” on a one to 100 scale in different pay spread conditions (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2011; 
Harbring & Luenser, 2008).  The researchers reported that effort levels chosen were higher, on 
average, when the spread was wide than when it was narrow (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2011; 
Harbring & Luenser, 2008).  Abeler, Kube, Altmann and Wibral (2010) reported that effort 
levels chosen on a one to ten scale were higher, on average, for individuals assigned to 
conditions where pay could vary within dyads than for individuals assigned to conditions where 
pay could not vary within dyads.   
This research is valuable as it addresses individual responses to pay variation issues; 
however, these studies have limitations.  The primary limitation is that these studies are not real 
effort studies.  The dependent variable is a choice f effort level variable rather than an actual 
effort or performance level.  There is not a true performance dependent variable.  Furthermore, 
these studies do not address many of theoretical mechanisms believed to explain the relationship 
between pay variation and performance (e.g., expectancy theory components).   
Since most work empirically addressing pay variation issues is at the firm level and pay 
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variation theories are at the individual level, it is necessary to begin work that tests more 
appropriate models.  Addressing the assumption that pay variation affects individual 
performance represents another purpose of this study.  Using a study design that creates a real 
performance situation, this investigation extends tests completed in economics.  The fundamental 
assumption related to individual level reactions, specifically performance, is explored.   
This analysis is focused on individual performance outcomes because this outcome is the 
primary individual-level explanation for positive effects of pay variation on firm outcomes.  That 
is, when pay variation is performance-based, there is an assumption that larger pay differences 
based on performance will increase individual motivation and this will increase performance.  
Most empirical studies skip the individual level altogether and those that do not tend to skip over 
motivation.  Thus, in addition to studying the basic effect of pay variation on individual 
performance, motivational mechanisms are explored in this study. 
A final limitation of prior research is that the methods used in most management research 
on pay variation have prevented causal inference despite the assumption that pay variation, as a 
representation of firm policies, is the independent variable and performance is the dependent 
variable.  Foundational articles in the pay variation literature were in organizational settings with 
non-experimental designs (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993).  This work provided external 
validity and indicated that there exists a pay variation and performance relationship in some 
form.  This approach, however, has not established t  validity of causal inferences.  Without the 
causal connection, theorizing and development are st ll d.  For example, arguments that pay 
variation causes individual performance outcomes are theoretical, but have not been supported 
by sufficient empirical evidence.  Considering the inconsistencies in the findings of this 
literature, it is important to establish the causal foundations of pay variation’s influence.  
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Therefore, the third purpose of this study is to address the assumption that there is a causal 
relationship between pay variation and individual performance. 
In sum, this study is focused on assumptions that have gone unaddressed and untested in 
prior investigations of pay variation by (a) differentiating the pay policies that contribute to pay 
variation, (b) making predictions about individual motivation and performance outcomes of pay 
variation, and (c) conducting an experimental test of these predictions.  A broad range of 
motivation theories are discussed, including expectancy theory (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 
1964), tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), and 
relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976), to fully understand construct definitions and prior 
research; expectancy theory is chosen as the organizing framework to understand individual 
motivational responses to varied pay conditions.  Due to the breadth of the pay variation 
definition, boundary conditions are established.  Only pay variations related to performance are 
considered. 
Hypotheses are tested in a laboratory setting with an experimental design to allow for 
causal inferences.  This approach has a number of important benefits.  Using random assignment 
and controlled manipulations strengthens internal validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
Non-experimental, correlational research designs are more common to pay variation research, 
but these designs are limited because they lack these two critical design characteristics.  The 
experimental research design makes it possible to look at objective performance outcomes of pay 
variation-related strategies.  In field research, it is often difficult to assess employee performance 
levels (since performance appraisals are driven at leas partially by non-performance factors, 
Cleveland & Murphy, 1992).  In the laboratory, objective performance criteria can be measured 
to determine performance levels.  A general lack of real pay/real effort studies of compensation 
8 
policies makes this endeavor especially worthwhile.  Addressing these assumptions can help 
move the pay variation literature forward, beyond simple tests of positive or negative 
relationships, to a more nuanced approach.  Pay variation has been inconsistently tied to concepts 
of equity and equality.  By exploring this issue, I suggest pay variation should not be viewed as 
an equity/equality proxy.  In this study, allocation rules, where the equity and equality distinction 
is appropriate, are separated from incentive intensity (the relative size of pay-for-performance as 
compared to base pay, Bamberger & Levi, 2009), the ext nt to which pay can vary depending on 
performance.  This distinction allows for more nuanced theorizing regarding the theoretical 
mechanisms that explain how pay variation and allocti n rules influence individual motivation 
and performance.  Establishing the causal relationship between these variables provides evidence 
that can strengthen arguments applying individual level theory to explain pay variation effects.  
Expectancy theory has recently gained popularity in the pay variation literature (e.g., Downes & 
Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012).  Testing its theoretical mechanisms provides evidence of the 
validity of the expectancy theory application to pay v riation. 
From a practical standpoint, better understanding indiv dual motivation and performance 
is valuable for managers.  This study focuses mainly o  entry-level, low skill tasks where 
performance is identifiable (i.e., can be measured), so the greatest benefit of this research is for 
organizations that have a workforce engaged in this type of work.  Managers are often 
encouraged to make large distinctions among individual employees within workgroups.  This 
study can provide further information that may be helpful when making these allocation 
decisions for primarily entry-level, low skill employee groups.  Are large distinctions for 
individual employees within groups preferable or are small distinctions better?  Are large 
between group distinctions motivational?  For managers concerned with performance 
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implications of pay approaches, this study provides evidence regarding the effects of pay policies 
for entry-level jobs.  Organizational decision makers can also benefit from findings that clarify 
the influence of pay policies on employee outcomes.  While contextual variables that are not 
included in this study are also important for consideration (see for example, Gupta & Conroy, 
2013), this study sheds light on two policies that are within the control of firm management. 
In sum, this research investigates pay variation-related policies, allows for causal 
inference in a real pay/real effort study, and explores critical assumptions in the pay variation 
literature.  All of these issues are important aspects of this complex research area.  The variables 
under investigation are HR practices over which managers have some control.  This study can 
benefit both the academic literature and managerial p actice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Overview 
 The first section of this chapter is devoted to reviewing the pay variation literature, 
including a definition of the pay variation construct and a description of the theories applied to 
explain the pay variation and performance relationship.  Empirical findings are reviewed and 
limitations of prior work are noted.  Following this review, a relationship between pay variation-
related policies and individual performance is hypothesized.  Expectancy theory is then applied 
to develop a model that predicts the individual motivational mechanisms that explain the 
performance outcomes of pay variation-related policies.   
Construct Definition 
Pay variation is the extent of differentiation in pay made within an organization.  This 
definition is certainly broad.  This breadth can prevent precision in theorizing around the sources 
and effects of pay variation.  Recent work has suggested distinctions made about the pay 
variation construct can improve theorizing (Gupta et l., 2012).  When these distinctions are 
made, the sources of pay variation become clearer.  The effects of pay variation can then be 
theorized with sources and types in mind.  Here, th construct distinctions suggested by Gupta et 
al. (2012) are discussed. 
 A review of prior work on pay variation points to three main types of pay variation that 
are studied in the literature.  The types are horizontal, vertical and overall (Gupta et al., 2012).  
Before addressing these types, it is important to no e what is meant by the term pay.  Here, pay is 
defined as monetary compensation for work.  Pay comes in many forms.  Common forms are 
base pay (the wage paid for the job), pay raises (increases in base pay provided over time) and 
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bonuses (one time payments).  An individual’s annual salary at any given moment includes base 
pay and the accumulation of wage adjustments (if pay reductions are assumed not to occur, these 
adjustments can be viewed as pay raises).  These annual salary amounts are common forms of 
pay included in pay variation measures.  For example, in computing pay variation measures, 
researchers focused on sports teams have used the annual salaries of athletes (Depken, 2000; Gee 
& Wen-Jhan, 2008) and researchers focused on education have used the annual salaries of 
teachers (Heutel, 2009; Trevor & Wazeter, 2006).  Understanding the forms of pay is helpful in 
thinking about the types of variation. 
Horizontal Pay Variation 
 Horizontal pay variation is variation in pay across individuals within a job (Gupta et al., 
2012; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005).  Aligning this definit on with empirical measures, this type of 
pay variation can be assessed by collecting a pay value (e.g., salary, bonus) for every employee 
within a job or job category, then creating a measure of the disparity.  As noted, an employee’s 
annual salary can be viewed as inclusive of two main components, base pay and the 
accumulation of pay raises (base + raises). The job is constant.  So, base pay is constant since it 
is the wage paid for the job.  This means that the diff rences in pay are the differences in wage 
adjustments.   
It is complicated to determine the precise source of these differences.  Because the job is 
constant, we can assert that the differences in pay are driven mainly by differences in 
individuals.  These differences include seniority, performance, knowledge, skill, and political 
connections.  They could also include factors considered at hire, such as negotiation skills and 
gender.  Despite its complexity, understanding the source of the variation is important to 
predicting its effects.  For example, Kepes et al. (2009) isolated performance sources and 
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political sources of horizontal pay variation and reported that pay variations with performance 
sources were positively related to workforce performance; pay variations with political sources 
were negatively related to workforce performance.  In this example, performance and politics 
were the sources of the pay differences among employees in the job.  Pay variation was the 
extent that performance and politics were rewarded.  That is, pay variation is associated with the 
size of pay differences associated with a source of pay (i.e. reward intensity). 
Vertical Pay Variation 
Vertical pay variation is variation in pay across jobs.  Its optimal operationalization 
would be to collect a value for each job in the organization.  This value could be the lower limit 
of each job level or the midpoint for a job level.  In market pricing systems, it could be the value 
associated with each market priced job (Milkovich, Newman, & Gerhart, 2014).  It could also be 
estimated using the average, median or mode value associ ted with each job.  This array of 
values can then be used to create a disparity measure.  Here, the pay values are a result of the 
difference in the value associated with each job for the organization.   
Vertical pay variation represents the firm’s philosophy on the values of various jobs.  For 
example, in a job evaluation system, each job is assigned points based on its assessment 
compared to compensable factors (Milkovich et al., 2014).  These compensable factors are 
chosen by organizational leadership to represent wha is important to the firm.  Because these 
values are associated with jobs rather than people, diff rences in the values can be explained by 
differences in the job, such as differences in the labor market for the job (e.g., market pricing 
structures) or differences in job evaluations (e.g., job evaluation systems).  Brown, Sturman, and 
Simmering (2003) studied the issue of vertical pay v riation in hospitals by creating a measure of 
pay dispersion (using the gini coefficient) across nine job categories.  In the vertical context, pay 
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variation does not represent an intensity of reward fo  individual behaviors as directly as it does 
in horizontal pay variations.  Rather, as in the case of the Brown et al. (2003) study, it is 
representative of the difference in pay structures, specifically elitist (where there is great 
dispersion among jobs) versus egalitarian (where there is little difference among jobs).   
Overall Pay Variation 
The last type of pay variation is overall pay variation.  This variation includes both 
vertical and horizontal variation.  Overall pay variation involves combining both job differences 
and individual differences.  It is inclusive of the sources of pay for individuals and the sources of 
pay for jobs.  This means it is representative of both intensity of individual reward systems and 
elitist/egalitarian pay structures.  Because of the variety of factors that can explain the 
differences in pay, teasing out the explanations for overall pay variation is difficult.  Still, this 
type of variation has been at the center of much pay variation research (Belfield & Marsden, 
2003; Clark, Kristensen, & Westergard-Nielsen, 2009; Heyman, 2005; Tsou & Liu, 2005).  
Unfortunately, findings are difficult to interpret because the reasons for the variation are rarely 
specified in the empirical models.   
Summary 
Based on the above review of the pay variation construct, it is clear that research in this 
area has two primary construct definition issues that must be clarified early in the research 
process.  One is that the type of pay variation must be specified.  The second is that the source 
(also called the “basis” of pay, Gupta et al., 2012) of the variation must be clear.  In this study, I 
focus on performance-based horizontal pay variation.  My focus on performance sources of pay 
differences allows me to draw on the pay-for-performance literature and to contribute to the 
underlying arguments associated with the motivationl effects of pay variation.  Horizontal pay 
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variation holds the job constant.  By holding the job constant, I can ensure a true performance-
basis for pay differences (i.e., the source of pay variation is performance). 
Theories of Pay Variation and Performance 
 Pay variation has attracted the interest of many disciplines, including economics, 
management, and finance.  As such, theoretical explanations for pay variation’s influence on 
performance are diverse.  Theories that have regularly appeared in the literature include equity, 
relative deprivation, agency, and tournament theories.  More recently, expectancy theory has 
received attention.  While the specific definition f performance as an outcome varies in 
empirical studies, most of the work is primarily focused on the organizational or workforce 
performance outcomes of pay variation.  At the same ti , all of the theories are focused on 
individual responses as an outcome of pay variation; hese responses are assumed to lead to 
higher level organizational and workforce performance outcomes. Here, I outline the 
fundamental tenets of each of these theories. 
Equity Theory 
Equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) is commonly applied in the management literature to 
explain the effects of pay variation on performance (e.g., Ang, Hauser, & Lauterbach, 1998; 
Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2003; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Cowherd & Levine, 1992).  This 
theory suggests that individuals compare their own perceived input/outcome ratios to the 
perceived input/outcome ratios of comparison others (Adams, 1963, 1965).  Inputs refer to 
anything a person is perceived to contribute to the organization, e.g., effort, education.  
Outcomes refer to anything perceived to be received by the person from the organization, e.g., 
pay, promotion.  Inputs and outcomes are perceptions of the focal person.  That is, equity theory 
is based on each individual’s view of inputs and outc mes of himself/herself and of others 
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viewed as relevant (i.e., referent others).  To the ext nt ratios of inputs/outcomes between oneself 
and relevant others are not equal, a person is expected to experience inequity.  Inequities lead 
individuals to experience tension that must be reliev d.  The way this tension is relieved depends 
on the type of inequity experienced. 
Positive inequity (overpayment) is experienced when one feels he or she contributes less 
than others for the same or greater outcomes or cont ibutes the same as others for greater 
outcomes.  An overpayment behavioral response is to increase one’s own contributions (i.e., 
inputs) to balance the ratio.  Interestingly, in a pay context, increasing one’s inputs may lead to 
increased future pay, making a continued imbalance i  the ratio likely.  Research indicates that 
feelings of overpayment are rare in western society (Levine, 1993; Pinder, 1998).  Thus, issues 
of overpayment receive much less attention than issues of underpayment.  Negative inequity 
(underpayment) is experienced when one feels he or she contributes more than others for the 
same or lower outcomes or contributes the same as others for lower outcomes.  Research 
indicates that underpayment leads to negative reactions, such as reducing performance (i.e., 
lowering contributions, Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Levine, 1993) or leaving the situation 
(Adams, 1963, 1965).  In sum, equity theory is an individual-level theory that considers the 
inputs and the outcomes of oneself and others, uses social comparisons as a fundamental 
building block, and suggests negative inequity can le d to problematic individual responses in 
organizations. 
Since pay variation represents a difference in outcomes among employees, it has been 
proposed that greater pay variation represents greater p y inequity (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).  
This “pay variation = pay inequity” is a fundamental assumption of many equity theory 
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applications that may not be accurate, a point addressed in the limitations section.  Here, the 
logic, if this assumption is accepted, is briefly reviewed.  
Pay variation represents greater variation in outcomes.  When focusing on horizontal 
variations, the job is the same, leading to the assumption that inputs are equal.  As such, 
employees are theorized to respond to negative inequ ti s created by pay variation by quitting or 
reducing effort, both of which are expected to negatively influence performance outcomes for 
firms.  Since overpayment beliefs are uncommon, all but those at the top of the distribution are 
believed to experience negative inequities.  The prediction follows that greater variation 
increases the inequity tension experienced for most employees in a job, and that this negatively 
affects individual performance, and subsequent firmperformance. 
Relative Deprivation Theory 
According to relative deprivation theory, feelings of deprivation are experiences of 
resentment about not having something (Crosby, 1976).  Certain conditions create feelings of 
deprivation, and deprivation is entirely relative (i. ., social comparison-based).  Seeing others 
with something one desires and to which one feels entitled leads to deprivation.  Deprivation, as 
a negative feeling of resentment, can lead to negative behavioral reactions.  This is especially 
likely when the lack of something is assumed to be utside of one’s control.  These negative 
responses could include reducing effort or retaliating against the organization. 
Applications of relative deprivation theory to pay variation research are similar to 
applications of equity theory.  Differences in pay variation are assumed to represent differences 
in receipt of a desirable resource (i.e., pay/money).  When variations are greater, these 
differences are perceived to be greater, increasing the deprivation experienced by those who are 
not at the top of the distribution.  As such, all but those at the top of the distribution are expected 
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to experience deprivation.  This deprivation is expected to be increasingly experienced as the 
variation increases.  Thus, high pay variation should have negative effects on most individual 
employees, effort should be reduced and/or counterproductive behaviors increased, and 
organizational performance should suffer.  As with equity theory, there are problematic 
assumptions in this application; these assumptions are addressed in the limitations section. 
Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) is one of the most prevalent economics 
theories applied to explain the performance effects of pay variation.  Unlike equity and relative 
deprivation theories, tournament theory was specifically formulated with the intent of explaining 
vertical pay variations and responses to vertical pay variations.  According to this theory, pay 
differences across levels are more motivating to those at lower levels when there are large pay 
gaps between jobs than when the pay gaps are small (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).   
This theory suggests that greater pay differentials between jobs create competition to be 
the best relative performer within a job so that one can be promoted to the higher paying job.  As 
a result of this competition and the large prize for 'winning' (i.e., getting the promotion), 
individuals are especially motivated to be the best p rformer in the group of competitors.  This 
increased motivation, then, is proposed to explain why pay variation should be positively related 
to firm performance.  Since this theory is specified for vertical variations, which are between-job 
variations, tournament theory is not an ideal theory f  explaining horizontal variations (i.e., 
within-job variations). 
Agency Theory 
According to agency theory, employees are agents engaged in contracts with 
organizations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  As agents, employees have their own goals and 
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agendas.  Similarly, organizations are entities with goals and agendas.  In order to ensure 
employees contribute to the organization’s goals, the employee’s goals must be aligned with 
those of the organization.  This can be done through monitoring, in which an employee is 
watched and must behave in a manner consistent with the organization’s expectations.  It can 
also be done through incentives, by aligning employee incentives with the organization’s 
interests.  Introducing these incentives aligns the employee’s and the organization’s goals.  The 
employee desires the pay associated with the incentive and behaves in ways to access the 
monetary payout associated with the incentive.  Assuming incentives are aligned with the 
organizations goals, the use of incentives should increase organization-focused behaviors (e.g., 
high performance) among employees. 
Applying agency theory to pay variation, increasing pay variation is assumed to represent 
increasing incentives (e.g., Lee et al., 2008).  Through this increased use of incentives, the firm is 
aligning employee interests with firm interests.  This results in higher employee motivation and 
performance, which increases subsequent firm performance.  Limitations and assumptions are 
also present in applications and tests of agency theory.  These are addressed later. 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory has been applied to pay research for many years (e.g., Lawler, 1973).  
In the area of pay variation, it has received increasing attention recently (e.g., Gupta et al., 2012; 
Kepes et al., 2009).  Expectancy theory is based on three fundamental perceptions that 
individuals have regarding the exertion of effort (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).  These 
three perceptions are combined to determine motivation l force.  Increasing employee 
motivational force toward performing well should lead to increased individual performance. 
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The first factor in expectancy theory proposed to influence motivation is effort to 
performance expectancy or EP expectancy (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).  
Essentially, EP expectancies are the answer to the individual's que tion, "if I exert effort, will I 
perform?"  That is, EP expectancies are the individual's perceptions of the probability that 
effort leads to performance.  Lawler (1973) identified multiple factors which influence EP 
expectancies, including the actual situation, past experiences, and self-esteem.   
The second component in the expectancy motivation equation is performance to outcome 
expectancy, i.e., PO expectancy (Lawler, 1973; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).  PO 
expectancies, also known as instrumentalities, answer the question, “if I perform, will it lead to 
outcomes?”  Because there are multiple outcomes of which an individual may concern himself or 
herself, people can have several PO expectancies.  Pay is the primary outcome for 
consideration in pay research.  Lawler (1973) proposed that PO expectancies were influenced 
by multiple factors, including the actual PO relationship (i.e., the objective situation), past 
experience, and communication from others.  Much of t e research on pay focuses on the PO 
link because of all the links, it is likely to be most controllable for the organization (“most easily 
and directly influenced by organizations,” Lawler, 1973, pp. 57-58).  That is, an organization 
may develop policies to address the extent that outcomes are tied to performance and these 
policies are likely to directly affect PO expectancies.   
Valence refers to the value an individual places on the outcome of performance (Porter & 
Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).  As noted earlier, a number of outcomes may be considered by an 
individual.  In addition to pay, individuals may consider outcomes such as peer relationships, 
respect and recognition from one’s supervisor, and feelings of achievement.  While there are 
multiple outcomes likely to be considered for any specific action, individuals can cognitively 
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manage only a limited number of outcomes and are likely to satisfice in making effort decisions 
(Lawler, 1973). 
Each of the factors discussed (EP expectancies, PO expectancies, and outcome 
valences) come together to determine motivational force.  The specific formulation of this 
relationship is: Motivation Force (MF) = EP * ∑ (PO * Valence of Outcome).  The sum 
sign (∑) indicates that there are multiple outcomes for which PO expectancies and outcome 
valences are assessed.  All of the values associated with outcomes are added together.  The 
multiplication signs indicate that the theory is multiplicative (Nagengast, Marsh, Scalas, Xu, 
Hau, & Trautwein, 2011; Vroom, 1964).  That is, if either EP or ∑(PO*valence) equal 0 
(e.g., effort is not believed to influence performance, performance will not lead to valued 
outcomes), then there is no motivational force and motivated effort will not occur.   
It is important to note that expectancy theory is a choice-based theory.  That is, it 
suggests individuals may have many different equations to determine which level of effort is 
optimal.  So in a given performance situation, the individual must choose whether or not to exert 
effort toward the task, and if effort is exerted, how much will be exerted.  In a task performance 
situation, the individual’s level of motivation is the effort level that is chosen. 
Applications of expectancy theory to explain pay variation have focused mainly on PO 
expectancies and valences (Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes t al., 2009).  In pay variation contexts, 
PO expectancies can be interpreted as PPay expectancies, which are expected to be 
strongest when pay is performance-based.  The valences associated with pay in these 
performance-based pay environments should be higher w n there is greater pay variation 
because the potential rewards for high performance re of greater value compared to the 
outcomes of poor performance, assuming pay is valued.  Specifically, pay variation based on 
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performance is viewed as a measure of the intensity a sociated with the incentive system.  As a 
result, performance-based pay variations are theoriz d to be positively related to individual 
motivation and performance, which influences firm performance.  
Empirical Findings of the Pay Variation and Performance Relationship 
One set of theories suggests a negative effect of pay variation on satisfaction (i.e., equity, 
relative deprivation) and another set suggests a positive effect of pay variation on motivation 
(i.e., tournament, agency, and expectancy).  Of course, I propose that it is more complicated than 
this (e.g., negative effects would depend on how people feel about pay differences), but here I 
discuss the typical treatment of these theoretical arguments in prior research. 
Empirical research has dealt with this theoretical tension by describing the theories as 
competing arguments to explain the effects of pay variation (e.g., San & Jane, 2008).  These 
competing arguments are then tested by assessing the pay variation and organizational 
performance relationship with authors reporting which effect is stronger based on the results 
(e.g., “Our empirical results are more in line with the ‘fairness, morale, and cohesiveness’ 
models than the ‘tournament’ models,”  San & Jane, 2008, p. 886).  I review the published 
findings supporting each perspective, particularly those with a focus on horizontal pay variation. 
Negative relationships have been reported in a variety of samples, including professional 
athletes (Bloom, 1999; Depken, 2000), top management teams (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake & 
Sanders, 2010), and faculty members (Pfeffer & Langto , 1993).  Findings of a positive 
relationship have also been reported in a variety of samples, including professional athletes 
(Becker & Huselid, 1992), truck drivers (Kepes et al., 2009), and students (Harbring & Luenser, 
2008).  Methodological differences may illuminate th se disparate results. 
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Negative relationships are typically found when the pay variation of interest is not 
performance-based or legitimate (Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012).  For example, 
Kepes et al. (2009) reported pay variation was negatively related to performance when it was 
based on politics.  Other studies have controlled for performance-based pay, leaving only non-
performance-based pay variation as the independent variable (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; e.g., 
Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).   
When methods ensure performance as the source of pay differences (e.g, sports samples 
where individual performance is clearly measured or studies where organizations report the 
influence of both political and performance factors in determining pay), positive relationships are 
often reported.  For example, the Kepes et al. (2009) study reported a positive relationship with 
firm performance for performance-based pay variation.  Trevor et al. (2012) reported that pay 
variations explained by individual input were positively related to team performance in the 
National Hockey League.  Other sports samples where individual performance is the clear 
determinant of rewards have also supported a positive relationship.  Specifically, race car drivers 
(Becker & Huselid, 1992), professional tennis players (Gilsdorf & Sukhatme, 2008), and 
marathon runners (Frick & Prinz, 2007) have all been found to increase performance as prize 
spreads increase. 
 A Critique of Prior Research 
A number of limitations are apparent from the preceding review.  This study aims to 
address many of these limitations, which are outlined below. 
Pay Basis 
Theoretical frameworks all point to the critical roe that the performance source or basis 
for pay variation plays in a positive relationship between pay variation and firm performance.  
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For pay to be motivating, expectancy theory proposes PO expectancy links must be high, 
which is essentially representative of the pay and performance link.  Similarly, agency theory 
indicates tying pay to performance increases alignment of employee behaviors with firm 
performance goals.  Tournament theory suggests promoti n of the highest performer to the next 
level leads to higher individual performance.  Equity theory indicates that inputs must be 
balanced with outcomes.  Performance represents an input viewed as one of the most legitimate 
in a work context (Werner & Ones, 2000).  Pay represents an outcome.  Alignment of pay with 
performance should be tied to equity perceptions.  Relative deprivation theory proposes that 
control over pay differences may alleviate feelings of negative deprivation (Crosby, 1976).  
From this perspective, performance-based pay may not create feelings of deprivation to the 
extent that an employee is able to perform the job (i.e., he or she has control over making 
additional money).  
Despite the clear importance of the basis for pay variation, it has not been viewed as a 
central issue in pay variation research until recently.  Empirically, many of the early models of 
pay variation did not ensure that performance-based pay variation was central to the analysis.  
Rather, it was implicitly assumed that pay variation was performance-based.  In reality, pay is 
not always performance-based.  For example, Kepes et al. (2009) reported that some pay 
variation was based on politics in a sample of truck drivers.  Research on the determinants of 
wages indicates that pay is partially driven by worker productivity, but not fully (Bishop, 1987). 
Part of the issue may be that it is difficult to ensure pay variation measures are 
performance-based.  Even performance appraisals are not fully performance-based (Cleveland & 
Murphy, 1992).  Research that makes explicit the source of pay variation both theoretically and 
empirically is important as work on pay variation moves forward. 
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Incentive Intensity versus Pay Allocation  
 In trying to understand pay variation’s effects, a variety of pay constructs have been 
viewed as related and sometimes as equivalent to pay variation.  Consider the arguments made 
above in various theoretical applications.  Terminology for expectancy, agency, and tournament 
theory focuses on incentive intensity and pay-for-performance.  Terminology for equity and 
relative deprivation theory tends to focus on equity and inequity.  Pay variation tests are viewed 
as tests of equity and equality allocation approaches and/or as tests of incentive intensity.  For 
example, one approach taken by researchers has been to propose competing arguments for a pay 
variation and performance relationship (e.g., San & Jane, 2008).  Incentive intensity arguments 
based on theories such as tournament or agency theory are applied to explain a positive 
relationship and allocation rule arguments based on theories such as equity or relative 
deprivation are applied to explain a negative relationship. 
 The application of these terms is related to the mechanisms through which individuals are 
believed to respond to pay variation, i.e., fairness/ quity and motivation.  The fairness view 
based on relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976) and equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) has focused 
on terms such as equity or inequity, equality or inequality (e.g., Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).  
As noted, the theoretical logic is that employees interpret large gaps in pay compared to others as 
inequitable, which has negative performance consequences.  
The motivation view based on agency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), expectancy (Porter & 
Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) and tournament (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) theories describes pay 
variation as pay-for-performance and incentive use (e.g., Franck & Nuesch, 2011).  The take-
away is that higher pay variation is representative of greater pay-for-performance or greater 
25 
incentive use, and this leads to higher motivation and subsequent performance for individual 
employees.   
These two views essentially have their own language to define what pay variation 
represents; this leads to confusion.  Are pay variation, equity, equality, inequity, inequality, pay-
for-performance, and incentive intensity all addressing the same basic construct?  Or are there 
important differences between the constructs?  The latt r seems more likely, as clarified below. 
 Pay-for-Performance and Incentive Intensity. Pay-for-performance is “pay that varies 
with some measure of individual or organizational performance…” (Milkovich et al., 2014, p. 
686) while incentive intensity can be defined as “the overall magnitude of the incentive as a 
proportion of total pay” (Bamberger & Levi, 2009, p. 302; Zenger & Marshall, 2000).  At first 
glance, it might appear that pay variation is an accurate representation of incentive intensity for 
performance.  In reality, it is not so simple. One issue is that pay variation may or may not be 
performance-based (Kepes et al., 2009) as noted above. 
 Aside from the performance-basis issue, an additional issue is that pay variation is an 
aggregate measure, a snapshot of the pay distribution or range in an organization at a moment in 
time.  Data on specific pay strategies, such as the incentive policy of the firm, may be difficult to 
obtain; data on the range or dispersion of pay, in some cases, is available publicly (e.g., 
professional sports, academic salaries).  These samples have been the predominant samples of 
management research in this area.  The pay variation measures developed from these samples are 
typically based on individual salaries of each membr of the organization.  Rather than 
measuring the actual pay policy of the firm, the range or dispersion in values is assumed to 
represent the incentive intensity of the firm.  Thus, a measure of pay variation is a proxy for 
incentive intensity.  A problem arises because this proxy includes more than simply incentive 
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intensity.  For example, if the firm has high incentive intensity for employees in a job (i.e., there 
is a large amount of money that can be awarded for high performance), this will be well-
represented by a pay variation measure only if there is heterogeneity in the performance 
criterion.  If performance is homogeneous, there will be little variability in a performance-based 
pay variation measure.  In sum, the level of variation is created by both the pay policies that are 
implemented in a firm as well as the heterogeneity of employees and groups on reward criteria.   
 The arguments made using pay-for-performance and incentives to describe the 
relationship between pay variation and performance are concerned mainly with individual 
motivation.  Since pay variation acts as a measure of incentive intensity, a stronger test of these 
arguments would be to ensure a performance basis of pay and to isolate the incentive intensity 
that is driving employee motivation from heterogeneity of performance.  
Equity and Equality.  Foundational management articles addressing pay variation were 
largely rooted in equity and equality allocation arguments.  Authors have argued that pay 
variation represents an equity allocation approach while pay compression (i.e., low pay 
variation) represents an equality allocation approach (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993).  
Findings about the pay variation and performance relationship are then used to draw inferences 
about equity versus equality allocation approaches to pay distribution (e.g., Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer 
& Langton, 1993).  Table 1 lists the use of the (in)equity and (in)equality terminology in some of 
the most influential articles in the pay variation literature.  In looking across the definitions, a 
number of flaws are notable. 
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Table 1 
Prior Uses of Equality and Equity Terminology 
Article Equity/Equality Reference  
Pfeffer & 
Langton (1988) 
Equality and dispersion distinction treated as ends of a continuum (p. 




“Pay compression or even pay equality is desirable to promote 
harmonious social relations” (p. 382); Salary disper ion is described 
as a measure of inequality (p. 391) 
 
Bloom, (1999) High dispersion treated as unequal allocation, which is treated as the 
same as inequity (p. 26, p. 38) 
 
Bloom & Michel, 
(2002) 
 
Dispersion treated as synonymous with inequality (p. 33) 
Shaw, Gupta, & 
Delery, (2002) 
 
Salary dispersion is described as a measure of inequality (p. 500) 
Trevor, Reilly, & 
Gerhart, (2012) 
Argue that inequality and inequity are often confounded in prior work 
(p. 585) 
 
One flaw occurs when pay variation is treated as a proxy for an equity allocation 
approach (i.e., the distribution of rewards based on individual contributions).  In reality, there are 
different issues that should be considered when theorizing around allocation approaches versus 
pay variations.  Equating the two involves the assumption that high pay variation is 
representative of equity allocations.  However, payv riation in organizations may not be the 
result of legitimate sources (Downes & Choi, 2013; Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2009).  
Perceptions of equity tend to be higher when pay differences are the result of performance 
differences (Werner & Ones, 2000) versus other sources.  In order for high pay variations to be 
symbolic of equity allocation approaches, it is necessary that the distributions are based on 
performance or other bases that are viewed by employees as legitimate (Downes & Choi, 2013).  
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In fact, Leventhal’s (1976) conceptual definition of equity allocation rules defined them as 
distributions within a group based on individual contributions.  If pay variation is high, pay 
differences may be related to individual contributions, but they may not.  Thus, the suggestion 
that high pay variation is a proxy for an equity allocation rule is tenuous. 
Another flaw with suggesting equity is the same as high pay variation and equality is the 
same as low pay variation is that allocation rules may vary from work group to work group.  So, 
while pay variation is largely conceptualized as an organizational phenomenon, allocation rules 
are not necessarily conceptualized at this level.  Wang and He suggested this distinction in their 
work developing a team pay model: 
“Note that most studies on pay compression and pay differentiation are conducted at the 
firm level, whereas team-based versus individual-based compensation plans are discussed 
at the team level. For nondedicated cross-functional team members, an equal team 
compensation plan could result in pay differentiation at the firm level...” (2008, p. 763) 
 
An equity allocation approach where high performers are rewarded differentially than low 
performers may be the preferred approach by some managers while others may be more prone to 
equality allocations.  Firms may have large pay differentials across the organization, despite 
equal allocations by some managers.  In fact, a firm with high incentive intensity based on group 
performance may have high pay variation despite an quality allocation rule approach.  It seems 
unreasonable to assume pay variation is a fair repres ntation of the equity/equality distinction.   
Further complicating the application of equity and equality arguments to pay variation 
research is that some authors have treated equity and equality as synonymous (rather than a 
antonymous as described above) such that high pay variations are viewed as inequality, and this 
is assumed to be inequitable (e.g., Bloom, 1999, noted by Trevor et al., 2012).  Specifically, pay 
variation represents varied pay outcomes among employees, leading to the proposition that 
greater pay variation represents both greater pay inequality and inequity (Pfeffer & Langton, 
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1993).  These pay variation arguments assume that different outcomes (different pay levels) 
create inequity, but they ignore the role of inputs (Gupta et al., 2012).  Inputs are fundamental in 
equity considerations (Adams, 1963, 1965).  If pay differences are performance-based, the inputs 
are different when high pay variation exists.  Greater variation indicates larger pay differences 
based on inputs, something that equity theory implies would lead to feelings of equity, not 
inequity.  In fact, research suggests inequity is perceived when wages are the same but 
performance varies (Werner & Ones, 2000).  An assumption that pay variation is representative 
of both inequity and inequality is inaccurate when pay is performance-based. 
In sum, at least two faulty assumptions of equating equity and equality arguments to pay 
variation exist, 1) that equity and equality are two ends of the pay variation spectrum, and 2) that 
pay variation is equivalent to both inequity and inequality.  Application of these assumptions 
may simplify the study of firm pay policies by linki g pay variation to equity/equality allocation 
theoretical arguments.  However, considering the issue  raised here, the inconsistent findings of 
this research stream, and the importance of construct clarity to the management discipline, it is 
important to explore these issues, and empirically separate the constructs. 
Methodological Approach 
 Methodologies used in the bulk of pay variation research have approached both pay 
variation and performance as firm level constructs.  On the one hand, this provides ease in study 
design and analysis as the variables are at the samlevel of analysis; these studies are also field 
studies, allowing for stronger external validity.  On the other hand, this approach misaligns 
theoretical applications and empirical models. 
 All five of the theories described suggest individual level responses can explain the 
effects of pay variation on firm performance; yet, individual level responses have received 
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limited attention.  These theories suggest that the causal chain is: pay variation related policies 
(measured as pay variation)   individual motivation and performance (unmeasured)  
organizational performance (measured as workforce poductivity or firm financial performance).  
There is a need to explore the assumption that these policies influence individual performance.  
The theoretical mechanisms described by motivation theories, such as valences and PO 
expectancies, have not been tested in response to pay variations.  In order to understand if and 
how these policies influence individuals, these mechanisms also require attention. 
It should be noted that in the economics literature, experimental design has been more 
common than in the management literature.  The findings of this work are interesting and suggest 
value in this approach.  For example, Abeler et al. (2010) reported that when wages were 
allowed to vary, students intended to exert greater effo t (representing high motivation).  
Harbring and Luenser (2008) found that student effort intentions were higher for high rather than 
low prize spreads.  Unfortunately, the methods used in these studies are limited.  One issue is 
that effort allocation is an intention rather than actual effort, i.e., selected performance when 
performance is not actually required or selected effort when effort is not actually required.  This 
does not fully address the individual performance response of interest.  This work also tends to 
take a tournament theory focus (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; Harbring & Luenser, 2008), 
where individuals compete with others to win the prize, rather than creating a group environment 
where there are some common goals among individuals.    
Summary and Implications 
This study is designed to deal with the limitations de cribed as a way of moving the pay 
variation literature forward.  As noted earlier, I make explicit two main construct boundaries in 
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my investigation, 1) a focus on horizontal pay variation only and 2) a focus on performance-
based pay variation only.  The rest of this investigation follows with these constraints in place.  
The preceding discussion also indicates two compensation policies especially relevant to 
the study of pay variation and its consequences, 1) equity and equality allocations, and 2) 
incentive intensity.  Thus, in this study, I define and operationalize these constructs separately, 
which allows for separate theorizing for each.   
I define equity and equality within the allocation rule framework (Leventhal, 1976).  
Allocation rules guide the distribution of rewards in a group; equity and equality rules are 
predominant types of allocation rules (Leventhal, 1976).  An equity allocation rule exists when 
pay is distributed within a group based on individual contributions to the group; an equality 
allocation rule exists when pay is distributed within a group equally. 
Incentive intensity is the variable proportion of pay.  Specifically, I conceptualize this in 
terms of the pay-for-performance range of pay for engaging in work.  Larger ranges represent 
greater incentive intensity since there is an increased difference between what is paid for low or 
average performance and what is paid for high performance.  A pay range involves two main 
considerations.  Pay floors are the amounts that will be paid regardless of performance (Brown & 
Huber, 1992).  That is, floors are determined by the value of the job to the organization, and are 
independent of performance.  As pay for the job, differences in floors are likely to be tied to 
economic concerns such as labor supply and demand.  Floors can be low where one makes very 
little for performing poorly or high where even low performance results in a high level of 
compensation.  Pay ceilings are an aspirational amount.  That is, a pay ceiling is the amount that 
is possible, that could be paid, if performance is high.  Pay ceilings set a cap on what is possible.  
Together, the pay floor and the pay ceiling create the pay range (Kepes et al., 2009), or the range 
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of possible pay outcomes depending on performance.  This pay range represents incentive 
intensity, or the proportion of pay that is variable. 
In sum, an allocation rule can be viewed as a decision made regarding distributions to 
individual members, while pay range is the size of differences established by pay-for-
performance plans.  These two factors coexist in a compensation system when group 
performance creates a pool of rewards to be allocated.  Specifically, the potential amount of 
money to be distributed to members of a group depends o  the pay range of the firm’s pay-for-
performance plan.  The way this reward pool is distribu ed depends on allocation rules.  In the 
case of equality distributions, individual pay outcomes depend on the pay range and the group’s 
performance; in the case of equity distributions, idividual pay outcomes depend on the pay 
range and the individual’s performance (though it should be noted that group performance is 
relevant to the creation of the pool).  Figure 1 depicts how these issues have been treated in the 
past and the treatment approach used in this study.  Table 2 juxtaposes the two policies. 
The model built and tested in this study is focused on performance-based horizontal pay 
variation and separates pay range and allocation rule constructs as different policies.  Definitions 
of important terms, as defined in prior research, are included in Table 3 for definitional clarity.  
These are the definitions used in this study. 
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Figure 1 
Pay Variation, Incentive Intensity, and Allocation Rules 
 
Table 2 
Pay Range and Allocation Rules 
Pay Range Equality Allocation Rule Equity Allocation Rule 
Narrow Pay Range 
(Low Incentive 
Intensity) 
Narrow range of potential pay 
outcomes; Allocated equally 
across group members  
 
Narrow range of potential pay 
outcomes; Allocated based on 
individual contributions 
Wide Pay Range 
(High Incentive 
Intensity) 
Wide range of potential pay 
outcomes; Allocated equally 
across group members  
Wide range of potential pay 






Term  Definition 
Ability The combination of knowing what to do and how to do it (Campbell, 
1990) 
Allocation Rule “principles or values as the basis for distributing outcomes” (Kabanoff, 




(EP) “the perceived likelihood that effort will result in the desired 




“give all recipients the same, regardless of their contributions” 
(Leventhal, 1976, p. 94) 
Equity Allocation 
Rule 
“outcomes are distributed according to input” (Kabanoff, 1991, p. 418) 
“distribute rewards and resources in accordance with recipients’ 
contributions” (Leventhal, 1976, p. 94) 
Incentive Intensity  “the overall magnitude of the incentive as a proportion of total pay” 
(Bamberger & Levi, 2009, p. 302; Zenger & Marshall, 2000) 
Motivation “a set of energetic forces that…initiate work-related behavior…” (Pinder, 
1998, p. 11; Pinder, 1984) 
Motivational Force  (MF) “a multiplicative function of valence…instrumentality…and 
expectancy” (Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; Porter & Lawler, 1968; 
Vroom, 1964); A task performance situation has multiple motivational 
forces associated with different effort levels; Indivi uals are expected to 
exert effort associated with the highest motivational force. 
Pay Basis “decisions regarding how to pay” (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, p. 115) 
Pay Ceiling Pay maximum, the highest possible pay amount 
Pay Floor “the amount of pay that he or she [the employee] can be certain to take 
home” (Brown & Huber, 1992, p. 280); Pay minimum, the lowest 
possible pay amount 
Pay-for-Performance  (PFP) “pay that varies with some measure of individual or organizational 
performance…” (Milkovich et al., 2014, p. 686)  
Pay Range “size of the difference between the highest pay rate and the lowest pay 
rate” (Kepes et al., 2009, p. 507); “the pay difference across employees 
in the same job” (Kepes et al., 2009, p. 500) 
Pay Variation “the extent to which pay varies within a collective” (Gupta et al., 2012, p. 
104) 
Performance Engaging in “behaviors relevant to the goals of the organization” (Klehe 




(PPay) “the perceived likelihood that the desired performance will be 
rewarded [with pay]” (aka, instrumentality, Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; 
Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) 
Valence of Pay 
Outcome 
“perceived value of the reward [pay]”(Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; Porter 
& Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964)  
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 Hypothesis Development 
Hypotheses are developed as follows.  First, the relationships between pay range, 
allocation rules, and individual performance are proposed.  A critical part of this investigation is 
testing the relationship between performance-based pay variation and individual performance.  
The review of the literature indicated that this tet should involve the policies creating the pay 
variation rather than a pay variation measure as used in prior non-experimental, field research.  
Pay variation is best conceptualized from a policy perspective as pay range; allocation rules are 
fundamentally different despite the use of allocation rule logic to explain pay variation’s 
relationship with performance.  Following these hypotheses, expectancy theory is applied in 
detail to the pay variation and performance model to develop hypotheses about the mechanisms 
through which pay variation may affect individual motivation and performance. 
Main and Interaction Effects of Pay Policies on Perfo mance 
In the review of the literature, it was noted that performance-based pay variation is 
primarily a function the incentive intensity (conceptualized as pay range in this investgation).  
Thus, an ideal test of the pay variation and individual performance assumption isolates the pay 
range policy.  The theories outlined above (e.g., aency, expectancy) all point to positive effects 
of pay range, assuming performance is the source of pay differences.  Specifically, wide pay 
ranges have greater separation between pay floors and pay ceilings.  As the aspirational amount 
that can be earned increases, motivation to earn the reward for high performance should increase.  
All else equal, larger rewards are more desirable than small rewards, and so motivation is 
expected to be higher as pay ranges increase.  
A separate issue is the effect of allocation rules on individual performance.  Allocation 
rules, specifically equity and equality distributions, have been confounded with pay variation in 
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the past.  While allocation rules are different from pay variation and should not be treated the 
same conceptually, it is worthwhile to test the relationship of allocation rules with individual 
performance as well.  Equity allocation rules focus individuals on their own individual 
performance, strengthening the line of sight between th  behavior and the reward.  Equality 
allocation rules allow for free riding (i.e., exerting less effort due to group pooling of efforts, 
Shepperd, 1993) as the reward is less clearly related to one’s individual performance.  These line 
of sight effects make equity allocation rules likely to create a stronger situation for encouraging 
individual performance than equality allocation rules. 
Widening pay ranges increase reward intensity.  As the range increases, equity-based 
allocation rules should lead to stronger individual motivational effects.  By contrast, equality-
based allocation rules are likely to weaken individual motivation because of a weaker link 
between individual performance and pay (i.e., weaker lin  of sight, conceptualized as PO 
expectancies when applying expectancy theory).  This is because individual effort may be 
viewed as less likely to influence the performance outcomes of the group, which are the primary 
determinant of the pay that will be earned when equality allocation rules are used.  Reward 
intensity should strengthen the effect of allocation rules on individual behavior.  Individual 
performance is rewarded when equity allocation rules are in place while group performance is 
rewarded when equality allocation rules are in place.  Thus, increasing the reward intensity 
should have a stronger effect on individual performance outcomes under equity allocation rules 
than under equality allocation rules.   
The preceding logic leads to the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Individual performance is higher in high pay range conditions than in low 
pay range conditions. 
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Hypothesis 2: Individual performance is higher in equity allocation rule conditions than 
in equality allocation rule conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individual performance depends on the interaction of pay range and 
allocation rule such that: Individual performance will be significantly higher in high pay 
range conditions than in low pay range conditions under equity allocation rules, while 
the effect of pay range on individual performance will be weaker or non-significant 
across pay range conditions under equality allocation rules. 
 
Expectancy Theory Components 
Theoretical framework.  Specific theoretical frameworks that explain the relationships 
proposed in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are rarely tested.  Thus, I focus on applying expectancy 
theory as the theoretical mechanism for pay variation’s effects, and testing these relationships.   
Expectancy theory is chosen for several reasons.  One, expectancy theory is a 
parsimonious and comprehensive theory of motivation.  It is parsimonious because it narrows 
down the multitude of factors that influence motivaion to three – effort to performance 
expectancies (from here on, EP expectancies), performance to outcome expectancies (from 
here on, PO expectancies), and outcome valences.  It is comprehensive because most factors in 
the environment or in the individual that are likely to influence motivation can be understood 
based on their relationship with these three factors.  In fact, expectancy theory can accommodate 
both tournament theory and agency theory.  Tournamet th ory involves individual desires for 
the large prize (i.e., high valences) in high pay vriation contexts.  It also explains that 
employees compete through performance for this prize, meaning that performance must be 
believed to be the reason for gaining the prize (i.e., strong PO expectancies).  Agency theory 
also suggests incentives align the interests of employees and organizations because they are 
based on desired employee behaviors (i.e., PO expectancies) and valued (i.e., valence). 
Expectancy theory has been well-applied to pay contexts.  Lawler, a well-known scholar 
in pay research, often applied expectancy theory to explain work motivation as it relates to pay 
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(e.g., Lawler, 1971, 1973).  As such, in much of his work, he applied expectancy theory to 
explain why organizations may struggle to appropriately motivate using compensation.  More 
recently, scholars have used the expectancy framework to explain the pay variation and firm 
performance relationship (e.g., Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2009).  Here, I apply the theory at 
the individual level.  This test of the theory to pay variation responses at the individual level is 
rarely conducted but makes logical sense based on the theory's attributes.  Recent theorizing in 
pay variation research has emphasized the value of expectancy theory in explaining pay 
variation’s relationship with employee outcomes (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 
2012), yet there has not been an empirical test of the individual-level theoretical mechanisms of 
the theory as applied to pay variation.  In this study, I test these effects directly. 
Formulation.  Here, important expectancy theory issues relevant to the development of a 
pay variation and individual responses model are not d.  The three expectancy theory 
components are EP expectancies, PO expectancies, and valences (see the literature revi w 
and Table 3 for definitions).  These three components combine to predict motivational force.  
The equation is: Motivation Force (MF) = EP * ∑ (PO * V).  Prior research on pay has 
often assumed EP expectancies are constant (Gupta et al., 2012).  In reality, EP 
expectancies are likely to vary based on differences in situations and people.  Objectively, some 
situations lead to higher EP expectancies than other situations.  For example, a sales person 
assigned to a high sales volume territory is more likely to perform given a certain level of effort 
than a sales person assigned to a low sales volume territory.  Furthermore, people vary, such that 
some people are likely to perceive their effort as more likely to lead to performance while others 
do not, given the same situation.  Much of the research focused specifically on expectancy theory 
suggests EP expectancies have significant predictive power for m tivation and performance.  
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For example, Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) reported an average r of 0.22 between EP 
expectancies and performance across 21 between-subject studies in a meta-analysis of 
expectancy theory.  The average r was even higher for intention to exert effort (r=0.38 for three 
studies).  It seems clear the EP expectancies are important to the prediction of performance.  
Thus, I include EP expectancies to develop a more complete model of individual motivation 
and performance. 
The second part of the equation, ∑ (PO * V), states that all (PO * V) terms are to be 
summed.  This is because there are multiple outcomes of a behavior that may be considered, pay 
is only one of the many outcomes.  Individuals can ognitively manage a limited number of 
outcomes (Lawler, 1973).  In addition, an experimental design is used in this study such that the 
only outcome that should vary across conditions is pay.  Thus, the theorizing is focused on pay 
outcomes, dropping the sum sign of the expectancy equation.  The revised equation is: MF = 
EP * PPay * VPay. 
Expectancy theory is inherently a choice theory.  It suggests that individuals consider 
multiple motivational forces at once associated with various behaviors or effort levels, and select 
the behavior and effort level associated with the highest motivational force.  Because multiple 
choices are under consideration, some scholars view expectancy theory as a theory that should be 
tested within-subjects (Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983).  It can predict across subjects as well, 
however.  Individuals may respond to certain conditions with high EP expectancies, PPay 
expectancies, or valences while other conditions may lower these values.  We can predict that 
motivation will be higher between subjects across conditions that have differential effects on the 
high effort motivation force components.  
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The choice nature of expectancy theory is acknowledged here by recognizing multiple 
equations may be considered by individuals, and focusing on the most important of these 
equations to explaining motivation.  Two of the main motivational force equations are the high 
effort and the low effort equations.  These two equations represent the motivation to perform and 
the motivation to slack.  The high effort equation s essentially the best case scenario from a 
motivation perspective while the low effort equation s essentially the worst case scenario. 
The high effort equation involves beliefs that exerting high effort will lead to high 
performance, beliefs that this performance will lead to the high pay, and the valence of high pay.  
Relating the high pay outcome to the pay range, it is represented by the pay ceiling.  That is, the 
highest amount possible for performing the task well is the pay ceiling.  Thus, the valence of the 
pay ceiling is the outcome valence of interest in the high effort motivational force equation. 
The low effort equation involves beliefs that exerting low effort will lead to low 
performance, beliefs that this low performance willlead to low pay, and the valence of low pay.  
Relating low pay to the pay range, this is represented by the pay floor.  That is, the lowest 
amount that will be paid for performing the task poorly is the pay floor.  Thus, the valence of the 
pay floor is the outcome valence of interest in the low effort motivational force equation.   
While both equations may be relevant, the high effort equation is especially important to 
explaining motivation to perform well.  As the MFHE (i.e., the motivation force to exert high 
effort) increases, higher motivation to perform is expected since performing well is perceived as 
likely, being rewarded for performing well is perceived as likely, and the rewards for performing 
well (i.e., the pay ceiling) are valued. Kepes et al. (2009) reported that the pay ceiling, rather 
than the pay range or pay floor drove performance effects of pay variation in a sample of truck 
drivers.  Thus, in the theorizing and test presented here, the primary equation applied is (where 
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HE=high effort): MFHE = EP * PPay * VPay.  As needed, the MFLE (i.e., the motivational 
force to exert low effort) is discussed for comparison purposes. 
In sum, the following model has important characteris ics that distinguish it from other 
applications of expectancy theory in the pay variation context.  EP expectancies are treated as 
relevant to the pay context.  Pay is assumed to be he primary outcome under consideration.  
Valences for different pay levels are included.  Finally, as the motivational force to exert high 
effort increases, motivation is expected to increase. 
Effort to Performance Expectancies.  As noted, EP expectancies are perceptions that 
one’s effort will lead to certain performance outcomes.  Referring back to the two MFs, the EP 
expectancy for MFHE is more likely to vary among individuals than the EP expectancy for the 
MFLE equation.  That is, we can assume that beliefs that low effort leads to low individual 
performance will be high.  Doing little to nothing almost certainly results in low performance.  
The more variable EP expectancy is the one associated with high effort.  While some 
individuals may exert high effort and still perform poorly, others may exert high effort with 
better results.  An example may clarify the distinction made here.  An individual may consider 
the effort level to exert in a marathon race.  The MFHE is the force associated with working 
toward a fast running time; the MFLE is associated with running a slow time.  In these quations, 
the EP expectancy for running slowly (i.e., the belief that exerting low effort leads to a slow 
individual running time) is likely to be high for most individuals; the EP expectancy for a fast 
running time (i.e., the belief that exerting high effort leads to fast individual running time) is 
likely to vary greatly across individuals. 
Most pay variation research does not incorporate EP expectancies.  This is likely 
because pay itself is more proximal to the other two expectancy factors (PPay expectancy, 
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valence).  There are important interactions among the expectancy components, however, such 
that EP expectancies are relevant to overall motivation in conjunction with the other 
expectancy components that are influenced by pay.  Thus, a proximal factor likely to explain 
EP expectancies associated with exerting high effort (the MFHE) is identified and incorporated 
into the model.  The term EP expectancy going forward refers to the EP expectancy for the 
MFHE equation, unless otherwise specified. 
Campbell (1990) defined ability (i.e., what one is capable of) as including declarative 
knowledge and procedural knowledge and skill.  Declarative knowledge is one’s ability to “state 
the relevant facts and things,” and procedural knowledge and skill is “the knowledge attained 
when knowing what to do (i.e., declarative knowledg) has been successfully combined with 
knowing how to do it” (Klehe & Anderson, 2007, p. 978).  For any given performance task, then, 
ability can be viewed as knowing what to do and how t  do the given task.  Individuals who have 
high ability are likely to perceive themselves as cpable of completing a task when effort is 
exerted since they are likely to have objectively higher EP probabilities (Lawler, 1973).  Thus, 
ability should be positively related to EP expectancies.   
Performance to Outcome Expectancies.  Performance to outcome expectancies are 
perceptions that one’s performance will lead to certain outcomes (Porter & Lawler, 1968; 
Vroom, 1964).  PO expectancies in this study are reduced to include only one outcome, such 
that only PPay expectancies are considered.  The PPay expectancy for MFHE involves the 
belief that high performance will lead to the high pay outcome.   
PPay expectancies are likely to vary as a result of the pay system.  For this reason, pay 
research invoking expectancy theory often focuses on this link in the expectancy theory equation 
(e.g., Kepes et al., 2009).  In the marathon runner example, it is possible to see how prize 
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structure (similar to attributes of a pay system) may influence PO expectancies.  If the 
marathon is a contest where many prizes are given, th  runner is likely to have higher PO 
expectancies for the high effort equation than if only one prize is given.   
The allocation rule in this study appears most likely to influence PPay expectancies for 
exerting high effort (i.e., for MFHE).  Specifically, allocation rules that emphasize rewards for 
individual performance (i.e., equity allocation rules) should be associated with higher P ay 
expectancies for the MFHE than those that emphasize rewards for group performance (i.e., 
equality allocation rules).  Equity allocation rules indicate that the higher performing individuals 
receive pay in line with their contributions; equality allocations imply that individual 
performance differences are ignored in pay allocatins within a group (Leventhal, 1976).  Pay in 
the equality case, then, is a reflection of group performance alone, over which individuals have 
less control, weakening PPay expectancies associated with the MFHE (Schwab, 1973).  True, 
individuals contribute to group performance.  The contributions of others are uncertain, 
especially the extent to which they will perform well.  Thus, one’s own performance has a 
weaker relationship with pay outcomes for MFHE when equality determines allocation amounts.  
Equity allocation rules should lead to a stronger line of sight between individual 
performance and outcomes since the individual’s contributions determine individual pay 
outcomes (Lawler, 1973).  A group that is working toward a pool of pay to be distributed may 
perform individually at varied levels.  The amount of he pool earned by the group is then 
distributed to group members based on each member’s contribution.  Assuming a non-zero 
reward pool, an equity rule may lead to a large payout for the individual even when the group 
performs poorly because the small pool is distributed according to contribution.  A small pool 
may result in high pay for an individual if she is performing highly and a large pool may still 
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result in low pay for an individual if he/she is performing poorly.  Overall, then, the individual’s 
performance is the primary determinant of her reward when equity allocation rules are in place.   
Supporting the superiority of equity allocation rules for individual performance purposes, 
Karau and Williams (1993) provided meta-analytic evid nce for social loafing in collective 
contexts.  Based on an integrative model drawing on expectancy theory, the Collective Effort 
Model (CEM), the authors reasoned that the relationship between individual performance and 
group performance was important to effort exertion.  As this link weakens, beliefs that individual 
performance will lead to valued outcomes decrease (lower PO*V values). Corroborating this 
idea, Schwab (1973) found that individual pay plans were associated with higher PO 
expectancies than group incentive plans in a study of production workers.   
More recent evidence regarding equity and equality locations for motivation also 
supports the idea that MFHE, and thus overall task motivation, should increase for quity 
compared to equality.  For example, social loafing (a sign of low motivation) was lower in 
groups when an individual incentive component was included, rather than an entirely group-
based reward system (Pearsall, Christian, & Ellis, 2010).  In another study, Barnes, Hollenbeck, 
Jundt, DeRue, and Harmon (2011) reported that group incentives that included an individual 
component led to faster, i.e., higher quantity, performance outcomes (a sign of high motivation) 
than group incentives without individual differentiation.   
Valence.  Valence refers to feelings about an outcome.  The outcome of interest in the 
MFHE equation is the pay ceiling.  Though some have proposed that pay is low in importance to 
employees (e.g. Herzberg, Mausner, Petersen, & Capwell, 1957), it is likely that low reporting 
on pay importance is an issue of socially desirable responding rather than actually feelings about 
pay (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004).  Several studies show that pay is an important motivating 
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influence (Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980).  
Evidence, then, generally suggests that pay is an outcome of positive valence for most 
individuals. 
Similar to PPay expectancies, the value assigned to the pay outcome may be affected 
by the pay system in place.  The marathon runner may put much higher valence on a one million 
dollar reward for a fast running time than a one hundred dollar reward.  Similarly, the ceiling of 
the range of pay outcomes for performance on a task will affect the valences assigned to a high 
effort MF equation.  For an employee making a decision about whether or not additional effort is 
worthwhile, pay range information, and specifically the pay ceiling, indicates how much pay is 
possible if performance is high.   
In general, money has an increasing value as the amount increases.  Of course, this is a 
foundational assumption of much of the economics literature.  The function may be linear or 
non-linear depending on the theory, but it is generally increasing at low and moderate levels of 
pay (Hey & Orme, 1994).  Behavioral choices are oftn predicted based on payout maximization.  
Based on rational choice theory, it is assumed that given two alternatives, individuals will select 
the alternative with the greatest utility, which can be calculated by assigning monetary values to 
potential outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998).  In fact, economists are known for their 
ability to assign monetary valuations to non-monetary concerns (e.g., health care, sustainability, 
Hanley, Ryan, & Wright, 2003).   
Pay is money received in exchange for work.  Pay has all the value characteristics 
associated with money, but also has symbolic value (F rnham & Argyle, 1998; Mitchell & 
Mickel, 1999).  In fact, a recent article indicated hat the importance of money earned as pay for 
effort is more affected by increasing amounts than t e importance of money from random 
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sources (Devoe et al., 2013).  Thus, from both an instrumental perspective and a symbolic 
perspective, higher ceilings should have higher valences than lower ceilings. 
Expectancy Theory Hypotheses.  These basic hypotheses are valuable as support will 
demonstrate that allocation rule and pay ceilings do in eed influence the components of the 
expectancy equation.  The preceding logic leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: Individual EP expectancy is positively related to individual ability. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Individual PPay expectancy is higher in equity allocation rule 
conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Pay valence is higher in high pay ceiling conditions than in low pay ceiling 
conditions.   
 
Individual Motivation 
Applications of the expectancy components to individual motivation and performance 
have been conceptualized in two ways.  One, the expctancy components can be viewed as 
predictors of overall motivation (Van Eerde & Theirry, 1996) which then predicts performance 
outcomes.  Two, the expectancy components can be combined as in the MF function (MFHE = 
EP * PPay * VPay) to create the motivational force for performance.  The MF value is then 
tested as an antecedent to performance.   
The first approach allows for the separation of expectancy components from motivation, 
and adds a variable between the expectancy components and performance (expectancy 
components  motivation  performance).  The second approach is somewhat truer to the 
original conceptualization of expectancy theory (Kenn dy et al., 1983) and requires attention to 
the specific MF of interest.  With this approach, there is no mediator (EP * PPay * Valence 
of Pay Outcome = Motivational Force  Performance).  Predictions are made according to the 
first approach for motivation here.  These predictions allow for consideration of the nature of the 
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expectancy component’s interaction.  For purposes of testing the motivation to performance 
relationship (addressed in the next section), both the motivation  performance view and the 
MF  performance views are applied.    
To the extent the MFHE is high, individuals should be highly motivated.  There is 
evidence that each factor associated with the high effort equation has an effect individually in 
addition to potential interactions.  Specifically, in a meta-analysis of expectancy theory 
components, Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) reported that all three components positively 
predicted effort and intention.   
Considering the marathon runner example illuminates this point.  If she believes she can 
run fast, believes that running fast will lead to a prize, and values that prize, she is likely to exert 
the effort to run faster.  Assuming none of the factors is equal to zero, there should be a basic 
direct effect of every component on motivation.  Each of the factors associated with exerting 
high levels of effort is expected to increase motivation. 
The multiplicative nature of the theory has been debat d by scholars because evidence of 
the interactions is weak (Lawler, 1994).  In fact, Van Eerde and Theirry stated, “Vroom’s models 
do not yield higher effect sizes than the components of he models.  This suggests that the 
models lack validity” (1996, p. 581) as a conclusion in their meta-analysis on expectancy theory.  
Since expectancy theory is formulated to be multiplicative (Arnold, 1981; Nagengast et al., 2011; 
Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964), the interactions of the components on motivation are 
predicted here.  Thus, there is not agreement among scholars regarding the interaction of the 
expectancy components.  A test of this interaction in the context of pay variation is lacking.  It is 
valuable to test these interactions, thereby contributing to application of expectancy theory to pay 
variation research and to the debate on the multiplicative nature of expectancy theory.  
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Predicting the nature of the interaction effects is po sible by applying the equation 
outlined earlier and mathematically testing the effct of changes in the components on 
motivation force.  The revised equation provided earli r removed the summation of outcomes 
and focused on the pay outcome only: MFHE = EP * PPay * VPay.  Because values for EP 
expectancies and PPay expectancies are probabilities, they are represnt d in this illustration 
within a range of 0 to 1; valences can be positive or negative.  Here, positive valences of pay are 
assumed based on the logic that money is valued.  To ensure a standard scale, valences for pay 
outcomes are also treated with values between 0 and 1 i  this illustration.   
The equations are estimated in Table 4.  A wide range of values could have been 
considered.  The values presented here are simply for illustrative purposes.  For two-way 
interaction predictions, the third factor is assumed to be held constant.  Constants are assigned a 
value of 0.50; high probabilities and valences are assigned a value of 0.90; low probabilities and 
valences are assigned a value of 0.10.  Assigning values allows for prediction of the nature of the 
interaction effect, which is plotted in Figure 2.  Two-way interactions are similar across factors.  
It should be noted that two-way interactions are prima ily included for the sake of 
completeness.  The unmodified expectancy theory formulation is Motivation Force (MF) = EP 
* ∑ (PO * Valence of Outcome).  Thus, the only two-way interaction that is true to the 
original formulation of expectancy theory is the P ay expectancy by pay valence interaction.  
The three-way interaction is best for incorporating EP expectancy.  However, to test the three-




Illustration of Expectancy Two-way Interaction Equations 
Valence Constant Low EP High EP 
Low PPay MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.50 = 0.005 MF = 0.90 * 0.1 * 0.50 = 0.045 
High PPay MF = 0.10 * 0.90 * 0.50 = 0.045 MF = 0.90 * 0.9 * 0.50 = 0.405 
 
PPay Constant Low EP High EP 
Low Valence MF = 0.10 * 0.50 * 0.10 = 0.005 MF = 0.9  * 0.50 * 0.10 = 0.045 
High Valence MF = 0.10 * 0.50 * 0.90 = 0.045 MF = 0.9  * 0.50 * 0.90 = 0.405 
 
EP Constant Low PPay High PPay 
Low Valence MF = 0.50 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.005 MF = 0.5  * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.045 
High Valence MF = 0.50 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.045 MF = 0.5  * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.405 
Note. The basic expectancy equation is: MFHE = EP * PPay * Valence of Pay Outcome 
 
Figure 2 
Nature of Expectancy Two-way Interactions 
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A simple way to demonstrate the potential for a three-way interaction is to look at the 
motivation force equation.  Effects of zero would make this illustration especially strong because 
all but the high EP expectancy, high PPay expectancy, and high pay valence environment 
would lead to zero motivation force; however, zero values seem unlikely in a work context.  That 
is, because someone is in a job that he is qualified for, he is unlikely to have a zero value for 
EP.  Similarly, assuming that pay is performance-based, even when equality allocations are 
used, there should be some probability for performance to lead to pay.  Finally, pay is assumed to 
have a positive value, especially the pay ceiling (.e., the pay valence incorporated into the high 
effort MF equation).  All values are represented as non-zero.   
The theory and formula lead to the prediction that when all expectancy components are 
high, motivational force will be much higher than if any one factor is low.  As with the two-way 
interactions, these values across possible scenarios re included in a table (Table 5).  The nature 
of the predicted interaction is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Table 5 
Illustration of Expectancy Three-way Interaction Equations 
Low EP Low PPay High PPay 
Low Valence MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.001 MF = 0.1  * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.009 
High Valence MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.009 MF = 0.1  * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.081 
 
High EP Low PPay High PPay 
Low Valence MF = 0.90 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.009 MF = 0.9  * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.081 
High Valence MF = 0.90 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.081 MF = 0.9  * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.729 
Note. The basic expectancy equation is: MFHE = EP * PPay * Valence of Pay Outcome. 
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Figure 3 
Nature of Expectancy Three-way Interaction 
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Individual Motivation Hypotheses.  The preceding logic leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7: Individual EP expectancy is positively related to individual motivation. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Individual PPay expectancy is positively related to individual 
motivation. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Pay valence is positively related to individual motivation. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The MFHE components (individual EP expectancy, individual P Pay 
expectancy, and pay valence) interact to predict individual motivation, such that:  
 
Hypothesis 10a: Individual EP expectancy interacts with individual PPay 
expectancy to predict individual motivation; the positive relationship between 
EP expectancy and motivation is strengthened as P Pay expectancy 
increases. 
 
Hypothesis 10b: Individual PPay expectancy interacts with pay valence to 
predict individual motivation; the positive relationship between PPay 
expectancy and motivation is strengthened as the pay valence increases. 
 
Hypothesis 10c: Individual EP expectancy interacts with pay valence to predict 
individual motivation; the positive relationship between EP expectancy and 
motivation is strengthened as the pay valence increases. 
 
Hypothesis 10d:  There is a three-way interaction among the three MFHE 
components, such that motivation is highest when all three components are high 





The foundational concern of the pay variation litera u e is not simply that motivation 
increases but that performance increases (Shaw, 2014).  All else equal, intentions (i.e. 
motivation) lead to behaviors (Ajzen, 1991).  Research indicates a strong correlation between 
motivated effort and performance (Broedling, 1975; Lawler & Porter, 1967).   
The motivation and performance relationship has been discussed at length in prior 
research (Broedling, 1975; Lawler & Porter, 1967; Vroom, 1964), but has been questioned by 
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some recent pay researchers (Ariely, 2008; Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Pink, 
2009).  Some of this work has suggested that over-motivation created by incentives leads to 
performance anxiety and prevents positive performance outcomes (Ariely et al., 2009).  
However, a closer look at work in this area suggests that it is extreme rewards that may explain 
this effect (e.g., $300 for a small amount of work).  Thus, it is valuable to test this relationship in 
a pay context where amounts vary by less extreme amounts.  
Since the pay ranges tested in this study are more reasonable than those of the prior 
research on this issue (Ariely et al., 2009), such that the over-motivation problem is unlikely, the 
positive motivation to performance relationship is expected to hold.  Specifically, greater 
motivation will increase performance.   
Returning to the prior discussion of expectancy theory, two tests are possible to explain 
motivation and performance.  In one, the motivation o perform the task predicts task 
performance.  This is based on the Expectancy ComponentsMotivationPerformance model.  
This approach allows for the testing of hypotheses 7 through 10 with a subsequent test of the 
motivation and performance relationship.  In the second test, the high effort motivation force is 
actually calculated (MFHE = EP * PO * VPay); this MF value is then used to predict 
performance.  Thus, hypotheses are presented to address both approaches to testing.  The full 
model is presented in Figure 4. 
Hypothesis 11: Individual motivation is positively related to individual performance. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Individual motivational force (MF=EP * PPay * VPay) is positively 
related to individual performance. 
 
 The model presented in Figure 4 depicts a complex network of relationships that explain 
the effects of horizontal pay variation-related policies on individual performance.  Each link has 
been hypothesized above (hypotheses 4 through 12).  Support for the hypothesized links will 
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contribute to our understanding of individual performance as an outcome of pay variation-related 





 The hypotheses and model presented here contribute to th  conversation on pay variation 
in a number of ways.  First, allocation rules (i.e., equity and equality) are separated from pay 
range (i.e., incentive intensity).  This distinction leads to separate predictions.  In fact, these pay 
policies are expected to interact to predict performance outcomes.  Furthermore, allocations rules 
are predicted to influence PPay expectancies while pay range, and specifically p y ceiling, is 
predicted to affect valences.   Ceilings are theoriz d as influencing the high effort equation, 
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which influences subsequent performance.  Kepes et al. (2009) reported that the ceiling was the 
driver of pay range effects.   
 Second, the hypotheses presented are in regard to in ividual-level responses to pay 
variation-related policies.  While often theorized, individual-level responses have been somewhat 
neglected by the management discipline in pay variation research.  A test of the effects of 
policies on individual level responses can test the assumption that individuals respond 
differentially to pay variations.  In addition, explicit incorporation of the expectancy theory 
components tests the validity of expectancy theory as an explanatory motivational framework for 
pay variation-related policies.  Recent theoretical work has indicated that expectancy theory may 
be ideal for explaining the effects of pay variation (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 
2012), but an empirical test is lacking. 
 Third, the hypotheses here also address other ongoing debates of the pay literature.  The 
effects of over-motivation in pay contexts have received much attention of late (Ariely, 2008; 
Ariely et al., 2009).  In this study, the motivation and performance relationship is hypothesized 
to be positive (hypotheses 11 and 12).  If it is found to be positive, this will provide evidence that 
within realistic pay settings, where values are not extreme, pay-for-performance does not 
negatively affect performance due to over-motivation.  Another inconclusive area relates to 
whether or not the multiplicative function of expectancy theory is valid (Van Eerde & Theirry, 
1996).  Expectancy interactions were hypothesized.  Supported for these hypotheses would 
provide evidence for the interactive effects proposed by expectancy theory.   
 In sum, the hypotheses provided here test old assumptions and provide a new treatment 
of pay variation.  The old assumptions refer to payv riation as an influence on individual 
motivational and performance responses.  The new conceptualization is a more nuanced policy 
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view of pay variation.  By separating allocation rules from pay range, the model is based on a 







A primary purpose of this study is to address causal inferences regarding pay variation 
and individual performance.  An experiment was chosen as the research design because 
experiments are the most appropriate design for inte nal validity purposes (Shadish et al., 2002).  
The two primary independent variables for this study are pay range and allocation rule.  
As noted earlier, pay range is a combination of pay ceilings and pay floors.  If both pay 
ceilings and pay floors differ across manipulations, it is not possible to know precisely whether 
the ceiling or the floor is related to the dependent variable in a causal way.  Thus, pay range was 
separated into a pay ceiling manipulation and a pay floor manipulation.  This means that three 
independent variables were identified for manipulation: allocation rule, pay ceiling, and pay 
floor.  The combinations that result from the pay ceiling and pay floor manipulations represent 
various pay ranges.  For testing purposes, described in Chapter 4, each manipulation was entered 
as an independent variable.   
Allocation rule included two levels (i.e., equality and equity); pay ceiling included two 
levels (i.e., high of $12 and low of $8); pay floor included two levels (i.e., high of $6 and low of 
$2).  This led to a 2x2x2 fully crossed factorial matrix, i.e., 8 cells or conditions, as depicted in 
Table 6.  Participants received pay within this range for performing a data entry task (addressed 




 Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range 
Pay Floor/ 
  Bottom End of Range 
Low $8.00 High $12.00 
Equality Equity Equality Equity 
Low 
$2.00 




































In this chapter, the study methodology is described.  This includes information about the 
task performed by participants, experimental procedur s, manipulations, and measures.  In 
addition, pretesting and pilot testing results are discussed.   
Subjects 
 Participants in the study were business students at a southern university.  All students 
participating in the study received extra credit in a business course for their participation.  
Students were informed that they could earn extra credit for participating in a financial services 
task study in the business behavioral research lab.  In addition, they were told there was the 
potential to earn money; however, no expected monetary amounts were communicated to 
participants.   
 Because there were human subjects involved in this research, institutional review board 
approval was necessary.  Following initial protocol approval, modifications to the study design 
were made.  These modifications were mainly the addition of questionnaire items.  Each 
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modification has a separate approval letter.  The institutional review board approval letters are 
included in Appendix A. 
Task and Materials 
 The task for the study was a computer task involving data entry of financial information.  
This task was completed multiple times. The first time was a two minute training session free of 
any manipulation.  The second and third times were each five minutes.  The second and third 
sessions occurred following the manipulation, and were completed for pay.  Completing the task 
required participants to match an applicant ID number on a paper form to an applicant ID 
number on an electronic form, then enter the income value from the paper form into the 
electronic form. 
The task required printed materials for each participant.  These materials were included in 
colored binders at each participant’s work station.  The materials were identical for all 
participants, and there were separate sets of material for each of the three sessions.  The 
participants were asked to use information from the printed material to enter data on the 
computer (see Figure 6 for an example of the paper forms used by participants).   
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Figure 6 
Mortgage Application Example 
 
Participants were told their task was a group task with other members in different 
locations also working on the task with them.  This group nature of the task was required because 
the allocation rule involves distribution within a group context.  In reality, the groups were 
simulated in that actual groups did not exist, with the task set up to create the illusion of a group.  
The study required some level of interdependence to ensure the task could feasibly 
involve equality or equity allocation rules.  That is, if there is no interdependence, such that 
group performance was simply additive, an equality llocation rule would not make sense; if 
there is full interdependence, such that individual contributions could not be identified, an equity 
allocation rule would not make sense (DeMatteo, Eby, & Sundstrom, 1998).  To ensure either 
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pay approach was reasonable, the task was developed t  r flect some level of interdependence 
while retaining the ability to measure individual performance.  The task program created the 
feeling of a group by providing information on other participants during both the training video 
(e.g., participants are at other universities) and during the login process (e.g., “all participants are
logged in” text box).  Participants were asked to enter one piece of information related to 
mortgage applications while other group members would input other information (see Figure 7 
for the data entry form).  This provided interdepend ce in that group members had separate 
pieces of important information, and they were building an overall database as a group.  
Furthermore, they were told that for the mortgage application to be processed, it was necessary 
to have six pieces of information entered correctly.  There was some reward interdependence in 
all conditions because group performance was indicated to the participant as determining the 
pool of pay for the group though the allocation rules differed across conditions. 
 The task was developed to reflect work of an entry level financial services employee.  
Participants were told that the study would help researchers better understand the most effective 
work design for this specific task.   
 An additional requirement for the task was that it llow for individual performance 
measurement that could be completed quickly and effici ntly.  Thus, the program quickly 
referenced the database entries completed by the partici nt to check for the number of accurate 
entries completed during the data entry session.  The data on performance was communicated to 
a laptop in the debriefing room to allow for payment at the end of the study.   
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Figure 7 
Mortgage Application Task Data Entry Form 
 
Experimental Procedure  
 Participants recruited through courses signed up to participate in the study through an 
online experiment management system.  Using the online system, participants could browse the 
available times and selected a 1.5 hour timeslot to participate.  Times were available during the 
day and in the evening so that most individuals whoanted to participate could participate.  
There were 47 sessions available for sign up with 18 timeslots per time period.  This provided 
846 available spots.   
 The full participant schedule is presented in Table 7.  On the day of the session, 
participants went to the business behavioral research l boratory at their assigned time.  Once at 
the lab, participants checked in at the front desk.  Participants completed an informed consent 
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form (see Appendix A for a copy of the informed conse t form), then listed their instructor 
information on a separate sign-in form so that extra credit could be assigned.   
At the time the study was to start, participants were told their participant ID number and 
given a notecard with both their participant ID number and laptop number written on the card.  
They were told that the participant ID number should be entered correctly every time to ensure 
payment at the end of the study and asked to write the ID number by their name on the sign in 
sheet.  This was done because the ID number was critical for the program to run correctly.  The 
computer program referenced the participant ID number to indicate the appropriate information 
to display because the participant ID number contained the condition number.  The participant 
was then instructed to go to the computer lab, find his/her assigned laptop, and enter the 
participant ID number on the laptop to begin the study.   
During the study (i.e., after sign in and before th payment and debriefing), there was no 
need for interaction with the experimenter except in the case of questions.  At the end of the 
session, participants were paid and debriefed by the experimenter.  Because everything went 
through the computer program, participants had as much time as needed to complete 
questionnaires or read information.  The only time-constrained activities were the training and 
task performance sessions.  This allowed for a staggered exit of participants, which was 







Participant Sign-In and Consent Form Completion 
 
5 
Brief Study Introduction Video, followed by Questionnaire I: 
Motivational Traits, Big Five, Trait Affect, Social Desirability, Equity 
Sensitivity, General Mental Ability 
 
12 













Task Performance 1 
 
5 
Questionnaire III: Individual performance, Group performance 2 
Task Performance 1 Pay Information 
 
5 




Questionnaire IV (continued): Expectancy Components, Effort and 
Motivation, Manipulation Checks 
 
5 
Task Performance 2 
 
5 
Questionnaire V: Individual performance, Group performance 
 
2 
Task Performance 2 Pay Information 
 
5 
Questionnaire VI: Pay Satisfaction, Fairness Perceptions, Emotion, 
Feelings toward Group, Interest in Continuing Work 
 
10 
Pay, Debrief, Opportunity to Ask Questions 5 
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Once seated at their laptops, participants entered their participant ID number, then watched a 
short video introducing them to the study.  The video included a professionally dressed man, 
speaking to the participant.  He said the following: 
“Hello, my name is William. We really appreciate you being a part of our study today. 
First, let me tell you about what we are doing.   
This study is intended to help us understand the efficiency of data entry methods in the 
financial services industry. Your participation in this study is very important because the 
research findings may help banking organizations ru more effectively.   
 
Over the next couple of hours, you will work with a group to complete a financial 
services task and respond to questionnaires multiple times.  The directions for what you 
are to do throughout the study will be included on y ur laptop.   
 
Please read and follow all of the instructions provided throughout the study. Please 
complete all questions to the best of your ability. If ou have any technical difficulties 
throughout the study, please simply raise your hand. You can now begin by completing 
the first questionnaire. ” 
 
Participants then completed a questionnaire that included several individual difference 
measures.  Following the questionnaire, participants watched a video on the laptop that provided 
training on the experimental task.  This training was a video made via screen capture and voice 
over (see Appendix B for a copy of the slides and training language).  Following the video, 
participants were asked to use the training binder that included print mortgage application forms 
to practice what they had learned from the training video.  Performance in this practice session 
was measured, but not communicated to participants. Thi  performance measure was used as the 
measure of ability. 
 Following the training practice session, the laptop screen provided additional information 
about participating in the task as a member of a group and the method of payment for the 
participant (i.e., the manipulation).  The participant completed Questionnaire II after the 
manipulation.  Questionnaire II included motivation measures and manipulation checks.  The 
participant then began their first task performance session using a binder of printed materials 
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labeled TASK1.  This task performance session took place for five minutes.  At the end of the 
five minutes, participants responded to Questionnaire III regarding perceived individual and 
group performance.  At this point, the data collected were sufficient for testing all hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 2.  However, in order to allow f r a broader data collection that incorporated 
important considerations in this area of research, such as affective and cognitive responses to 
compensation after a payment is made, additional questionnaires were administered and the 
manipulation was repeated.  The next paragraph describ  this extension.  However, all 
hypotheses were tested based on data from Questionnaire II, Questionnaire III, the training 
performance session, and the TASKI performance session. 
Following Questionnaire III, a message told the participants: a) their own performance 
level (measured based on the number of accurate entri s and performance cutoffs established 
during pilot testing, discussed in detail later in this chapter), b) the group’s performance level 
(average in all cases), and c) payment based on this information and the condition.  The 
participant then completed Questionnaire IV, which included responses to compensation after 
being paid (e.g., emotions and pay satisfaction).  After the first part of Questionnaire IV, 
participants were told that they would be performing the task again for five minutes with the 
same pay system in place (i.e., the manipulation was repeated).  This was the same pay 
manipulation used for the first five minute task performance session.  The participants completed 
the second part of Questionnaire IV next, which included motivation measures and manipulation 
checks for the second paid round of the task.  Questionnaire V was included following the task 
performance session to measure perceived performance before actual performance information 
was shared.  Questionnaire VI measured responses to the pay and task.  After finishing this 
questionnaire, the screen indicated to the participants that they had completed the study, should 
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now leave the computer lab quietly, and should go to the conference room to receive payment.  
An illustration of the programming screens for the experimental session are provided in 
Appendix C. A full copy of the questionnaire codebook is available in Appendix D. 
When participants arrived for debriefing, the researcher asked for the index card 
containing the participant ID number and laptop number.  This information was used to look up 
the participant’s payment.  The participant was then paid and asked to sign the receipt book 
regarding payment.  The actual purpose of the study was then revealed to the participant.  Here is 
the script used for the debriefing: 
“As we are still in the process of conducting this study, it is really important that you 
keep information about this study confidential and don’t discuss it with anyone else.   
 
In this study, we are trying to understand what causes people to be motivated and perform 
well on a task.  The groups in this study were simulated and all were rated as having 
average performance.  We were most interested in how your compensation influenced 
your performance. 
 
If you would like more information regarding this study, we can e-mail you a copy of the 
paper once it has been published.”   
 
Participants were also asked if they had any information about the study prior to arrival for the 
study session and given the opportunity to ask questions or provide feedback.  After debriefing, 
the participant had completed the study.   
Experimental Manipulations 
As noted earlier, the study had 8 conditions.  These conditions varied according to 
allocation rule (equality and equity), pay ceiling (low and high), and pay floor (low and high).  
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.  I  selecting pay values, the potential total 
payout for approximately two hours in the lab was considered.  Assuming minimum wage is 
viewed as appropriate, the average amount paid should be around $14 to $15 per participant.  
Another consideration for determining pay ceilings and floors was the resulting range (i.e., 
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creating low floor, high ceiling conditions that were much larger than the high floor, low ceiling 
conditions).  Thus, the pay floor values were $2 and $6 and the pay ceiling values were $8 and 
$12.  This means that the range of payments received across all participants was between $4 and 
$24 since there were two sessions for which participants were paid.  Table 8 shows the pay 
range-related condition information for one session. 
 
Table 8 
Pay Ceiling and Floor Conditions 
 Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range 
Pay Floor/ 








$2.00 - $8.00 
Range = $6.00 
Midpoint = $5.00 
 
$2.00 - $12.00 
Range = $10.00 
Midpoint = $7.00 
High 
$6.00 
$6.00 - $8.00 
Range = $2.00 
Midpoint = $7.00 
$6.00 - $12.00 
Range = $6.00 
Midpoint = $9.00 
 
In addition to the pay conditions, the allocation rule was also manipulated, such that some 
individuals were paid under an equality allocation rule and others under an equity allocation rule.  
Participants were told that pay for the job they were doing ranged from a low value to a high 
value depending on their pay condition (see Table 8 above); they were also told that they had 
been assigned to a workgroup to complete the task and that the performance of the workgroup 
determined the pool available for payment.  The participants were told that pay was either 
distributed to the group members equally (in equality conditions) or based on individual 
contributions (in the equity conditions).  Following performance of the task, participants were 
informed of their payment and the payments of other group members.  All participants were paid 
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based on membership in an average performing group.  Thus, individuals in the equality 
conditions were paid based on equal distributions of the average group performance pool (all 
group members received the same payment).  Participnts in equity conditions were paid based 
on measurement of their actual performance (group members received different payments 
depending on performance).  Table 9 lists the actual payments that were made during the study. 
 
Table 9  
Actual Study Payments 
 Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range 
Pay Floor/ 
Bottom End of 
Range Low/$8.00 High/$12.00 
Low 
$2.00 
Group Range: $16 - $64  
Ind. Range: $2 - $8 
Reward Pool for Average 
Performing Group of 8 = $40 
Equity Condition: 
High Perf = $8, Average Perf = 
$5, Low Perf = $2 
Equality Condition:  
All = $5 
 
 
Group Range: $16 - $96  
Ind. Range: $2 - $12 
Reward Pool for Average 
Performing Group of 8 = $56 
Equity Condition: 
High Perf = $12, Average Perf = 
$7, Low Perf = $2 
Equality Condition:  




Group Range: $48 - $64  
Ind. Range: $6 - $8 
Reward Pool for Average 
Performing Group of 8 = $56 
Equity Condition: 
High Perf = $8, Average Perf = 
$7, Low Perf = $6 
Equality Condition:  
All = $7 
Group Range: $48 - $96  
Ind. Range: $6 - $12 
Reward Pool for Average 
Performing Group of 8 = $72 
Equity Condition: 
High Perf = $12, Average Perf = 
$9, Low Perf = $6 
Equality Condition:  
All = $9 
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The text for the manipulation was as follows.  Items in bold were populated based on 
condition.  As noted, the ‘group’ participants were in was a simulated group.  Thus, each 
participant represented one observation. 
Before Task Performance Sessions 1 & 2:  
You will be working in a group with 7 other people to enter the information from the 
forms into the computer. 
 
Pay is based on the performance of members of the group. 
 
Individual performance is determined by the number of accurate entries made by an 
individual.  For you, this is the number of accurate entries made in the income field. 
 
Group performance is determined by the number of applications that can be processed 
and the accuracy of those applications. 
 
To process an application, at least 6 of the 8 fields must be entered. 
 
Your group can make between [GROUP FLOOR #] and [GROUP CEILING #] .  
 
This money will be distributed to individual members of the group [based on individual 
contributions - OR -  equally]. 
 
In other words, individual payments [depend on individual performance - OR - are the 
same for everyone in your group].  
 
Since this money will be distributed [based on individual contributions - OR -  equally 
among group members], your payment [is dependent on your performance as follows 
- OR -  is dependent on the group’s performance as follows]: 
 
• High individual performance – you will receive [individual ceiling]. 
• Average individual performance – you will receive [individual midpoint]. 
• Low individual performance – you will receive [individual floor] .  
 
- OR – 
 
• High performing group – you will receive [individual ceiling]. 
• Average performing group – you will receive [individual midpoint]. 




 Ability was measured as the number of correct entri s made during the training 
performance session.  The expectancy components and motivation were measured using self-
reported responses (see survey measures below).  The performance dependent variable was 
measured subjectively (self-reported, see survey measur s below) and objectively.  The objective 
performance measure was the number of accurate entri s in the income field by the participant 
during the TASK1 session. 
Survey Measures 
Questionnaires were administered at six points during the session.  For the purposes of 
testing the hypotheses from Chapter 2, survey measur s were collected related to the TASK1 
session.  Survey measures were used for the following variables: effort to performance 
expectancy, performance to pay expectancy, valence of pay, motivation, and subjective 
performance.  See the codebook in Appendix D for all measures collected during the study. 
For effort to performance expectancies, performance to pay expectancies and motivation, 
participants were asked to: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following regarding the task you will be performing (TASK1).”  Responses to items were on 5 
point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The effort to performance 
expectancy and performance to pay expectancy scales were adapted from scales used in a study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013).  
Effort to performance expectancy was measured using the following five items: 
1. How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it. 
2. The effort that I put into this task is not related o my performance on this task. 
(Reverse Coded) 
3. If I try hard, I will do well on this task. 
4. There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task. 
5. If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well. 
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Performance to pay expectancy was measured using the following five items: 
1. The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make. 
2. How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task. 
3. It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task. 
4. If I perform well, I will make more money. 
5. My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make. (Reverse 
Coded) 
 
Motivation was measured in the pilot study using ten i ms: 
1. I hope I do really well here. 
2. I am very motivated to do well on this task. 
3. I feel driven to do well on this task. 
4. I really want to do well. 
5. I am highly motivated to do well on this task. 
6. I couldn't care less whether or not I perform well in this session. (Reverse Coded) 
7. I am motivated to perform well on this task. 
8. I don't care whether or not I do well here.  (Reverse Coded) 
9. I'm really not motivated to do well on this task.  (Reverse Coded) 
10. I do not care about my performance on this task. (Reverse Coded) 
 
The measure was then reduced to the following five items for the full study (for details on 
this reduction, see Pilot Testing later in this chapter):  
1. I am very motivated to do well on this task. 
2. I feel driven to do well on this task. 
3. I really want to do well. 
4. I am motivated to perform well on this task. 
5. I do not care about my performance on this task. (Reverse Coded) 
 
For the pay valence associated with the pay ceiling, participants responded to three items 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  Specifically, the 
participants were asked to: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following regarding the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing 
(TASK1).”  The valence scale was also adapted from scales used in a study described in 
Djurdjevic (2013).  The following three items in response to this question were used for the pay 
valence scale: 
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1. I would really like to make this much money. 
2. I want to make this amount of money. 
3. I really value this amount of money. 
 
Subjective performance was measured using 2 questions after performing the task, but 
before pay information and performance feedback was given.  Question 1 asked the following, 
“How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK1)?” with responses on a 5-point 
scale ranging from poor to excellent.  Question 2 asked the following, “Individual performance is 
rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you expect your individual performance will be rated 
for TASK1?” with responses on a three point scale of low, average and high. 
Pretest 
Pretesting was completed in June 2013.  Eight PhD students went through the entire 
program from a participant perspective to assess the flow and capacity of the task program and to 
provide suggestions for improvement.  There were not a y incentives at this stage.  Data from 
this run through were not used for any analyses.  Rather, feedback given during a group 
roundtable discussion session of the PhD students was used to improve the study design. 
Feedback from pretesting lead to two primary updates to the program.  First, the training 
video was revised to provide a stronger sense of the group nature of the task (see Appendix B for 
the final video slides and script).  Second, the program had a capacity issue that would not allow 
it to run for all participants at once.  This was corrected prior to pilot testing. 
Pilot Test 
Pilot testing was completed in June 2013 with four bjectives: 1) a full run through of the 
study to ensure logistical efficiency and computer operation, 2) a test of the manipulations, 3) a 
test of measure reliability, and 4) a test of the appropriateness of performance cutoffs.  
Undergraduate students in business courses were provided extra credit for participation in the 
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pilot study.  They were also paid for participation based on their condition, and in equity 
conditions, individual performance.   
Logistical Efficiency and Computer Operation 
Twenty-nine undergraduates participated in the pilot study.  Regarding the full run 
through of the study, undergraduates were comfortable with the operation of the program and 
were able to navigate the various screens.  The training video was effective as most participants 
completed the task as described.   
The most significant issue that arose in the pilot study related to the participant 
experience involved the participant ID number entry.  One participant entered the ID incorrectly, 
leading to problems with the manipulation/payout process.  Thus, a new protocol was added that 
participants would write their ID themselves on thesign in form to confirm they read it correctly, 
and they would be told at sign in, “the participant ID number must be entered correctly so that 
we can pay you at the end of the study.”   
Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation checks confirmed that participants were aware of the compensation policies 
for the task.  Most participants correctly entered their minimum and maximum pay amounts (i.e., 
the floors and ceilings).  Tables 10 and 11 provide the frequency of responses by condition.  For 
ceilings, 86% of participants in the low ceiling condition and 87% of participants in the high 
ceiling condition entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The 
most money I can make in this session is $__________.”  For floors, 100% of participants in the 
low floor condition and 93% of participants in the igh floor condition entered the correct value 
when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The minimum amount of money I can earn 
during this session is $__________.”   
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Table 10 
Pilot Response to Ceiling Manipulation Check 
Item: The most money I can make in this session is 
$_____________. 






8 12  0 
85.71% 0.00% 
12 0 13 
0.00% 86.67% 
16 0 1 
0.00% 6.67% 
64 2 0 
14.29% 0.00% 




Pilot Response to Floor Manipulation Check 
Item: The minimum amount of money I can earn during this 
session is $_____________. 






2 15 0 
100.00% 0.00% 
6 0 13 
0.00% 92.86% 
48 0 1 
0.00% 7.14% 
 
When ceilings and/or floors were entered incorrectly, it was primarily due to participants 
incorrectly entering the group minimum and maximum.  To correct for this, when running the 
full experiment, group minimum and maximum pay question  were added next to the individual 
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minimum and maximum manipulation checks.  This was to help the participants distinguish 
between the group ceiling/floor and the individual ceiling/floor in their responses. 
The means for the allocation rule manipulation checks were also in the expected 
directions.  Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my individual performance,” were significantly 
higher in the equity condition (M=3.92, N=13) than in the equality condition (M=2.75, N=16), 
F(1, 27)=9.54, p<0.01.  Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my group's performance,” was 
significantly higher in the equality condition (M=4.50, N=16) than in the equity condition 
(M=3.38, N=13), F(1, 27)=7.75, p<0.05.  See Table 12 for allocation rule manipulation checks. 
 
Table 12 
Allocation Rule Manipulation Checks 
Item Condition N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Pay on this task is based on 
my group's performance. 
equality 16 4.50 0.73 
equity 13 3.38 1.39 
Pay on this task is based on 
my individual performance. 
equality 16 2.75 0.93 
equity 13 3.92 1.12 
 
Measure Reliability 
The third purpose of the pilot study was to assess the measurement items for the variables 
in the study.  For both effort to performance expectan ies and for performance to pay 
expectancies, each five item scale had high internal consistency (EP expectancy α=0.84; 
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PPay expectancy α=0.89), and all items were included for the final study.  Table 13 and Table 
14 provide detailed information for each of the items. 
 
Table 13 
Effort to Performance Expectancy Item Descriptive Statistics 
Item (N=29) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it. 4.28 0.75 
The effort that I put into this task is not related o my performance on 
this task. (Mean is based on the item after it was recoded) 
3.93 1.07 
If I try hard, I will do well on this task. 4.38 0.62 
There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task. 4.34 0.77 
If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well. 4.59 0.50 
 
Table 14 
Performance to Pay Expectancy Item Descriptive Statistics 
Item (N=29) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make. 4.38 0.82 
How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task. 3.93 1.03 
It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task. 4.41 0.63 
If I perform well, I will make more money. 4.31 0.81 
My performance on this task will not affect how much money I 
make. (Mean is based on the item after it was recodd) 
3.28 0.70 
 
 Regarding the motivation measure, ten items were included in the pilot test, but this was 
reduced to five items for the full experiment as feedback from participants indicated some survey 
fatigue.  The ten item measure had high internal consistency (α=0.96).  Items with the strongest 
intercorrelations, and thus contributing to internal consistency were selected for inclusion in the 
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Motivation Item Descriptive Statistics 
Item (N=29) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Item Used for 
Full Study 
I hope I do really well here. 4.55 0.74  
I am very motivated to do well on this task. 4.28 0.96 X 
I feel driven to do well on this task. 4.24 0.95 X 
I really want to do well. 4.38 0.94 X 
I am highly motivated to do well on this task. 4.17 0.97  
I couldn't care less whether or not I perform well in 
this session. (Mean is based on the item after it was
recoded) 
3.79 1.32  
I am motivated to perform well on this task. 4.28 0.96 X 
I don't care whether or not I do well here.  (Mean is 
based on the item after it was recoded) 
4.10 0.98  
I'm really not motivated to do well on this task.  
(Mean is based on the item after it was recoded) 
3.72 1.31  
I do not care about my performance on this task. 
(Mean is based on the item after it was recoded) 
4.14 0.99 X 
 
Subjective performance was measured using two items: “How would you rate your 
performance on the task (TASK1)?” with responses on a 5-point scale ranging from poor to 
excellent and “Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you expect 
your individual performance will be rated for TASK1?” with responses on a 3-point scale of low, 
average and high.  The coefficient alpha for the two subjective performance items was 0.69.  The 
correlation for these two items was 0.60 for the pilot study.  These low values may be because 
the 3-point scale is limited while the 5-point scale lows for finer distinctions.  No participants 
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selected low for their performance level for the 3-point scale question.  Both items were included 
for the full study.  Since the two items were on difference scales, for analysis purposes, both 
items were standardized and then combined.  The coefficient alpha based on the standardized 
items was 0.75.  See Table 16 for item descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 16 
Performance Item Descriptive Statistics 
Item (N=29) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK1)? (5-
point response scale) 
3.72 0.84 
Where do you expect your individual performance will be rated 
for TASK1? (3 point response scale) 
2.62 0.49 
 
Three items were included for pay valence in the full st dy, but were not tested as part of 
the pilot study.  This was because the decision to measure the pay valence directly in relationship 
to the pay maximum, which is truer to the expectancy theory application used here, was made 
after the pilot study was completed.  Initially, the questionnaire simply asked questions regarding 
the valence of pay, in general, without reference to the maximum.  Direct questions about the 
pay maximum value were a better representation of the pay valence construct in the high effort 
motivational force equation, and were used for the full study. 
Performance Cutoffs 
Regarding performance cutoffs (i.e., the number of accurate entries in the income field 
required for each level of performance), the distribution of correct entries during the pilot was 
considered in order to set the performance cutoffs f r the full study.  Performance cutoffs were 
not critical to testing of the hypotheses in Chapter 2, but were important for paying participants 
and for running the full study.  For pretesting and pilot testing, performance cutoffs were set as 
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follows: Low = 0 to 14 correct entries; Average = 15 to 19 correct entries; High = 20 or more 
correct entries. 
  The distribution of performance for the pilot study is provided in Figure 8.  Based on 
this distribution, performance cutoffs were adjusted to ensure a distribution of low and high 
performers across conditions.   
 
Figure 8   
Pilot Study Performance Distribution 
 
Based on the pilot study performance levels, the following cutoffs were established for 
the full experiment: Low = 0 to 22 correct entries, Average = 23 to 26 correct entries, High = 27 
or more correct entries. 
 
Funding 
 The average payment for participation in this study was approximately $15.  Funding for 
payments to participants and other miscellaneous expenses was provided by the James H. Penick 
















 The hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 were tested uing the data collected according to 
the methods described in Chapter 3.  The results of these tests are reported here.  Before 
reporting the results of the hypothesis tests, the sample is described, manipulation checks are 
reported, and the psychometric properties of variables are discussed.   
Study Sample 
The sample for this study was made up of 584 undergraduate business students at a large 
university.  Student participants were recruited in classrooms and were all given extra credit for 
participation in the study.  Sixty-two percent of participants reported their sex as male, and 78 
percent reported their race as white.  The average reported participant age was 21 years old. 
Of 584 participants in the study, the data for 16 participants were removed from the 
analysis.  There were two reasons for which an observation was removed.  First, some 
participants were repeat participants, such that the second observation would not be independent 
(N=3).  Second, there were some technical difficulties hat led to removal of observations 
(N=13).  The primary technical issue occurred during o e session when the server disconnected, 
which prevented data from being recorded.  Other technical issues were specific to laptop 
failures. The analysis described here is based on the remaining 568 participants.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Allocation rule, pay ceiling and pay floor were all manipulated variables.  Individual 
ability and objective individual performance were masured based on the count of correct entries 
for the training and first paid task sessions, respectively.  All mediators of the model and the 
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subjective individual performance measure were measur d using multiple survey response items.  
Thus, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess the construct validity of the items 
used for the mediators and subjective performance measures.  In addition, variables were 
inspected to ensure they met parametric testing assumptions. 
Prior to running any analysis, three items were re-coded (e.g., 1 was recoded to 5; 2 was 
recoded to 4, and so on), so that the measurement scales would match other items tapping the 
construct.  The reverse coded item for EP expectancy was “The effort that I put into this ta k is 
not related to my performance on this task.”  The reve se coded item for PPay expectancy was 
“My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make.”  The reverse coded item 
for motivation was “I do not care about my performance on this task.” 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was completed o ensure items used to measure 
each construct were related to the intended construct, and not cross-loading onto other related 
constructs.  The analysis was complete in AMOS 20.0(Arbuckle, 2011).  Missing information 
limits the capability of AMOS to run full analyses.  Some cases had missing responses on items 
and had to be excluded for analysis in AMOS.  For the CFA, 558 cases were included.  The 
reduction made for the CFA was not required for the hypothesis tests described later in this 
chapter.  The CFA involved five parts – individual model fit, convergent validity, reliability, 
discriminant validity, and full measurement model fit.  
Individual Construct Model Fit 
 Model fit for each construct was assessed by separately nalyzing the measurement 
model for each construct to the extent possible. In some cases, the latent variable had less than 
four items, requiring fit to be assessed with two latent variables at a time.  Significant χ2 values 
indicate poor model fit when sample sizes are small or medium (Byrne, 2010).  For large sample 
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sizes, significant χ2 values are likely and are not a good indicator of m del fit.  Thus, to assess 
model fit, alternative fit measures were also used with cutoff criteria based on Hu and Bentler 
(1999).  Specifically, CFI values greater than 0.95, SRMR values less than 0.08, and RMSEA 
values less than 0.06 were treated as indications of good model fit.   
For the full five item EP expectancy scale, the RMSEA value was greater than 0.06 
and the χ2 p-value was less than 0.001.  To determine the item that may be problematic, the items 
were reviewed to assess their connection to the undrlying construct.   
EP Expectancy Items: 
1. How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it. 
2. If I try hard, I will do well on this task. 
3. There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task. 
4. If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well. 
5. The effort that I put into this task is not related o my performance on this task. 
(R) 
 
From a review of the items, one item in the EP expectancy scale appeared to be a poor 
fit conceptually.  Specifically, responses to the item, “there is a good chance that my 
performance will be high on this task” could be based on one’s overall motivation rather than 
exclusively one’s beliefs that effort leads to performance.  After removing the item from the 
analysis, model fit improved.  For the four item EP expectancy scale, all fit indicators were 
within recommended limits.  CFI and SRMR values continued to be acceptable.  χ2 p-values and 
RMSEA values were improved and acceptable (χ2 p-value>0.05; RMSEA = 0.05).  
For the PPay expectancy scale, the RMSEA value was also greater than 0.06 and the χ2
p-value was less than 0.001.  Similar to what was done f r EP expectancy, the PPay 
expectancy items were reviewed to assess their conne tio  to the underlying construct.   
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PPay Expectancy Items: 
1. The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make.  
2. How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task. 
3. It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task. 
4. If I perform well, I will make more money. 
5. My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make. (R) 
 
The second item was somewhat inconsistent with a conceptual definition.  Specifically, 
responses to the item, “How much money I make depends o  how well I perform this task” 
seemed to include both PPay expectancy (i.e., the belief that pay was tied to performance) and 
the size of the pay.  That is, rather than simply being a probability, this value indicated an 
amount in a more distinct way than the other items.  The last item “My performance on this task 
will not affect how much money I make” had a similar ssue, but it was not necessary to remove 
additional items as the model fit improved and all model fit indices were satisfactory against the 
cutoffs after removing one item (“How much money I make depends on how well I perform this 
task” was removed, all other items were retained). 
For the motivation scale, fit with the five item scale was acceptable.  Thus, no items were 
removed from the scale.  For pay valence and subjective performance, there were less than four 
items for each construct, so these constructs could not be analyzed individually.  This is because 
there would not be enough degrees of freedom to assess model fit (Kline, 2011).  The four item 
PPay expectancy measure had very good fit, so each construct was run separately with the four 
item PPay expectancy measure to allow for a test of fit.  All alternative fit indices for all three 






Items χ2 (df) χ2 p-value CFI SRMR RMSEA 
EP Expectancy 5 23.18 (5) <0.001 0.98 0.03 0.08 
EP Expectancy 4 5.20 (2) 0.07 0.99 0.02 0.05 
PPay Expectancy 5 56.15 (5) <0.001 0.95 0.04 0.14 
PPay Expectancy 4 1.53 (2) 0.47 1.00 0.01 <0.001 
Motivation  5 6.05 (5) 0.30 1.00 0.01 0.02 
Pay Valence (with 
four item PPay 
Expectancy) 
3 25.78 (13) 0.02 0.99 0.03 0.04 
Subjective 
Performance (with 
four item PPay 
Expectancy) 
2 10.50 (8) 0.23 1.00 0.02 0.02 
 
Convergent Validity 
 Values for the average variance extracted (AVE) were calculated for all latent constructs 
according to the method used above.  That is, the AVE was calculated based on the model of the 
construct alone if possible.  When the item had fewer than four items, the model was run with the 
construct and the four item PPay expectancy construct.  AVE represents the amount of 
variance in observed measures due to the latent cons ruct rather than error.  A value greater than 
0.5 indicates an acceptable AVE value (Kline, 2011) as it indicates the latent construct explains 
more variance than error.  Average variance extracted values for all scales, except the EP 
expectancy scale, were acceptable (PPay = 0.52; Motivation = 0.65; Pay Valence = 0.71; 
Subjective Performance = 0.61).   
The AVE for the four item EP expectancy scale was problematic.  Specifically, the 
AVE for the four item measure was 0.42.  Analysis indicated that the item, “The effort that I put 
into this task is not related to my performance on this task,” had a poor factor loading with a 
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standardized lambda of 0.32 and a squared multiple corr lation value of 0.10.  This poor factor 
loading explained the low AVE.  This item was removed and the model was reanalyzed.  Since 
the removal of this item lead to a less than 4 items, the construct was analyzed with the P ay 
expectancy construct to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom.  The reanalyzed model had an 
improved AVE for EP expectancy (i.e., above the 0.50 threshold, AVE = 0.52) and the model 
fit was acceptable (χ2 (13) = 42.95; p-value <0.001; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA = 0.06).   
A final indicator of convergent validity are lambda v lues.  If the standardized lambda 
values (i.e., the standardized regression weights) are greater than 0.30 and the unstandardized 
values are significant, this is an indication of convergent validity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1998).  All of the separate models had lambda values that were acceptable.   
Reliability 
 Coefficient alpha is a common measure of reliability that can be run in SPSS for each 
variable separately.  Coefficient alpha is a measure of the inter-correlation of items that is 
sensitive to the number of items (i.e., it increases as the number of items increases, Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994).  The coefficient alpha values indicated acceptable levels of reliability.  All 
values exceeded the 0.70 value (EP = 0.76; PPay = 0.74; Pay Valence = 0.84; Motivation = 
0.89; Subjective Performance = 0.75).   The alpha reported for subjective performance is based 





Construct Coefficient Alpha 
EP Expectancy 0.76 
PPay Expectancy 0.74 
Pay Valence  0.84 
Motivation  0.89 
Subjective Performance 0.75 
 
Discriminant Validity 
 There are two approaches that can be used to demonstrate discriminant validity across 
constructs.  The first is the pairwise χ2 difference test.  In this test, a model with two constructs is 
analyzed unconstrained where the correlation between the latent constructs is free to vary and 
then constrained (i.e., nested) where the correlation between the latent constructs is restricted to 
1.  If there is a significant difference between the χ2 values for the two models, such that the 
unconstrained model is a better fit than the constrained model, this provides evidence for 
discriminant validity.  Essentially, this indicates that allowing the constructs to be conceptually 
distinct is superior to treating them as equivalent.  A series of comparisons was run.  For all 
comparisons, it was found that the unconstrained moel was a significantly better fit than the 
constrained model (see Table 19).  According to this test, there was discriminant validity across 
the construct measures.   
The second approach is the Fornell-Larcker test (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  This test can 
be run when the full measurement model is analyzed (i. ., the model that includes all measures 




χ2 Difference Tests of Discriminant Validity 
  Unconstrained 
Constrained/ 
Nested χ2 Difference Test 
 Construct Pairing χ2 df χ2 df 
χ2 
Difference df p-value 
EP & PPay 42.95 13 169.50 14 126.55 1 <0.001 
EP & Motivation 36.18 19 97.33 20 61.15 1 <0.001 
EP & Pay 
Valence 
18.02 8 367.08 9 349.06 1 <0.001 
EP & Subjective 
Performance 
1.42 4 222.50 5 221.08 1 <0.001 
PPay & 
Motivation 
61.41 26 522.74 27 461.33 1 <0.001 
PPay & Pay 
Valence 




10.50 8 248.81 9 238.31 1 <0.001 
Motivation & Pay 
Valence 




11.04 13 245.43 14 234.39 1 <0.001 
Pay Valence & 
Subjective 
Performance 
3.32 4 242.62 5 239.30 1 <0.001 
  
Full Measurement Model Fit 
 All constructs were combined to test overall model fit, assess convergent validity, and 
assess discriminant validity within the context of he full measurement model.  EP expectancy 
and PPay expectancy were analyzed based on the shortened scales.  Overall model fit of the 
full model was acceptable (χ2 (109) = 201.46, p<0.001; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA = 
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0.04).  See Figure 9 for the full measurement model.  Standardized lambda values are 
represented by the arrows from the latent construct o the indicators. 
 Based on the full model, the standardized AVEs were acceptable for all latent constructs 
(EP = 0.52; PO =0.52; Motivation = 0.65; Pay Valence = 0.71; Subjective Performance = 
0.62) and standardized lambdas were all acceptable (> 0.30, Hair et al., 1998), indicating 
convergent validity.   
Running the full model did identify a problem with discriminant validity.  The Fornell-
Larker test involves comparison of the AVE values to correlation values.  If the AVE value is 
less than the correlation squared value, discriminant v lidity is questionable (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981).  When this threshold is not met, it indicates that shared variance between latent constructs 
is greater than the shared variance of the observed measures for their own construct.  The results 
of the Fornell-Larker test are presented in Table 20.  The test indicates that EP expectancy 
may not have discriminant validity from the PPay expectancy and motivation variables.  
Specifically, the AVE values for EP expectancy (0.52) and motivation (0.65) were less than 
the squared correlation value for the latent variables (0.74).  In addition, the AVE values for 
EP expectancy (0.52) and PPay expectancy (0.52) were less than the squared corelation 





Full Measurement Model 
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 Table 20 











EP Expectancy 0.52 0.74 0.86 0.41 0.32 
PO Expectancy 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.39 0.22 
Motivation 0.74 0.37 0.65 0.42 0.25 
Pay Valence 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.71 0.21 
Subjective Performance 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.62 
Note. Values based on standardized weights; AVE values ar  along the diagonal; correlations are 
above the diagonal; squared correlations are below the diagonal. 
 
Summary 
 The confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence of the following.  One, items from the 
EP expectancy variable and the P ay expectancy scales were dropped due to poor fit and 
variance explained.  Two, there was strong evidence for convergent validity and reliability for all 
variables after items were removed for EP expectancy and PPay expectancy.  Three, there 
was evidence for discriminant validity for all varibles, though this evidence was somewhat 
weaker for EP expectancy.  For this variable, there was support for discriminant validity via 
the χ2 difference test; however, the more conservative Fornell-Larker test indicated that the EP 
expectancy measure may not have sufficient discriminant validity.  The evidence seemed 
sufficient for analyzing the model proposed; however, caution is urged in interpretation of the 
findings around the EP expectancy variable.   
 Based on this analysis, variables for hypothesis testing were constructed as follows.  
Variables were computed as means of item responses on 1 to 5 scales for EP expectancies 
(three items), PPay expectancies (four items), motivation (five items), and pay valence (three 
items).  Because the scales for subjective performance were different (i.e., one question was on 
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5-point scale and the other was on a 3-point scale), th  responses were standardized, and the 
mean of the two standardized responses was calculated.  For objective performance, a count of 
correct entries during the task session was used.  For ability, correct entry counts during the 
training session (prior to manipulation information) were used. 
Tests of Analytic Assumptions 
 Completing parametric tests (i.e., multiple regression and ANOVA) is more effective 
when the sampling distribution is normal and variances are homogeneous across conditions 
(Field, 2009).  Thus, variables were tested for homogeneity of variance and normality prior to 
hypothesis testing. 
Homogeneity of Variance 
 The homogeneity of variance assumption concerns the variance of variable values across 
conditions.  The variance should not differ significantly across conditions.  All measured 
variables were tested for homogeneity of variance. 
 To test for homogeneity of variance, Levene’s testcan be used (Levene, 1960).  If 
Levene’s test is significant, it indicates that variances differ across condition.  All tests were not 
significant.  Thus, we can assume homogeneity of variance for all variables across conditions.  




Homogeneity of Variance Tests 
Variable 
Levene 
Statistic (F) df1 df2 p-value 
Training Performance 1.05 7 560 0.40 
Pay Valence 0.35 7 560 0.93 
EP Expectancy 0.72 7 560 0.66 
PPay Expectancy 0.64 7 560 0.72 
Motivation  0.21 7 560 0.98 
Subjective Performance 1.10 7 560 0.36 
Objective Performance 0.30 7 560 0.95 
 
Normality 
 By testing for normality of sample data, it is possible to infer whether the sampling 
distribution is normal (Field, 2009).  The data for all variables were tested for normality visually 
and using skewness and kurtosis statistics.  
 To check for normality visually, frequency distributions and P-P plots (i.e., probability-
probability plots) were constructed.  Comparison of the frequency distribution to the normal 
curve provides a visual representation of the extent of on-normality.  Visual inspection of the 
frequency distributions led to concern regarding the normality of the EP expectancy, PPay 
expectancy, and pay valence measures.  These distributions are presented in Figures 10, 11, and 















Inspections of P-P plots, however, only raised concer s about the objective performance 
variable.  When data on the P-P plots fall along the line, there is evidence that the data are 
normal.  When they do not, there may be an issue with the normality of the data.  See Figure 13 
for the P-P plot for objective performance.  The individual performance count distribution is 
provided in Figure 14. 
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Figure 13   




Individual Performance Histogram 
 
 The results overall were rather ambiguous as to whether normality was a serious concern.  
To further investigate normality, kurtosis and skewn ss quantitative values were analyzed and 
are presented in Table 22.  Standardized kurtosis and skewness values reported in SPSS were 
assessed for deviations from 0.  Skewness and kurtosis values were a concern for objective 
performance and pay valence.  For objective performance, the absolute skewness value was 
greater than 1. For pay valence, absolute skewness and kurtosis values were both greater than 1. 
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Table 22 
Skewness and Kurtosis Values 
Variable Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
Ability -0.77 0.10 0.27 0.21 
EP Expectancy -0.48 0.10 -0.06 0.21 
PPay Expectancy -0.83 0.10 0.90 0.21 
Pay Valence -1.05 0.10 1.92 0.21 
Motivation -0.80 0.10 0.64 0.21 
Subjective Performance -0.05 0.10 -0.84 0.21 
Objective Performance -1.01 0.10 0.75 0.21 
 
 With experimental design, non-normality is primarily a concern within conditions.  That 
is, with 8 conditions, normality should be checked in each condition before concluding that it is a 
concern.  Thus, separate normality checks were run for each condition for the pay valence and 
objective performance variables.  This check of skewness and kurtosis once again confirmed an 
issue with normality for both variables.  See Table 23 for the values by condition.  Overall, the 
pay valence and objective performance measures remain d the only concern.  The problems 
found in the data indicate that two approaches were possible to correct for normality issues 1) 
outliers could be dropped from the analysis, or 2) the data could be transformed.  
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Table 23 
Skewness and Kurtosis by Condition 
Condition Variable N Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
1 
Pay Valence 69 -0.86 0.29 2.02 0.57 
Objective Performance 69 -0.94 0.29 0.43 0.57 
2 
Pay Valence 73 -0.95 0.28 0.71 0.56 
Objective Performance 73 -1.24 0.28 1.66 0.56 
3 
Pay Valence 73 -1.31 0.28 3.51 0.56 
Objective Performance 73 -0.70 0.28 -0.10 0.56 
4 
Pay Valence 71 -0.26 0.29 -1.34 0.56 
Objective Performance 71 -0.96 0.29 0.67 0.56 
5 
Pay Valence 70 -0.89 0.29 1.84 0.57 
Objective Performance 70 -1.23 0.29 1.99 0.57 
6 
Pay Valence 74 -1.56 0.28 3.75 0.55 
Objective Performance 74 -1.08 0.28 0.85 0.55 
7 
Pay Valence 70 -0.78 0.29 1.14 0.57 
Objective Performance 70 -1.09 0.29 0.71 0.57 
8 
Pay Valence 68 -1.39 0.29 2.55 0.57 
Objective Performance 68 -1.10 0.29 1.36 0.57 
 
 Outliers.  One of the potential explanations for non-normality is outliers.  For pay valence 
and objective performance, box plots for outliers in each condition were analyzed. Both sets of 
plots indicated outliers below the mean.  In addition, z-scores were calculated for each case with 
respect to the condition (i.e., the group) mean and standard deviation.  For pay valences, ten 
cases were more than 3 standard deviations from the group mean.  For objective performance, 
three cases were more than 3 standard deviations frm the group mean.  Outliers were all below 
the mean (see Figures 12 and 14 for the distributions).  This suggests that the overall non-
normality of the data may be due somewhat to these outliers creating negative skew.  It is 
possible for there was an ability ceiling to the number of correct entries that could be made in the 
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time provided while motivation likely explains extreme outliers at the bottom of the distribution.  
Another explanation for low values may be that individuals were trying to help group members 
by entering value in other fields (e.g., entering down payment).   
 Transformations.  Both the pay valence and objective performance variables were 
negatively skewed (i.e., had a left tail) and kurtotic (i.e., had peaks above a normal distribution).  
To address this violation, data transformations were investigated.   
 Box-Cox transformations are the ideal transformation for increasing the normality of data 
(Osborne, 2010).  A Box-Cox transformation specifically identifies the transformation needed 
based on the shape of the sample data rather than applying a more general transformation, such 
as the square root or the natural log.  The appropriate transformation for each variable was 
identified using SPSS syntax provided in Osborne (2010).  The ideal λ for objective performance 
was found to be 2.3; for pay valence, the ideal λ was found to be 2.8.  Skewness and kurtosis 
values were improved using the Box-Cox transformation.  For objective performance, the revised 
variable had a skewness value of 0.0, a kurtosis value of -0.24 and a correlation with the 
untransformed performance variable of 0.97.  For pay valence, the transformed variable had a 
skewness value of 0.01, a kurtosis value of -1.102, and a correlation with the untransformed pay 
valence variable of 0.96.   
 Selected Strategy.  Based on the analysis, outlier deletion or data transformation both had 
potential to improve the results of the analysis.  At the same time, both of these approaches have 
drawbacks.  Removal of outliers means removing real data points from the sample data.  Data 
transformations may complicate interpretation of results, especially when both a mediating 
variable and outcome variable undergo a transformation.  In this case, the Box-Cox 
transformations would be different for more than one variable, further confusing interpretations.  
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The central limit theorem indicates that when samples are sufficiently large, we can make 
normality assumptions about the sampling distribution regardless of the normality of the data 
collected (Field, 2009).  The data collected here have over 60 observations per condition, far 
above the requirements of the central limit theorem.   
 In order to deal with the issues aforementioned, hypotheses were tested in three ways.  
First, data were analyzed using all original data with no outlier removal or transformations made.  
Second, data were analyzed with both sets of outliers removed.  Third, data were analyzed with 
both pay valences and objective performance measures transformed using the Box-Cox 
transformation.  Findings were generally consistent across tests (see Table 31 at the end of this 
chapter for a comparison), and the unchanged dataset provides for easier interpretation and 
inference.  Thus, the results reported here are basd on the full, unchanged dataset. Deviations 
from these findings are noted in the text and in Table 31.   
Manipulation Checks 
 Manipulation checks were conducted to ensure that participants were aware of the 
compensation policies for the task.  Most participants correctly entered their minimum and 
maximum pay amounts (i.e., the floor values and ceiling values).  For ceilings, 94% of 
participants in the low ceiling condition and 87% of participants in the high ceiling condition 
entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The most money I, 
individually, can make in this session is $___.”  Results of a one-way ANOVA also indicate that 
individuals recognized the size of the pay ceiling.  The values for the high ceiling condition 
(M=$13.40) were significantly higher than the values for the low condition (M=$8.80) (F(1, 
566)=60.85, p<0.001).  
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For floors, 92% of participants in the low floor condition and 92% of participants in the 
high floor condition entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, 
“The minimum amount of money I, individually, can earn during this session is $___.”  One-way 
ANOVA results indicate that the values for the high floor condition (M=$7.09) were 
significantly higher than the values for the low condition (M=$2.73) (F(1,566)=75.19, p<0.001).  
The means for the allocation rule manipulation checks were also in the expected 
directions.  Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my individual performance,” were significantly 
higher in equity conditions (M=3.72) than in equality conditions (M=2.80) (F(1, 566)=111.75, 
p<0.001).  Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my group's performance,” were significantly 
higher in equality conditions (M=4.43) than in equity conditions (M=3.57) (F(1, 566)=119.79, 
p<0.001).   
Correlations 






Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Ability 6.92 2.68                   
2. Allocation Rule 0.50 0.50 0.00                 
3. Ceiling 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.00               
4. Floor 0.50 0.50 0.09* -0.01 -0.02             
5. EP Expectancy 4.31 0.56 0.17***  0.03 0.00 -0.01          
6. PPay Expectancy 4.26 0.64 0.15***  0.14**  -0.01 -0.02 0.54***         
7. Pay Valence 4.08 0.80 0.08* -0.02 0.10* -0.04 0.35***  0.30***       
8. Motivation 4.30 0.61 0.17***  0.00 0.05 0.00 0.72***  0.49***  0.40***     
9. Subjective Performance 0.00 0.90 0.15***  -0.03 0.00 -0.10* 0.23***  0.15***  0.19***  0.21***    
10. Objective Performance 23.07 6.74 0.58***  0.07ᵻ 0.02 0.00 0.14**  0.13**  0.09* 0.13**  0.22***  










Main and Interaction Effects of Pay Policies on Perfo mance Hypotheses 
To test the relationship between pay range, allocati n rules, and performance (hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3), the manipulated variables were entered as fixed factors in a univariate ANOVA with 
individual performance entered as the dependent variable.  The hypotheses were tested for both 
the subjective performance and the objective performance dependent variables. Regarding the 
entry of the pay range, pay ceilings and pay floors were both entered as fixed factors.  Different 
inferences can be drawn depending on which factors are ignificant at predicting performance.  
A significant relationship between pay ceiling and performance would indicate that the ceiling of 
the range drove the performance effect while a significa t relationship between the pay floor and 
performance would indicate that the floor of the range drove the performance effect.   
Based on this analysis, none of the manipulations or their interactions had a significant 
relationship with objective individual performance.  For subjective performance, the floor of the 
pay range had a significant effect.  Specifically, high floors had lower subjective performance 
(on a standardized scale, M=-0.09) than low floors (M=0.09) (F(1, 560) = 5.68, p<0.05).  
Overall, this analysis indicated that allocation rules were not significantly related to performance 
outcomes while pay range, and specifically pay floors, explained subjective performance 
outcomes.  Thus, based on the full, untransformed dataset, hypotheses 2 and 3 were not 
supported while hypothesis 1 received partial support with the floor of the pay range affecting 
self-reported performance levels. 
Interestingly, the analysis completed on the transformed objective performance variable 
and the analysis completed with outliers deleted, rsulted in significant findings for the allocation 
rule and objective performance relationship.  Specifically, equity allocation rules (M=23.83, 
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based on the outlier deletion method) had significantly higher mean correct income entries than 
equality allocation rules (M=22.60, based on the outlier deletion method; F(1, 548) = 4.85, 
p<0.05).   Thus, based on the transformed and outlier del tion datasets, hypothesis 2 received 
partial support.1 
Expectancy Component Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 4 through 6 addressed the effects of ability, allocation rules, and ceilings on 
the components of expectancy theory.  Hypothesis 4 predicted that ability would be positively 
related to EP expectancy.  Ability was a continuous variable rather than an experimental 
condition, so this relationship was tested by regressing EP expectancy on ability.  The 
relationship was positive and significant, supporting hypothesis 4 (B =0.04, SE=0.01, β=0.17, 
p<0.001).  Ability explained 3 percent of the variance in EP expectancy.  An increase in one 
correct entry during the ability training session was related to a 0.04 increase in reported EP 
expectancy.   
Since allocation rules and ceilings were all experim ntal manipulations, separate 
ANOVAs were run to test their effects.  Hypothesis 5 predicted that PPay expectancies were 
higher in equity allocation rule conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions.  There was 
a significant effect of allocation rule on PPay expectancies (F 1, 566) = 12.00, p<0.01).  
PPay expectancies were higher in equity allocation rule conditions (M=4.35) than equality 
allocation rule conditions (M=4.17).  The partial eta squared was 0.02, which can be interpreted 
as an indication that 2 percent of the variance in PPay expectancies could be explained by the 
allocation rule. 
                                                           
1 Analyses of a subset of data that included only the widest range ($2-$12) and the narrowest 
range ($6-$8) did not yield any findings beyond those reported above. 
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Hypothesis 6 predicted that the mean valence of ceilings in the high ceiling condition 
would be significantly higher than the mean valence of ceilings in the low ceiling condition. 
There was a significant effect of ceiling condition  valences of ceilings (F 1, 566) = 5.69, 
p<0.05).  The valences of high ceilings (M=4.16) were higher than valences of low ceilings 
(M=4.00).  The partial eta squared was 0.01, which can be interpreted as an indication that 1 
percent of the variance in pay valences could be explained by the ceiling condition. 
Ability and pay policy components were significant predictors of expectancy components 
in the expected directions. Thus, hypotheses 4 through 6 were all supported, although the effect 
sizes were quite small. 
Motivation Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 7 through 9 predicted that the expectancy components for exerting high effort 
levels (i.e., EP expectancies, PPay expectancies, and pay valences) would be positively 
related to motivation.  Regression analysis was used to test these hypotheses.  Motivation was 
entered as the dependent variable and EP expectancy, PPay expectancy, and pay valence 
were all entered as independent variables.  The main effects of the expectancy factors explained 
55 percent of the variance in motivation.  The overall model of direct effects was significant 
(F(3, 564) = 233.95, p<0.001).   
Each of the components was significant.  EP expectancies were positively related to 
motivation (β=0.60, p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 7.  P ay expectancies were positively 
related to motivation (β=0.12, p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 8.  Pay valences were positively 






Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 Regression Results 
Variable 
Motivation 
B SE  β 
Constant 0.50 0.15  
EP Expectancy 0.66 0.04 0.60*** 
PPay Expectancy 0.12 0.03 0.12*** 
Pay Valence  0.12 0.02 0.15*** 
R2 0.55   
Adj. R2 0.55 
N 568 
Note. *** p<0.001  
 
One concern raised from the CFA was that the EP variable may be indistinguishable 
from the PO variable.  Thus, multicollinearity statistics were reviewed for the regression 
analysis.  Tolerance statistics for all variables were greater than 0.20 (EP = 0.67; PPay = 
0.69; Valence = 0.86), indicating that a problem of multicollinearity was unlikely (Field, 2009).  
VIF statistics were below 10 (EP = 1.49; PPay = 1.45; Valence = 1.16), another indication 
that multicollinearity was not a serious concern (Hair et al., 1998).   
Hypothesis 10 predicted interaction effects of the expectancy theory components on 
motivation.  Models that exclude important variables and interaction terms are misspecified 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  Thus, the motivation regression was completed with all 
interaction terms included.  That is, a full regression including all variables from hypotheses 7 
through 10 was completed.  This analysis provided a complete model of motivation using the 
expectancy components.   
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To test the interaction effects, EP expectancy, PPay expectancy and pay valence 
were first mean-centered. These mean-centered termswere then multiplied to create interaction 
terms (hypothesis 10a: EP * PPay; hypothesis 10b: PPay * pay valence; hypothesis 10c: 
EP * pay valence; hypothesis 10d: EP * PPay * pay valence.  All main effects were 
entered in step 1 (i.e., EP, PPay, pay valence), two-way interaction effects were entered in 
step 2 (hypotheses 10a, 10b, and 10c), and the thre-way interaction effect was entered in step 3 
(hypothesis 10d). 
In step 1 the three expectancy components from hypot eses 7, 8, and 9 (EP, PPay, 
Pay Valence) remained significant, explaining 55 percent of the variance in motivation.  In step 
2, two of the two-way interactions were significant d one was not. Specifically, the P ay 
expectancy by pay valence interaction (β=0.14, p<0.001), and the EP expectancy by pay 
valence interaction (β=-0.11, p<0.01) were both significant.  The EP expectancy by PPay 
expectancy was not significant.  The addition of two- ay interactions explained an additional 1.3 
percent of the variance in motivation (F Change (3, 561) = 5.60, p<0.01).  In step 3, the three 





Hypothesis 10 Regression Results 
Variable 
Motivation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
β β β 
    
Step 1    
EP Expectancy 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
PPay Expectancy 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12** 
Pay Valence  0.15*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 
    
Step 2    
EP x PPay  -0.06 -0.07 
PPay x Pay Valence  0.14*** 0.12** 
EP x Pay Valence  -0.11** -0.11** 
    
Step 3    
EP x PPay x Pay Valence   -0.05 
 
R2 0.55 0.57 0.57 
∆R2  0.01 0.00 
N 568 
Note. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001    
   
Based on the lack of significance, hypotheses 10a and 10d were not supported.  
Hypotheses 10b and 10c could possibly be supported as the interaction terms were significant for 
each.  In order to determine if the hypotheses were supported, it was necessary to assess the 
nature of the interaction.  Thus, the interactions for 10b and 10c (see Figures 15 and 16) were 
plotted.  The plot for hypotheses 10b indicated that e hypothesis was supported (Figure 15).  
Specifically, the positive PPay motivation relationship was not present when th pay valence 
was below the mean.  This was confirmed by a simple slopes test at pay valence values of -0.8, 
0, 0.8, where 0 is the mean value, -0.8 represents one standard deviation below the mean, and 0.8 
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represents one standard deviation above the mean.  Below the mean, the PPay slope was not 
significant (p=ns); at the mean, the slope was significant (p<0.01); above the mean, the slope 
was significant (p<0.001).  In other words, when the pay valence was low, there was not a 
positive PPay and motivation relationship.   
The plot for hypothesis 10c indicated that the hypothesis was not supported (see Figure 
16).  Interestingly, the EP expectancy and motivation relationship was positive for both high 
and low pay valences; however, in each case, the moderator (i.e., pay valence) appeared to 
strengthen the EP and motivation relationship as it declined.  Thus, the nature of the 
interaction indicates that hypothesis 10c is not supported.  Only hypothesis 10b was supported. 
Figure 15 





EP Expectancy and Pay Valence Interaction Plot 
 
Overall, the regression tests provided support for he PPay by pay valence interaction 
(hypothesis 10b), and no support for hypotheses 10a, 10c, and 10d.   
Performance Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that individual motivation would be positively related to 
individual performance.  This hypothesis was tested for both the subjective performance and the 
objective performance dependent variables.  First, the subjective performance dependent variable 
was regressed on motivation. Motivation explained 4.3 percent of the variance in subjective 
performance (F(1, 566)=25.45, p<0.001).  The relationship between motivation and subjective 
performance was significant and in the expected direction.  Specifically, increases in motivation 
were related to increases in reported performance (B=0.31, SE=0.06, β=0.21, p<0.001).  Second, 
the objective performance dependent variable was regressed on motivation.  Motivation 
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explained 1.8 percent of the variance in the objectiv  performance measure (F(1, 566)=10.23, 
p<0.01).  The relationship between motivation and objective performance was positive and 
significant (B=1.47, SE=0.46, β=0.13, p<0.01).  Together, this analysis indicates support for 
hypothesis 11.  Motivation has a positive relationship with both measures of performance though 
the effect sizes are quite small.    
Hypothesis 12 made a similar prediction to hypothesis 11.  However, rather than 
predicting a relationship between motivation and performance, a positive relationship between 
MFHE (i.e., high effort motivation force) and performance was predicted.  To test this, the EP 
expectancy, PPay expectancy, and pay valence values were multiplied by one another to create 
a motivational force term.  All variables were on 5-point scales.  Checks for normality 
demonstrated that the motivational force term did not violate normality assumptions. 
Performance measures were regressed on the motivatinal force term.  For the subjective 
performance measure, high effort motivation force explained 5.8 percent of the variance in 
performance (F(1, 566)=35.15, p<0.001).  The relationship between MFHE and performance was 
significant and in the expected direction (B=0.01, SE=0.001, β=0.24, p<0.001).  For the objective 
performance measure, MFHE explained 2.1 percent of the variance (F(1, 566)=12.17, p<0.01).  
The relationship was positive and significant (B=0.04, SE=0.01, β=0.15, p<0.01).  Together, this 
analysis indicates support for hypothesis 12.  MFHE has a positive relationship with both 
measures of performance.  While the effect size is small, more variance in performance is 
explained by the MFHE term than the motivation measure.  The correlation between motivational 
force and motivation was 0.65. 
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Tests of Mediational Paths 
Mediational paths were implicitly proposed based on the full model developed.  Thus, in 
this section, mediational paths are tested. Mediation was tested using the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) approach.  For this approach the model was separated into two parts, such that tests were 
conducted to test for 1) a mediating relationship between the independent variables and 
motivation through the expectancy components and 2) a mediating relationship between the 
expectancy components and performance.   
The Baron and Kenny (1986) approach involves four steps.  First, the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable is tested.  If this relationship is 
significant, this is an indicator that a relationship exists and may be mediated.  Second, the 
independent variable and the mediator are tested for a relationship.  Third, controlling for the 
independent variable, the mediator and dependent variable relationship is tested.  If the 
relationships in step 1, step 2 and step 3 are significa t and in the direction predicted, then 
mediation is possible.  The final step is to test for a relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable while controlling for the mediator.  If the relationship falls to 
non-significance, a case can be made for full mediation.  If the relationship is small but still 
significant, partial mediation is established.   
The first Baron and Kenny (1986) test conducted was of EP expectancies as a mediator 
to the ability and motivation relationship.  Step 1 required a significant bivariate relationship 
between ability and motivation.  Referring back to Table 24, the correlation between ability and 
motivation was positive and significant (r=0.17, p<0.001).  Step 2 required the ability and EP 
relationship be significant.  This relationship was te ted for hypothesis 4 and was supported 
(β=0.17, p<0.001).  For the third and fourth steps, both ability and EP expectancy were entered 
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as independent variables in a multiple regression mdel with motivation as the dependent 
variable.  This analysis indicated that EP expectancy fully mediated the ability to motivation 
relationship.  The EP expectancy and motivation relationship remained significant (β=0.71, 
p<0.001) while the ability and motivation relationship became non-significant.  See Table 27 for 
the analysis.  A Sobel test was completed to confirm the mediated relationship (Sobel, 1982).  
Results support full mediation (t=3.95, p<0.001).  EP expectancy fully mediated the 
relationship between ability and motivation.   
 
Table 27 
Ability, EP Expectancy, and Motivation Step 3 and 4 Regression Results 
Variable 
Motivation 
B SE  β 
Constant 0.88 0.14  
Ability 0.01 0.01 0.05 
EP Expectancy 0.78 0.03 0.71*** 
R2 0.52   
Adj. R2 0.52 
N 568 
Note. *** p<0.001  
 
Similarly, PPay expectancies were expected to mediate the allocation rule and 
motivation relationship.  Step 1 required a significant bivariate relationship between allocation 
rule and motivation.  Referring back to Table 24, the correlation between allocation and 
motivation was not significant.  In addition, pay valences were expected to mediate the pay 
ceiling and motivation relationship.  The bivariate relationship between pay ceiling and 
motivation was not significant, indicating there was not a mediated relationship.  Overall, only 
the ability and motivation relationship was fully mediated by the expectancy theory components. 
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Testing the second part of the model, motivation was expected to mediate the relationship 
between the expectancy theory components and performance.  Each expectancy component was 
tested using the Baron and Kenny (1986) method.  Referring back to Table 24, the correlation 
between EP expectancy and performance was positive and significa t for both subjective 
(r=0.23, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.14, p<0.01) performance.  The EP expectancy and 
motivation relationship was tested for hypothesis 7 and was supported.  For the third and fourth 
steps, both EP expectancy and motivation were entered as indepennt variables in a multiple 
regression model with performance as the dependent variable (see Table 28).  For subjective 
performance, EP expectancy remained significant while motivation dropped to non-
significance.  For objective performance, neither EP expectancy nor motivation were 










EP Expectancy 0.08 0.17** 
Motivation 0.07 0.09 
R2 0.02 0.06 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.05 
N 568 568 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; ** p<0.01.  
 
Next, motivation was tested as a mediator of the PPay expectancy and performance 
relationship.  The correlation between P ay expectancy and performance was positive and 
significant for both subjective (r=0.15, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.13, p<0.01) performance, 
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indicating support for Step 1 of the Baron and Kenny (1986) test.  Step 2 required the P ay 
expectancy and motivation relationship to be signifcant.  This relationship was tested for 
hypothesis 8 and was supported.  The bivariate correlation between the two variables was also 
significant (r=0.49, p<0.001).  For the third and fourth steps, both PPay expectancy and 
motivation were entered as independent variables in a multiple regression model with 
performance as the dependent variable (see Table 29).  For subjective performance, PPay 
expectancy dropped to non-significance while motivation remained significant.  For objective 
performance, both PPay expectancy and motivation were non-significant.  A Sobel test was 
completed to confirm the mediated relationship betwe n PPay expectancy and subjective 
performance (Sobel, 1982).  Results support mediation for subjective performance (t=3.62, 
p<0.001).  Overall, this provides partial support fo mediation; motivation mediated the 
relationship between PPay expectancy and subjective performance, but not the relationship for 
objective performance.   
Table 29 






PPay Expectancy 0.08 0.06 
Motivation 0.09 0.18*** 
R2 0.02 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.04 
N 568 568 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; *** p<0.001. 
 
Motivation was also expected to mediate the pay valence and performance relationship.  
For step 1, the correlation between pay valence and performance was positive and significant for 
both subjective (r=0.19, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.09, p<0.05) performance.  Step 2 required 
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the pay valence and motivation relationship to be significant.  This relationship was tested for 
hypothesis 9 and was supported.  The bivariate correlation between the two variables was also 
significant (r=0.40, p<0.001).  For the third and fourth steps, both pay v lence and motivation 
were entered as independent variables in a multiple regression model with performance as the 
dependent variable (see table 30).  For objective performance, pay valence dropped to non-
significance while motivation remained significant.  For subjective performance, both pay 
valence and motivation were both significant, indicating there may be partial rather than full 
mediation.  The coefficient for pay valence and subjective performance dropped from the 
bivariate relationship.  Results of the Sobel test support mediation for both objective 
performance (t=2.50, p<0.05) and subjective performance (t=3.29, p<0.001).  Overall, there is 
support for motivation as a mediator of the pay valence and performance relationship.   
Table 30 






Pay Valence 0.04 0.13** 
Motivation 0.12* 0.16** 
R2 0.02 0.06 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.05 
N 568 568 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
 
The expectancy components were also expected to interact to predict motivation, which 
predicted performance, indicating motivation mediated the relationship between the interactions 
and performance.  These relationships can also be test d using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
method as well by testing the relationship between th  interactions and the dependent variable 
(step 1), the relationship of the interactions with the mediator (step 2), and the relationship of the 
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mediator with the outcome variable when controlling for the interaction variable (steps 3 & 4).  
The only difference from the prior tests of mediation presented above is that for interactions, the 
lower order terms are entered in the regressions that include the interaction variable (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005).  This approach is sometimes called the 
“Moderated Causal Steps Approach” to testing first stage moderation (Edwards & Lambert, 
2007, p. 5). 
A check of support of prior hypotheses indicated that mediation for most interactions 
would not be supported and did not require further esting.  The three-way interaction and 
motivation relationship was not supported (hypothesis 10d) and the relationships between the 
EP interactions and motivation were not supported (hypothesis 10a and 10c).  Thus, these first 
stage moderation relationships did not require further esting. 
Only the PPay expectancy by pay valence interaction required further testing for first 
stage moderation since hypothesis 10c was supported.  However, the PPay by pay valence 
interaction term did not have a significant relationship with the subjective or objective 
performance variables.  Thus, there is not evidence that motivation mediates the relationship 
between the PPay by pay valence interaction and performance.   
Follow-up Analyses 
Based on the full model, the relationship between pay policies and individual 
performance may be best specified by controlling for individual ability.  Ability is expected to 
both affect performance directly and through EP expectancies.  To isolate the pay policy 
motivational effect on performance, including ability in the model specification may be a better 
test.  Thus, a follow-up test for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 was conducted by entering ability as a 
covariate in a univariate ANOVA with individual perfo mance as the dependent variable.  
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For objective performance, ability (F(1, 562)=290.52, p<0.001) and allocation rules 
(F(1,562)=4.54, p<0.05) were both significant predictors.  Performance was higher for those 
high in ability versus those low in ability as would be expected.  Equity allocation rules 
(M=23.57) had higher mean correct income entries than equality allocation rules (M=22.58), 
consistent with hypothesis 2. 
For subjective performance, ability (F(1, 562)=14.51, p<0.001) and pay floors (F 1, 
562)=7.58, p<0.01) were significant predictors.  As with objective performance, performance 
was higher for those high in ability than for those low in ability.  The high floor, as in the prior 
analysis, had lower mean subjective performance ratings (on a standardized scale, M=-0.09) than 
low floors (M=0.09).  Overall, the evidence provided through direct tests suggests that ability is a 
consistent predictor of performance, that allocation rules significantly predict objective, but not 
subjective performance, and that pay floors significantly affect subjective, but not objective 
performance.  There is no evidence to indicate that pay ceilings significantly affect performance 
outcomes. 
Summary 
 A summary of the results for all hypotheses is provided in Table 31.  The intention of this 
table is to demonstrate that findings are consistent across attempts to correct for potential 
problems in the data related to normality and outliers.  As can be seen in the table, results were 
robust across remedies.  The notable difference is that allocation rules are significant when the 
dependent variable is transformed, when objective performance outliers are removed from the 
analysis, and when ability is controlled for in theanalysis.  Overall, the results reported here 
indicate that the basic linkages were as hypothesized, while only a few of the interaction 
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Not supported for 
objective performance 
Supported for floor and 
subjective performance  
Not supported for 
objective performance 
Supported for floor and 
subjective performance 
Not supported for 
objective performance 




Supported in follow-up 
analysis with ability as a 
covariate 
Supported for objective 
performance 
Supported for objective 
performance 
Hypothesis 3 Not supported Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 4 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 5 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 6 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 7 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 8 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 9 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 10 
10a: Not Supported 
10b: Supported 
10c: Not Supported 
10d: Not Supported 
10a: Not Supported 
10b: Supported 
10c: Not Supported 
10d: Not Supported 
10a: Not Supported 
10b: Supported 
10c: Not Supported 
10d: Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11 Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 12 Supported Supported Supported 
 
 Results about the relationship between ability and pay policies and expectancy equation 
components were all as hypothesized.  Ability was related to EP expectancies, equity 
allocation rules lead to higher PPay expectancies than equality allocation rules, and high pay 
ceilings had higher valences than low pay ceilings. Variance explained for each expectancy 
component by its respective predictor was less than3 percent.   
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 Motivation was well-explained by the expectancy comp nents.  In fact, 56 percent of the 
variance in motivation could be explained by EP expectancy, PPay expectancy and pay 
valence.  These relationships cannot be treated as causal since random assignment was applied to 
the pay policy conditions rather than the expectancy components; however, the power of the 
expectancy components in explaining motivation is an important contribution.  Each component 
contributed significantly to explaining motivation when all were run in the same regression.  
EP expectancy was the strongest in this relationship, but PPay expectancy and pay valence 
also contributed.   
 Interactions of the expectancy components added only 1.3 percent of variance explained 
in motivation.  PPay expectancy interacted with pay valences according to the expectancy 
theory formulation.  Motivation was flat across P ay expectancy levels when pay valences 
were low, but the PPay expectancy and motivation relationship was positive when pay 
valences were high.  Interestingly, EP expectancy also interacted with pay valence, but not in 
the way hypothesized.  In fact, the slope of the EP expectancy and motivation relationship was 
steeper when pay valence was low.  One explanation for the lack of interaction findings is that 
the measures for the expectancy components had range estrictions issues, which reduces power 
(Aguinis & Stone-Romero, 1997).  Specifically, the m an for EP expectancy was 4.31 with a 
standard deviation of 0.56, the mean for P ay expectancy was 4.26 with a standard deviation 
of 0.64, the mean for pay valence was 4.08 with a standard deviation of 0.80, and the mean for 
motivation was 4.30 with a standard deviation of 0.61.   
 The performance hypotheses modeled the motivation nd performance relationship two 
ways.  In hypothesis 11, the five item motivation scale variable was treated as the predictor; in 
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hypothesis 12, the motivational force for high effort (per expectancy theory’s formulation, Porter 
& Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) was treated as the predictor.  
 Both approaches lead to a significant explanation of performance; however, the 
motivational force variable consistently explained a greater proportion of the variance in the 
performance dependent variable.  This was the case across both performance measures.  For 
objective performance, the five item motivation measure explained 1.8 percent of the variance 
while motivational force explained 2.1 percent.  This may seem small, but in fact, the variance 
explained by motivational force was around 15 percent more than the variance explained by the 
five item motivation measure.  For subjective performance, motivation explained 4.3 percent of 
the variance while motivational force explained 5.8 percent of the variance.  The motivational 
force variance explained was around 30 percent higher than the variance explained by the five 
item motivation scale. 
 All of the model links, except for some of the interactions, were supported.  Mediation 
test results were less supportive.  Support was found for EP expectancy as a mediator of the 
ability and motivation relationship.  The other expctancy components did not mediate the 
relationship between pay policies and motivation.  Interestingly, there was evidence that 
motivation mediated the relationship between both ceiling valances and PPay expectancies and 
performance measures.  Motivation did not, however, m diate the relationship between EP 
expectancies and performance measures.  It is interesting that in the first set of mediational tests, 
mediation was not found for the pay policies, but in the second set of mediational tests, 
mediation was found for their associated expectancy components.  Based on this set of tests, 
there is no evidence for a fully mediated path betwe n pay policies and performance outcomes.  
 
124 
Still, the pay policies do appear to affect expectan y components in a causal way, and these 








 Despite an abundance of empirical work on the topic f pay variation, the accumulation 
of pay variation research has been inconclusive regarding the relationship between pay variation 
and performance outcomes (Conroy et al., in press; Shaw, 2014).  As such, recent work has 
focused on revising theoretical frameworks to reveal the nuances of the pay variation construct 
and its relationship with organizational outcomes.  Gupta et al. (2012) recognized the importance 
of the type and source of pay variation.  Downes and Choi (2014) drew attention to employee 
reactions in response to pay variation.  And Conroy et al. (in press) noted that cross-level issues 
of both the pay variation construct and its effects were important to work focusing on pay 
variation.  Each of these papers raised important issues, but none conducted an empirical test.  In 
this study, these more nuanced views of pay variation were recognized and taken into account.  
Boundary conditions established a central focus on horizontal performance-based pay variation.  
Individual reactions were tested.  And rather than assuming pay variation was the same as 
allocation rules, it was treated as pay range using a pay policy approach.   
Allocation rules were significantly related to objective individual performance, when 
controlling for ability and when outliers were removed from the analysis.  Pay range did not have 
a significant relationship with objective individual performance while the floor of the pay range 
had a significant relationship with self-reported, subjective individual performance.  In this 
section, I return to the original purposes of this study and discuss the findings within the context 
of the broader pay variation literature. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed and 




The overarching purpose of this research was to investigate a number of underlying 
assumptions applied in research addressing the pay variation and firm performance relationship.  
Three specific assumptions were identified and tested: 1) the assumption that allocation rule 
arguments are appropriate for explaining pay variation’s effects, 2) the assumption that pay 
variation has a relationship with individual motivaion and performance, and 3) the assumption 
that pay variation is the cause of individual motiva on and performance outcomes.   
Allocation Rule Arguments Applied to Pay Variation 
A central concern of this study was to distinguish equity/equality arguments from pay 
variation arguments.  Comparing the theory and results for allocation rules and pay range 
provides compelling evidence that these are conceptually distinct policies and that using 
allocation rule arguments to explain pay variation’s effects is questionable.  In this study, pay 
range was manipulated as a separate variable from all cation rules.  The arguments made for 
allocation rules differed from those for pay range.  Allocation rules affected PPay expectancies 
while the pay range, and specifically the pay ceiling, affected the valence of the pay outcome for 
high effort.  This leverage on different parts of the expectancy equation is one important piece of 
evidence indicating separation of these constructs and their theoretical arguments is important to 
pay variation research.   
Furthermore, allocation rules had a reasonably consistent effect on objective individual 
performance while pay range did not have a significant effect.  Perhaps what is rewarded is more 
influential in explaining behaviors than the size of the reward.  Of course, there exist a limitless 
number of levels of pay range.  The test presented here was based on one set of ranges.  A 
potential explanation for the lack of a range effect is a common limitation in laboratory studies.  
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Specifically, the ranges used for this short-term study are of less importance than the ranges 
associated with one’s professional career.  The valnce difference between a $1,000 bonus and a 
$10,000 bonus is likely to be much more influential than the difference between $2 and $12 for a 
short time period of work.  Still, the reality that the allocation rule was influential but pay range 
was not certainly provides evidence of the difference and uniqueness of these constructs and the 
importance of treating them separately in pay research.   
Considering these results in the context of the pay variation research stream provides 
some interesting implications.  Many of the studies conducted on the pay variation and 
performance relationship have found a significant relationship between pay variation and 
performance, though whether this relationship is poitive and negative varies (Ding, Akhtar, & 
Ge, 2009; Frick, Prinz, & Winkelmann, 2003; Lee et al., 2008; San & Jane, 2008).  The 
significant findings of prior research combined with the lack of significant findings for pay range 
in this study raise the question: what do the significant pay variation and firm performance 
findings of prior research actually represent?   
Much of the work that has reported a significant pay v riation and firm performance 
relationship has not ensured that pay differences ar  b sed on performance, such that pay 
variations were likely the result of many factors.  Pay variations may be indicative of seniority 
differences in seniority-based pay organizations, of favoritism when managers allocate pay, of 
variations in team performance in organizations that have team-based incentive pay, or variations 
in individual performance in organizations with indivi ual performance-based pay (Conroy et 
al., in press; Gupta et al., 2012; Gupta & Jenkins, 1996).   As noted in the Chapter 2 critique of 
the pay variation research, papers reporting a negativ  relationship may be conducted in contexts 
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where pay variation is based on non-performance factors or where performance-based pay is 
controlled. 
Regarding papers reporting a positive relationship, in some cases, these papers address 
pay variation in performance-based pay contexts and address team-level performance outcomes 
(e.g., Simmons & Berri, 2011).  When this occurs, the relationship that is found may actually be 
representative of allocation rules.  Specifically, repeated implementation of an equity allocation 
rule on a team should lead to greater pay variation over time if the same individuals tend to have 
low and high performance.  When empirical tests get closer to an allocation rule test (e.g., team-
level tests, individual performance-based pay contexts), the effect of allocation rules may explain 
positive findings; when empirical tests move away from allocation rule tests (e.g., firm-level 
tests, controls for performance-based pay, lack of performance-based pay contexts, differences in 
within and between group distributions), negative relationships become more likely to emerge.  
Thus, some of the prior research on pay variation may actually test allocation rules in a distal 
way.  Directly testing allocation rules would likely lead to clearer, more consistent results.  The 
confounding of allocation rules, incentive intensity, pay basis and other factors helps to explain 
the variety of findings in the literature.   
In all, the lack of clarity in the meaning of the pay variation construct seems to drive 
much of the confusion in this literature.  Taking a different approach to measuring compensation 
policies may yield clarity for the field of compensation; it may also provide more consistent 
findings with greater effect sizes.     
Pay Variation and Individual Performance 
 A second assumption tested in this study was the relationship between pay variation and 
individual motivation and performance.  Specifically, it is often assumed that pay variation 
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influences individual outcomes and these outcomes can be aggregated to explain firm-level 
outcomes.  A test of this argument has been lacking, however.  In this study, the relationship 
between pay range and individual performance was tested to address this concern.  The findings 
of this study support that, to some extent, individual responses are related to pay policies (e.g., 
expectancy components were affected by policies), though support for objective individual 
performance effects is less clear.  Allocation rules appeared to have a relationship with objective 
performance while pay range, specifically pay floor, only affected subjective, or more precisely, 
self-reported performance.   
As part of recognizing the difference between alloction rules and pay range, the 
difference between pay ceilings and pay floors within e pay range was addressed empirically.  
Subjective performance was related to pay range.  Narrower pay ranges were associated with 
lower self-reported, individual performance than wider pay ranges.  Because the study design 
allowed for separation of ceilings and floors, this finding can actually be interpreted as more 
nuanced.  The ceiling did not have a significant effect on subjective, self-reported performance; 
rather the floors were related to self-reported, subjective performance.  More specifically, when 
floors were low, subjective performance reports were higher than when floors were high.   
In trying to understand the results for self-reported performance, it is possible that floors 
affect these reported values in either a conscious or an unconscious way.  In comparing condition 
means, high floors had higher objective performance means and lower subjective performance 
means while low floors had lower objective performance means and higher subjective 
performance means.  The relationships for objective performance are not significant, but it is 
interesting that the means are in opposite directions, indicating the possibility of intentional or 
unintentional inaccurate reporting.  
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One potential explanation for the finding that floors were influential is that when lower 
floors characterize the pay system, individuals may be more likely to 'fudge' estimates of their 
own performance in hopes that they will receive a higher pay amount.  If this is the case, it may 
be that wider pay ranges encourage dishonest behaviors in an effort to avoid the lower end of the 
range.  The repercussions of low performance (i.e.,lower pay) may provide motivation to report 
higher performance levels (Lawler & Rhode, 1976).  When participants reported their 
performance levels, they did not actually have knowledge of the performance measurement 
system.  It seems possible that, given this uncertainty, some participants might have believed 
their own performance evaluation would determine their payouts.   
Another possibility is that the floor engages a certain mindset around performance.  For 
example, low floors may engage an avoidance motivation (e.g., a motivation to avoid pain, Elliot 
& McGregor, 2001).  This avoidance motivation may be to avoid being the lowest performer and 
may manifest in self-reports that are somewhat inflated for low floors.  Essentially, participants 
may not have consciously chosen to over-report performance, yet may have done so because of 
this underlying mindset. 
Regardless, the issue with self-reported performance i  a pay-for-performance system 
should encourage researchers to be careful of generalizing self-reported performance findings to 
objective performance implications of compensation systems.  Objective performance is 
arguably more important than subjective performance to firm outcomes.  Furthermore, additional 
work teasing out the effects of pay ceilings, pay floors, and pay ranges seems important for 
future work on pay variation. 
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Causal Inferences in Pay Variation Research 
The third assumption addressed in this study was in regard to whether there is a causal 
relationship between pay variation and individual responses.  In regard to performance, discussed 
at length above, pay range was not found to have a causal relationship with objective 
performance.  This is interesting because the link between pay range and individual performance 
is an important one to much of the pay variation research (Conroy et al., in press; Downes & 
Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012).  As previously noted, one possible explanation is the artificiality 
of the laboratory setting.  Another related explanation is that the pay manipulations may not have 
been sufficiently different, such that the narrow range was not small enough to find an effect.  
Mitra, Gupta, and Jenkins (1997) reported that a just noticeable difference for a raise in pay was 
around 7 percent.  The difference between $6 and $8, the smallest range in this study, is much 
more than 7 percent.  It may be that distinctions in pay must simply meet a threshold of 
noticeability to affect performance.  Finally, it is possible that allocation rules are actually a more 
important pay policy than pay range for influencing performance outcomes.  That is, what 
matters is how pay is distributed not how much pay is distributed.  If this is the case, it seems 
possible that fairness might explain performance responses.  Research that simultaneously 
addressed how motivation and fairness operate in the relationship between allocation rule and 
performance could address this possibility. 
Interestingly, the allocation rule was a more consistent, significant predictor when ability 
was controlled in the model.  The effect of allocation rule was significant across all datasets (i.e., 
untransformed, transformed, and with outlier removal) when ability was included as a covariate.  
This has implications for the pay variation literature as there has been discussion that controlling 
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for ability removes important variance related to the pay variation and performance relationship 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  Research that has addressed this issue has been conflicting.  
In this study, controlling for ability allowed the allocation rule effect to emerge.  This 
finding contrasts Gerhart and Rynes (2003) argument that controlling for ability suppresses a 
positive pay variation and performance relationship.  The difference may be explained by sorting 
effects (i.e., attraction and retention of employees due to firm policies and practices, Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003).  That is, firms with pay-for-performance are likely to attract and retain a higher 
caliber of employee, which is called a sorting effect.  This sorting effect has been established in 
prior work.  For example, Shaw and Gupta (2007) repo t d higher performers were less likely to 
turn over from firms with highly communicated, performance-based pay variation.  Since the 
study reported here was experimental and at the individual-level, the result is not surprising.  
That is, there are not sorting effects in this study design as participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions. Thus, the only effect of the manipulated pay policy would be a motivational effect.  
By controlling for ability, the motivational effect ould be isolated.  Much of the research on pay 
variation and firm performance may be representative of both sorting effects and incentive 
effects.  By not allowing for sorting effects, it is expected that the overall pay policy and 
performance relationship should be smaller than in organizations, though this does not prevent 
the motivation effect from emerging in the study.  This suggests that the small effects in this 
study may be due to a lack of the sorting opportunities n the experiment.  Additional work 
teasing out these models would be of great value. 
Some of the findings presented here do speak to causal effects of pay range.  Expectancy 
theory components were related to pay policies as hypot esized.  Ceilings affected pay valences 
and allocation rules affected PPay expectancies.  With random assignment to conditi s, the 
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results are supportive of a causal relationship betwe n the policies and expectancy theory 
mechanisms proposed.  Testing the expectancy theory framework was an additional contribution 
to the individual responses assumption prevalent in pay variation research.  Expectancy theory 
has been applied to pay variation theorizing in multiple papers (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014; 
Gupta et al., 2012; Conroy et al., in press), but has not been tested specifically.    
Summary and Recommendations 
In all, the differences in findings across allocation rules and pay range seem to provide 
strong evidence that pay range and equity/equality rguments should not be confused.  They 
address different pay policies in organizations and their confounding is inappropriate.  I suggest 
an end to this confusion, a shift to separating the policies and arguments that have become so 
entwined in this area of research. 
An important point raised in this study is that pay v riation is most representative of the 
incentive intensity policy of the firm.  This is an issue often raised when the competing 
hypotheses approach is used to explain the pay variation and performance relationship.  That is, 
pay variation is viewed as a proxy for high incentive intensity and this is hypothesized to be 
motivational.  If this is the logic, why not measure incentive intensity rather than a proxy for 
incentive intensity?  Similarly, why not measure allocation rules if the effects of allocation rules 
are of interest?   
It seems likely that prior work has taken the pay vriation approach because pay variation 
data are available through public sources for certain groups.  These data sources may be 
convenient, but work taking this approach continues to muddy the literature around incentive 
intensity and allocation rules.  Pay variation measure  may be representative of an accumulation 
of individual equity allocation rules over time with he same employees increasingly performing 
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highly; these measures may also represent a multitude of organizational factors related to pay. 
Most current models do not fully address these issue  theoretically or empirically.   
The study presented here does not provide clear evidence of a pay range and individual 
performance relationship.  The causality of high incentive intensity policies that create pay 
variation and firm performance continues to be unclear.  It may be more beneficial to actually 
ask firms about their pay policies if this is the interest of the researcher.  Much of the field work 
on pay variation is unclear regarding what the pay variation construct actually represents. 
Another recommendation is that researchers put an end to the old model of correlating 
pay variation measures and firm performance to test competing hypotheses that postulate a 
positive effect of pay variation based on tournament/agency/expectancy arguments versus a 
negative effect of pay variation based on equity/relative deprivation arguments.  Rather, the field 
of pay research would benefit from a move toward multi-level frameworks.   
Pay variation from a multi-level perspective would account for the correct levels of 
theoretical arguments.  For example, in this study, a positive relationship between pay range and 
individual performance was proposed based on expectancy theory.  Extensions of this study 
could address the relationship between pay range and individual affective responses based on 
theories more proximal to affective responses than motivation (e.g., justice theories).  Both 
motivational and affective responses may be important to the aggregation of individual-level 
effects to the group-level and to the firm-level.  Simply testing the pay variation and firm 
performance ignores far too much of the complexity involved in this research area, nuances 
across levels must be addressed.  In sum, studying pay policies (rather than rough measures) and 





 One study alone cannot sufficiently answer the many questions that arise for 
organizational leaders and managers in the realm of how to allocate resources to the workforce.  
It is important to keep in mind that in addition to motivation and performance, employees also 
experience feelings of unfairness and deprivation in response to pay policies and decisions.  
These feelings may lead to sorting effects, such that good employees leave the firm while poor 
employees stay (Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Shaw & Gupta, 2007).  As such, the practical 
implications noted here must be considered within a bro der context of the pay variation 
literature.   
 For organizational leaders designing pay programs, thi  study provides evidence that pay 
policies affect the motivational responses of employees.  Allocation rules appear to be important 
to influencing individual performance while pay range effects are unclear.  The results of this 
study give greater support to the idea of making distinctions among employees, but little support 
is provided regarding the size of these distinctions.  
Drawing on the findings related to expectancy theory, it appears that employees have 
stronger perceptions that pay will be tied to their own performance when equity rules are used 
than when equality rules are used.  A long tradition in expectancy theory research, as well as the 
results of this study, has shown that these expectancies do influence motivation and performance 
behaviors (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996).  When employees 
can see the relationship between their performance d their outcomes, it creates an impetus to 
perform, assuming the outcomes are valued.  This aligns with Shaw’s (2014) recommendation 
that identifiability (i.e., the ability to measure p rformance) is important to understanding pay 
variation’s effects.  When performance can be measur d at the individual-level, organizations 
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may benefit from allocating pay in a way that recognizes individual contributions through 
rewards. 
 Valences of outcomes are also influenced by the pay policies.  When employees see 
greater value in the rewards they can earn, they ar likely to be more motivated to perform well.  
In fact, the interaction between PPay expectancies and pay valences suggests that it is not 
simply important to align pay and performance for individuals.  Rather, it is important to tie 
rewards of value to high performance as this increases the strength of the PPay relationship 
with motivation.  Together, these findings indicate that pay policies which increase P ay 
expectancies and high effort outcome valences simultaneously may have the most profound 
effects on employee behaviors.  
 This study also speaks to issues facing supervisors and managers.  The clear importance 
of PPay expectancies and pay valences on motivation and performance suggests managers 
should create environments where employees experienc  ncreased PPay expectancies and pay 
valences.  One clear way to do this is to measure individual performance and reward such 
performance.  While managers may have less power over the budgets in their firms, they may be 
able to make allocation decisions that ensure employees have a clear line of sight regarding the 
performance to pay relationship.  When these performance measures and allocation approaches 
are in place, good communication with employees can also increase employee perceptions of the 
relationship between pay and performance.   
 As expected, ability was found to have a relationship with EP expectancies, which 
mediated the relationship between ability and motivation.  In fact, EP expectancies were the 
greatest predictor of motivation in this study.  Managers may benefit from creating an 
environment that increases the EP expectancies of their individual employees.  This may be 
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accomplished through stronger communication around good performance to increase feelings of 
self-efficacy (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993) or though training and selection practices that 
ensure highly capable employees. 
In sum, the importance of the expectancy components in affecting motivation and 
performance indicates that perceptions are central to explaining employee motivation.  So, it is 
not simply important that policies create an environment where performance is tied to valued 
outcomes.  It is also important that sufficient communication ensures employees are aware of 
these policies. 
Limitations 
Studies must be designed with consideration of the costs and benefits associated with a 
selected research design.  This investigation is no different.  A number of limitations note 
caution in interpreting results and may explain unsupported findings.  Here, these limitations are 
noted.  Limitations of one study may suggest future di ctions for follow-up studies.  These 
potential directions are also addressed.   
Generalizability 
In order to strengthen internal validity, an experimental design in a laboratory setting was 
used.  The use of a laboratory setting limits the realism of the pay policies and work 
environment.  Individuals in the study were not actu l employees; they were not trying to 
maintain employment or dealing with the host of pressures that are generally experienced in 
organizations.  The focus of this study was almost entirely on pay, such that other important 
outcomes to individuals, such as group relationships were weak.  Individuals did not know other 
members of their group or have concerns about a long-term working relationship.  In 
organizations, these relationships are likely to be important to the motivational force equation.  
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For example, acceptance from coworkers may be an important outcome for consideration in the 
motivational force equation.  Research in the field that measures other outcomes and individual 
differences regarding the value of these outcomes by employees could address this limitation.  
Prior field research findings in this area have been ambiguous, leading to a need to isolate pay 
policies in a lab setting and use experimental design to address causality.  This study has taken a 
step in that direction.  The knowledge gained from this study can be used to improve future field 
research on strategic compensation issues.  Specifically, as discussed earlier, pay policies may 
represent a better approach to measuring compensatio  strategies in future field research rather 
than simply pay variation. 
Another issue is the use of undergraduate students as a sample.  It would be reasonable to 
question the generalizability of this sample to the working population.  However, there are a 
number of reasons why the undergraduate sample may be ppropriate.  One, undergraduate 
business majors represent a population of current and future employees in organizational entry-
level positions.  Two, the pay ranges that could be paid in this study were more likely to be 
meaningful to an undergraduate than to individuals that are currently employed.  If we want to 
see how individuals react to different pay ranges, there is a need to use meaningful ranges.  It is 
unlikely that a manager would respond to the amounts of pay available in this study; however, 
undergraduates may view these potential payouts as valuable spending money.  In order to test 
for causality, an experimental approach was valuable, it would be far too expensive to conduct 
this kind of test with large amounts of money at stke.  Since students represent current and 
future employees at a time in their lives where lower amounts of money may be seen as valuable, 
this was an ideal sample for an experimental test dpite its limitations.   
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In general, a tradeoff was made in this study betwen external validity and internal 
validity, such that internal validity was given priority.  This study allowed for causal inference 
and helped identify problems in pay variation field research.  The knowledge from this study can 
be valuable for future research in field settings.  Addressing incentive intensity and allocation 
policies in actual organizations, rather than using pay variation as a proxy measure, can build on 
this study’s findings and address external validity concerns. 
Motivation-related Variance in Performance 
Another study limitation is the restricted amount of ime that participants were actually 
engaged in the paid task.  This limitation may explain a lack of motivation-related variance in the 
dependent performance measure.  The amount of variance explained in performance by 
motivation was around 1 to 2 percent for objective performance and 5 percent for subjective 
performance.  Considering that performance is a functio  of motivation and ability (Campbell, 
1990), this is a small amount.   
It may be that the performance measured in this study was more reflective of maximum 
performance than typical performance (Klehe & Anderson, 2007).  Maximum performance 
represents ability more than motivation and occurs when three conditions are met (Klehe & 
Anderson, 2007; Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988).  One, individuals are aware they are being 
evaluated.  This was part of the study since evaluation was required in order to distribute 
payment.  Two, the participant accepts the expectation that performance is maximized.  This may 
vary some, and is likely to be the reason that motivation had any relationship with performance.  
Three, the time duration is short.  The five minute in rvals in this study were short.  This 
decision was made to ensure that the overall study did not take too long, as this might have 
lowered participation and engagement in the study.  However, future research would benefit 
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from using tasks that take more time to complete.  Overall, a valuable modification to this study 
design would be to extend the task performance time, so that motivation would be required for a 
participant to continue performing the task well.  This would allow for greater variation in the 
performance variable and this variance would assist in detecting effects of pay policies. 
Group-level Outcomes and Affective Responses 
This study was also limited in that it focused entirely on individual-level responses.  This 
was the scope of the study.  Yet, we know that some sort of pay variation and performance 
relationship exists at the firm level based on prior research (Conroy et al., in press; Shaw, 2014).  
The cross-level nature of pay variation has been explicated in recent work (Conroy et al., in 
press).  The study presented here can be taken as evidence that there is a link between pay 
policies and motivational mechanisms, but it does not say anything about group-level or firm-
level outcomes of these policies.   
There may be interesting changes in effects as levels change.  For example, the 
heterogeneity and homogeneity of the motivation mechanisms within a group may influence 
what occurs at the group-level.  Similarly, the interdependence of the group may affect the extent 
to which individual motivation and performance are ctually related to group motivation and 
performance.  This suggests two areas for additional work.  One, as noted earlier, is testing the 
multi-level and cross-level relationships inherent in pay variation research.  Conroy et al. (in 
press) outlined a starting point of propositions for such an endeavor.  The other is to vary the 
level of interdependence of groups to assess how the effects of allocation rules and incentive 




The sorting effects (i.e., retention of certain types of employees) of pay variation policies 
were also not addressed in this study.  Still, these effects are important to consider.  Gerhart and 
Fang (2014) proposed that sorting effects are an important part of the pay-for-performance 
puzzle.  Though it was beyond the scope of this investigation to address sorting effects, the study 
presented here has identified a potential approach to addressing the sorting issue in the pay 
variation literature by separating incentive intensity and allocation rules rather than confounding 
them in one pay variation measure.  Incentive intensi y may make the pay system more salient to 
employees and lead them to have stronger positive or n gative affective reactions to allocation 
rules, leading to retention and turnover among employees, respectively.  These responses may 
also differ by the performance level of the employee.  Supporting this conjecture, Shaw and 
Gupta (2007) reported that highly-communicated, performance-based pay variation was related 
to lower turnover among high performing employees.  The sample was truck drivers, arguably an 
environment dominated by individual performance-based pay (i.e., similar to equity allocation 
rules).  Thus, a potential prediction is that high performers will have strengthened reactions to 
allocation rules as the incentive intensity increases with equity allocation being more desirable 
and equality allocations being less desirable.  Addressing these sorting questions is valuable to 
the area of pay variation because findings would have implications for firm performance 
outcomes.  The loss of good employees could have seriou  negative implications for the firm 
while the loss of poor employees may be desirable.  
Conclusion 
This investigation identified and tested assumptions f pay variation research.  The value 
of separating equality/equity arguments from pay variation arguments is the primary contribution 
of this work.  Most importantly, this study leads to the recommendation that strategic 
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compensation research would benefit by moving toward a more policy-based approach to 
addressing important compensation issues rather than using blunt proxy measures, such as pay 
variation.  Only by continually studying the effects of pay can the academic knowledgebase 
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in advance of that date.  However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate your obligation 
to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval.  Federal regulations prohibit 
retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue the project prior to 
the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval.  The IRB Coordinator can 
give you guidance on submission times. 
This protocol has been approved for 550 participants. If you wish to make any modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 








TO: Samantha Conroy 
 Nina Gupta 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: PROJECT MODIFICATION 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-04-687 
 
Protocol Title: Explaining the Effects of Pay Variation on Individual Outcomes 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date:  06/04/2013  Expiration Date:  05/06/2014  
 
Your request to modify the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB.  This protocol is 
currently approved for 550 total participants. If you wish to make any further modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
Please note that this approval does not extend the Approved Project Period.  Should you wish to 
extend your project beyond the current expiration date, you must submit a request for 
continuation using the UAF IRB form “Continuing Revi w for IRB Approved Projects.”  The 
request should be sent to the IRB Coordinator, 210 Administration.   
For protocols requiring FULL IRB review, please submit your request at least one month prior to 
the current expiration date. (High-risk protocols may require even more time for approval.)  For 
protocols requiring an EXPEDITED or EXEMPT review, submit your request at least two weeks 
prior to the current expiration date.  Failure to obtain approval for a continuation on or prior to 
the currently approved expiration date will result in ermination of the protocol and you will be 
required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the project.  Data collected past 
the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the dataset should you wish to 
publish.  Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can be certified by the IRB for 
any purpose.    
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 








TO: Samantha Conroy 
 Nina Gupta 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: PROJECT MODIFICATION 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-04-687 
 
Protocol Title: Explaining the Effects of Pay Variation on Individual Outcomes 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date:  06/24/2013  Expiration Date:  05/06/2014  
 
Your request to modify the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB.  This protocol is 
currently approved for 550 total participants. If you wish to make any further modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
Please note that this approval does not extend the Approved Project Period.  Should you wish to 
extend your project beyond the current expiration date, you must submit a request for 
continuation using the UAF IRB form “Continuing Revi w for IRB Approved Projects.”  The 
request should be sent to the IRB Coordinator, 210 Administration.   
For protocols requiring FULL IRB review, please submit your request at least one month prior to 
the current expiration date. (High-risk protocols may require even more time for approval.)  For 
protocols requiring an EXPEDITED or EXEMPT review, submit your request at least two weeks 
prior to the current expiration date.  Failure to obtain approval for a continuation on or prior to 
the currently approved expiration date will result in ermination of the protocol and you will be 
required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the project.  Data collected past 
the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the dataset should you wish to 
publish.  Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can be certified by the IRB for 
any purpose.    
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 








TO: Samantha Conroy 
 Nina Gupta 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: PROJECT MODIFICATION 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-04-687 
 
Protocol Title: Explaining the Effects of Pay Variation on Individual Outcomes 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date:  07/19/2013  Expiration Date:  05/06/2014  
 
Your request to modify the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB.  This protocol is 
currently approved for 550 total participants. If you wish to make any further modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
Please note that this approval does not extend the Approved Project Period.  Should you wish to 
extend your project beyond the current expiration date, you must submit a request for 
continuation using the UAF IRB form “Continuing Revi w for IRB Approved Projects.”  The 
request should be sent to the IRB Coordinator, 210 Administration.   
For protocols requiring FULL IRB review, please submit your request at least one month prior to 
the current expiration date. (High-risk protocols may require even more time for approval.)  For 
protocols requiring an EXPEDITED or EXEMPT review, submit your request at least two weeks 
prior to the current expiration date.  Failure to obtain approval for a continuation on or prior to 
the currently approved expiration date will result in ermination of the protocol and you will be 
required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the project.  Data collected past 
the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the dataset should you wish to 
publish.  Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can be certified by the IRB for 
any purpose.    
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 








TO: Samantha Conroy 
 Nina Gupta 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: PROJECT MODIFICATION 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-04-687 
 
Protocol Title: Explaining the Effects of Pay Variation on Individual Outcomes 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date:  02/06/2014  Expiration Date:  05/06/2014  
 
Your request to modify the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB.  This protocol is 
currently approved for 613 total participants. If you wish to make any further modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
Please note that this approval does not extend the Approved Project Period.  Should you wish to 
extend your project beyond the current expiration date, you must submit a request for 
continuation using the UAF IRB form “Continuing Revi w for IRB Approved Projects.”  The 
request should be sent to the IRB Coordinator, 210 Administration.   
For protocols requiring FULL IRB review, please submit your request at least one month prior to 
the current expiration date. (High-risk protocols may require even more time for approval.)  For 
protocols requiring an EXPEDITED or EXEMPT review, submit your request at least two weeks 
prior to the current expiration date.  Failure to obtain approval for a continuation on or prior to 
the currently approved expiration date will result in ermination of the protocol and you will be 
required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the project.  Data collected past 
the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the dataset should you wish to 
publish.  Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can be certified by the IRB for 
any purpose.    
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 









PROJECT TITLE: Financial services task   
INVESTIGATORS:  Samantha Conroy, Nina Gupta  
 
RESEARCH PURPOSE AND DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES:  The purpose of this 
research is to study performance on a financial servic s task. You will watch a training video 
that teaches you how to perform a financial services task. Then, you will have the chance to 
practice the task. Finally, you will perform the task over two different sessions. Throughout 
the study, you will also be completing a number of surveys. You will receive course extra 
credit for completing this study. You also have an opportunity to earn money by working on 
the task in this study.   
 
TIME COMMITMENT INVOLVED:  About 100 to 120 minutes 
 
RISKS AND CONFIDENTIALITY: No risk is anticipated in this study. In addition, your 
responses will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Data 
from the experiment will be saved into an electronic format that is identifiable only by 
number.  GPA and SAT/ACT score data will be matched to participant ID numbers using 
student ID numbers.  Student ID numbers will then b deleted and only participant ID 
numbers will remain in the electronic data. 
 
BENEFITS: Increased understanding of the academic research process.  
 
CONSENT 
I have been fully informed of the above-described procedure with its possible benefits and risks. 
I understand that my responses will be kept confidet al to the extent allowed by law and 
University policy. I voluntarily give permission for my participation in this study. I know that the 
investigator and his/her associates will be available to answer any questions I may have. If, at 
any time, I feel my questions have not been adequatly nswered, I may request to speak with 
the primary investigator, Samantha Conroy, at 479-55-6105. If I have any questions about my 
rights as a research participant, I can contact the University’s Compliance Coordinator, Ro 
Windwalker, at 479-575-2208. 
 
We need your GPA and SAT/ACT score to help us with the statistical analysis of the data. Your 
information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy.  
 
     I give the researchers permission to obtain my GPA and SAT/ACT score from my student 
records.  
     I do NOT give the researchers permission to obain my GPA and SAT/ACT score from my 





Participation in this study is voluntary and you may choose not to participate without any 
negative consequences. You may also choose to stop at any time during your participation. 
 
__________________________________________            
Student ID Number    
__________________________________________            
Name (Printed)   
__________________________________________           __________________________ 










Thank you for participating in our study. 




This is a multi-university study, and members of your group are at other universities. 









Individuals participating in the study will be organized into groups of 8 to enter information from 
paper applications into an electronic database. You and other members of your group will be able 
to work together to complete the task through an electronic system. 
There are 8 group members because there are eight fields to be entered per application. Each 
member of your group will be responsible for entering a different piece of information. 
Your group’s participation in the task will help usa sess data entry effectiveness when there are 




There are three binders at your work station – a blue inder marked training, a green binder 








Inside the binders you will see mortgage applications. 
These documents were developed to look like actual loan applications, so that we can determine 
how well this multi-location data entry system works. 
These documents contain pieces of information that will be entered into an electronic database 
by your group. 
 
 
The applicant ID on the mortgage application will be important for matching the paper forms to 











The information that your group will enter includes: 
Monthly payments and total liabilities… 
 
 









Of these entries, each group member has a different value that he or she is responsible for 
entering. 
Look for your university in this table. In the same row, you will see the field that you are 












You are at the University of Arkansas, so you will be responsible for entering income 
 
 
To begin the task, you will first login. 






Your username is your four digit participant ID number given to you on an index card when you 



















Enter your participant ID and password, then click ok. 
If you made a mistake, click cancel and enter the information again. 
 
 







































As a reminder, participants at the University of Arkansas, enter income. That means once you 













To enter the data, start by checking the applicant ID number on the electronic form and matching 
it to the paper application. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: The paper applications are in numerical order from lowest to highest inside the 
binder; however, the electronic forms are likely to show up in a different order. So it is important 
that you always match the applicant ID on the electronic form to the applicant ID on the paper 




Once you have matched the ID, enter the value for income from the paper form into the field on 








You should enter only numbers; the program will not accept any other characters, such as dollar 





When you are completing the task with your group, you will notice that various other fields will 
have entries. This is because other group members ar  simultaneously entering information. 
You may edit the other fields if you feel like helping your group members. But your main job is 
to enter the information in your assigned field. 
When you are finished with a form click “Save and Next,” and a new form will appear. 
Please note once you click “Save and Next,” you cannot go back to make changes to the form. 






You will have a limited amount of time for data entry. 
For the training practice session, you will have 2 minutes. For the TASK1 session, you will have 
5 minutes. For the TASK2 session, you will have 5 minutes. 
Time is tracked on a timer as you work on the task. 




If you have questions about entering information on forms, you may replay this video before 
moving forward.  You can also refer to the mortgage data entry help card inside the training 
binder at any time during the study.  When you are comfortable that you are ready to practice the 
task, you should click next. During the practice session, you will practice the task alone. 
But you will begin working with a group for the TASK1 session.  And you will continue 
working with the same group for the TASK2 session. 
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Abbreviation Construct Scale Source 
A Agreeableness  Goldberg, 1999 
ACO Achievement Orientation Jackson, 1984 
AFO Affiliation Orientation Jackson, 1984 
ANG Anger  
Izard, 1971; Shaver, Schwartz, 
Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987 
APAP 
Achievement Performance Approach 
Motivation Trait 
Elliot & McGregor, 2001 
APAV 
Achievement Performance Avoidance 
Motivation Trait 
Elliot & McGregor, 2001 
C Conscientiousness  Goldberg, 1999 
CA Cognitive Ability  NA 
CV Ceiling Pay Valence  NA 
DJ Distributive Justice  Colquitt, 2001 
E Extraversion Goldberg, 1999 
EFT Effort  NA 
EP 
EP Expectancy for Task 
Performance  
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
ES Emotional Stability  Goldberg, 1999 
FG Feeling of being in a Group NA 
FR Fear  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
FT Fairness  
Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; 
Nicklin, Greenbaum, McNall, 
Folger, & Williams, 2011 
FTC Fairness Counterfactual  
Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; 
Nicklin et al., 2011 
FV Floor Valence  NA 
GL Group Liking  Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999 
GLT Guilt  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
HOP Hope  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
HPP Happiness  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
I Intellect or Imagination Goldberg, 1999 
IC Interest in Continuing NA 
IJ Informational Justice  Colquitt, 2001 
MCAR Manipulation Check Allocation Rule  NA 
MCC Manipulation Check Ceiling  NA 
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Abbreviation Construct Scale Source 
MCF Manipulation Check Floor  NA 
MCR Manipulation Check Range NA 
MOT Motivation  NA 
NA Negative Affect  
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988 
OJSS Observer Justice Sensitivity 
Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & 
Arbach, 2005 
PA Positive Affect  Watson et al., 1988 
PJ Procedural Justice  Colquitt, 2001 
POI PO Expectancy Intrinsic  
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
POM PPay Expectancy, Money 
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
PSA Pay Satisfaction Administration  Heneman & Schwab, 1985 
PSL Pay Satisfaction Level  Heneman & Schwab, 1985 
PSS Pay Satisfaction Structure  Heneman & Schwab, 1985
RLF Relief  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
SD Social Desirability  
short form, Crowne & Marlow, 
1960; Reynolds, 1982 
SDN Sadness  Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987 
SGP Subjective Group Performance NA 
SIP Subjective Individual Performance  NA 
SVI State Valence Intrinsic 
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
SVM State Valence Money  
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
TVI Trait Valence Intrinsic 
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
TVM Trait Valence Money 
Adapted from the full study 
described in Djurdjevic (2013) 
VJSS Victim Justice Sensitivity Schmitt et al., 2005 
-R- Reverse Coded   












We would like to ask you some questions about yourself. Please answer these questions as 
candidly as you can. Remember that your answers are completely confidential. No one 
outside the project staff will ever know your answers. 
 
1.  Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 
 


























































QI1_a ACO a. Purposeful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_b ACO b. Achieving  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_c AFO c. Loyal  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_d ACO d. Enterprising  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_e AFO e. Good-willed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_f ACO f. Capable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI1_g ACO g. Resourceful  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




2. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 
 





























































QI2_a AFO a. Connected  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI2_b ACO b. Industrious  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI2_c AFO c. Pleasant  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI2_d AFO d. Good-natured  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI2_e AFO e. Companionable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI2_f ACO f. Aspiring  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 






3. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 




























































QI3_a AFO a. Warm  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_b AFO b. Neighborly  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_c AFO c. Cooperative  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_d ACO d. Driven  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_e ACO e. Accomplishing  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_f ACO f. Ambitious  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI3_g ACO g. Competitive [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




4. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 


























































QI4_a AFO a. Diplomatic  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI4_b AFO b. Friendly  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI4_c AFO c. Sociable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI4_d ACO d. Productive  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI4_e ACO e. Self-improving  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI4_f AFO f. Approachable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 












5. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 
 


























































QI5_a APAP a. It is important for me to do well 
compared to other people.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_b E b. I don't mind being the center of 
attention.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_c I-R c. I have difficulty understanding 
abstract ideas.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_d OJSS d. I am upset when someone is treated 
worse than others.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_e AFO e. I enjoy being with friends.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_f ACO f. I respond positively to competition.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_g E g. I talk to a lot of different people at 
parties.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI5_h E-R h. I have little to say.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
6. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 
 



























































QI6_a ACO a. I am willing to work toward distant 
goals.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI6_b C b. I am always prepared.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI6_c E-R c. I don't talk a lot.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI6_d I d. I have a rich vocabulary.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI6_e ES-R e. I have frequent mood swings. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 





7. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI7_a ES-R a. I often feel blue.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_b APAV b. My fear of performing poorly is 
often what motivates me.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_c ES c. I seldom feel blue.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_d VJSS d. It makes me angry when others 
get an award which I have 
earned.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_e E-R e. I don't like to draw attention to 
myself.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_f APAV f. My fear of performing poorly on 
new tasks is often what motivates 
me.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_g A g. I take time out for others.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI7_h APAV h. I just want to avoid doing poorly 
when I start new tasks.  























8. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 




























































QI8_a AFO a. I make an effort to maintain 
associations with people.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_b ACO b. I am willing to put forth effort to 
attain excellence.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_c I c. I am full of ideas.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_d I d. I am quick to understand things.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_e OJSS e. I am upset when someone does 
not get a reward he/she has 
earned.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_f E f. I feel comfortable around people.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI8_g A-R g. I feel little concern for others.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
9. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI9_a ES-R a. I am easily disturbed.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_b ES-R b. I get irritated easily.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_c C c. I like order.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_d VJSS d. It bothers me when others receive 
something I deserve. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_e ES-R e. I change my mood a lot.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_f AFO f. I make an effort to win 
friendships.  




I just want to avoid doing poorly.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI9_h ACO h. I aspire to accomplish difficult 
tasks.  




10. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI10_a C-R a. I make a mess of things.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_b OJSS b. I get upset when I see someone 
else treated unfairly.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_c I-R c. I do not have a good imagination.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_d E d. I am the life of the party.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_e APA
V 
e. My goal is to avoid performing 
poorly. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_f A f. I have a soft heart.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_g E g. I start conversations. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI10_h C h. I pay attention to details.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
11. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI11_a A a. I make people feel at ease. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_b E-R b. I am quiet around strangers. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_c A c. I feel others' emotions.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_d VJSS d. I get upset when I feel unfairly 
treated.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_e ACO e. I maintain high standards. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_f I-R f. I am not interested in abstract 
ideas.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI11_g I g. I have excellent ideas. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




12. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI12_a C-R a. I often forget to put things back in 
their proper place.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_b A b. I am interested in people.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_c ES-R c. I worry about things.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_d APAP d. It is important for me to do better 
than others.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_e OJSS e. It gets me down to see someone 
being criticized for things that are 
ignored with others.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_f ES-R f. I get stressed out easily. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI12_g I g. I use difficult words.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
13. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI13_a ES-R a. I get upset easily.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI13_b A-R b. I am not really interested in others.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI13_c AFO c. I accept people readily.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI13_d C d. I get chores done right away.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI13_e I e. I have a vivid imagination.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI13_f ES f. I am relaxed most of the time.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 







14. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI14_a APAP a. My goal in performance situations 
is to do better than other people.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI14_b AFO b. I enjoy being with people.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI14_c E-R c. I keep in the background.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI14_d VJSS d. I get upset when other people are 
treated better than me.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI14_e A-R e. I am not interested in other people's 
problems.  






15. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you. 
 



























































QI15_a C a. I follow a schedule.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI15_b OJSS b. I am upset when someone is 
undeservingly worse off than 
others.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI15_c A c. I sympathize with others' feelings.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI15_d VJSS d. It bothers me when others receive 
something that ought to be mine.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI15_e C-R e. I leave my belongings around. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




16. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please 
indicate how often you have experienced each of these f elings in the last year.  
 



























QI16_a PA a. Active [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_b NA b. Upset [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_c NA c. Ashamed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_d PA d. Strong [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_e NA e. Jittery [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_f NA f. Afraid [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI16_g PA g. Excited [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 







17. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please 
indicate how often you have experienced each of these f elings in the last year.  
 




























QI17_a NA a. Hostile [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_b PA b. Proud [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_c PA c. Enthusiastic [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_d PA d. Alert [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_e PA e. Inspired [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_f PA f. Determined [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI17_g NA g. Scared [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 






18. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please 
indicate how often you have experienced each of these f elings in the last year.  
 




























QI18_a NA a. Distressed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI18_b NA b. Nervous [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI18_c NA c. Guilty [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 





19. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following statements. 
 



































QI19_a TVI a. Doing the right thing is important to me.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_b SD b. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t 
get my way.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_c TVI c. I value doing the right thing.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_d SD d. I’m always willing to admit it when I 
make a mistake.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_e SD e. I am sometimes irritated by people who
ask favors of me.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_f TVM f. I value money a lot.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI19_g TVM g. I really like money.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 












20. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following statements. 
 
 


































QI20_a SD a. I have never deliberately said something 
that hurt someone’s feelings.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_b SD b. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always 
a good listener.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_c TVM-
R 
c. Most things in life are more important 
than money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_d SD d. There have been times when I was quite
jealous of the good fortune of others.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_e SD e. I have never been irked when people 
expressed ideas very different from my 
own.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_f SD f. There have been occasions when I took 
advantage of someone.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_g TVI g. I want to do things that are important.  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI20_h SD h. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with 
my work if I am not encouraged.  






















21. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following statements. 
 


































QI21_a SD a. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive 
and forget.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI21_b SD b. On a few occasions, I have given up doing 
something because I thought too little about 
my ability.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI21_c SD c. I am always courteous, even to people who 
are disagreeable. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QI21_d SD d. There have been times when I felt like 
rebelling against people in authority even 
though I knew they were right.  




Doing a job right is important to me.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your background and experiences. Please 
remember that your answers are completely confidential.  Please answer honestly. Type in the 
required information or mark the indicated spaces for your responses. 
[QI22] 22. Are you currently a student at the University of Arkansas (pick one)? 
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 22a 
[2] No  ------------------ Go to Question 23 
[QI22a CA] 22a. What is your current college GPA? _______  
[QI23] 23. Have you taken the SAT (pick one)? 
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 23a 
[2] No  ------------------ Go to Question 23 
[QI23a CA] 23a. What is your SAT score? _______  
[QI24] 24. Have you taken the ACT (pick one)? 
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 24a 
[2] No  ------------------ Go to End of Questionnaire I 
[QI24a CA]  24a. What is your ACT score? _______  





Before you start TASK1, we have some questions for you. Please answer these questions as 
candidly as you can.  Remember that your answers are completely confidential. No one 
outside the project staff will ever know your answers. 
  
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 
 


































QII1_a 1POM a. The better I perform on this task, the more 
money I will make. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII1_b 1POI-
R 
b. My performance on this task will not 
affect how content I feel about this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII1_c 1POM c. How much money I make depends on 
how well I perform this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII1_d 1MOT d. I am very motivated to do well on this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 











2. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII2_a 1EFT a. I will probably exert a lot of effort on 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII2_b 1MOT b. I feel driven to do well on this task. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII2_c 1POI c. How good I feel about this task depends 
on how well I perform. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII2_d 1MOT d. I really want to do well. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII2_e 1SVM e. The money I can make on this task is 
important to me. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII2_f 1EP f. How well I do on this task depends on 
how much effort I put into it. 




3. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 






































QII3_a 1EP-R a. The effort that I put into this task is not
related to my performance on this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII3_b 1SVI b. I want to feel good about myself by 
performing well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII3_c 1POM c. It is likely that I will make more money 
if I perform well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII3_d 1SVM d. I value the money that I can earn for 
this task. 





4. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 
 


































QII4_a 1SVI a. I want to do the right thing by 
performing well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII4_b 1MOT b. I am motivated to perform well on this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII4_c 1POI c. The better my performance on this 
task, the better I will feel about myself. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII4_d 1SVM d. I want the money I can make for this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII4_e 1POM e. If I perform well, I will make more 
money. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
 
 
5. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 




































a. I plan to take it easy while performing 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII5_b 1EP b. If I try hard, I will do well on this task. [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII5_c 1MOT-
R 
c. I do not care about my performance on 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] 
QII5_d 1EP d. There is a good chance that my 
performance will be high on this task. 







6. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 







































QII6_a 1EP a. If I put my mind to it, I should be able to 
perform this task well. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_b 1POI b. If I perform this task well, I will feel that I 
have done something worthwhile. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_c 1EFT c. I plan to work hard in this session. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_d 1POI d. It is likely that I will feel that I have done 
something worthwhile if I perform well 
on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_e 1EFT e. I will try really hard on this task. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_f 1POM
-R 
f. My performance on this task will not 
affect how much money I make. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII6_g 1SVM g. Getting paid for this task is quite valuable 
to me. 














7. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 
 


































QII7_a 1MCR a. There is a small difference in the most and 
the least money I could make in this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_b 1MCC b. The maximum amount of money I can 
earn on this task is large. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_c 1FTC c. Pay for this task could be distributed o 
group members differently. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_d 1FT-R d. I really don't agree with how I will be paid 
for this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_e 1FT e. The approach to distributing pay for this
task is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_f 1FTC f. I think my pay should be based only on 
my own performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_g 1MCR g. There is a large difference in the most and 
the least money I could make in this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII7_h 1MCA
R 













8. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII8_a 1FTC a. I don't think how much I make should 
depend on my group's performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII8_b 1FTC b. I think pay should be distributed to 
group members differently for this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII8_c 1MCR-
R 
c. There is a small difference in the most 
and least money my group could make 
in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII8_d 1FTC d. I wish they had used a different way to 
distribute pay to group members in 
this study. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII8_e 1MCR e. There is a big difference in the most 
and least money my group could make 
in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII8_f 1MCAR f. My own performance will make a big 
difference in how much money I make 
in this session. 




















9. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII9_a 1MCAR a. Pay on this task is based on my 
group's performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
QII9_b 1MCAR b. I really want my group to do well in 
this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
QII9_c 1FT c. The way pay is distributed in this 
study is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
QII9_d 1MCAR d. How much I make in this session 
depends on my group's performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
QII9_e 1MCAR e. How much money I make in this 
session depends on my own 
performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  























10. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII10_a 1MCAR a. I really want to do well in this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII10_b 1MCF b. The minimum amount of money I 
can earn on this task is small. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII10_c 1FTC c. Pay for this task should be 
distributed to group members 
differently. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII10_d 1MCAR d. Pay on this task is based on my 
individual performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII10_e 1MCAR e. The group's performance will 
make a big difference in how 
much money I make in this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII10_f 1FT f. Distributing pay based on 
performance is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
11. Below are several statements regarding the maximum co pensation for the task you 
will be performing (TASK1). Each statement has a missing value.  Please fill in the 
blank for the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement. 
 
 
QII11_a 1MCC a. The most money my group can make in this 
session is  
$_____________. 
QII11_b 1MCC b. The most money I, individually, can make 









12. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII12_a 1CV a. I would really like to make this 
much money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII12_b 1CV b. I want to make this amount of 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII12_c 1CV c. I really value this amount of 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
13. Below are statements regarding the minimum compensatio  for the task you will be 
performing (TASK1). Each statement has a missing value.  Please fill in the blank for 
the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement. 
 
QII13_a 1MCF a. The minimum amount of money my 
group can make in this session is 
$_____________. 
QII13_b 1MCF b. The minimum amount of money I, 
individually, can make in this session is 
$_____________. 
 
14. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the minimum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK1). 
 


































QII14_a 1FV a. I would really like to make this 
much money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII14_b 1FV b. I want to make this amount of 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QII14_c 1FV c. I really value this amount of 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 





We have a few quick questions for you while we calculate performance. 
 




[4] Very Good 
[5] Excellent 
 




[4] Very Good 
[5] Excellent 
 
[QIII3 – 1SIP] 3. Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you 





[QIII4 – 1SGP] 4. Group performance is rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you expect 












Please answer the following questions as candidly as you can.  Remember that your 
answers are completely confidential.  No one outside the project staff will ever know your 
answers. 
  
1. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have 
right now.  Please indicate the extent to which youare currently experiencing each 
emotion. 


















































QIV1_a 1SDN a. Upset [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_b 1HOP b. Hopeful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_c 1FR c. Worried [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_d 1RLF d. Relief [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_e 1FR e. Tense [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_f 1ANG1 f. Irritated [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_g 1FR g. Nervous [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_h 1HPP2 h. Enthusiastic [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV1_i 1ANG2 i. Mad [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
2. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have 
right now.  Please indicate the extent to which youare currently experiencing each 
emotion. 
 


















































QIV2_a 1SDN a. Discouraged [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_b 1HPP1 b. Cheerful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_c 1HOP c. Eager [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_d 1SDN d. Sad [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_e 1ANG1 e. Annoyed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_f 1SDN f. Disappointed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_g 1GLT g. Guilt [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV2_h 1FR h. Anxious [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




3. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have 





















































QIV3_a 1HOP a. Optimistic [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_b 1HPP2 b. Excited [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_c 1HPP1 c. Joyful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_d 1HPP2 d. Thrilled [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_e 1HPP1 e. Happy [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_f 1ANG2 f. Angry [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_g 1GLT g. Regret [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV3_h 1ANG1 h. Aggravated [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 




4. We would like to know how you feel about the way pa was distributed in your group 
for TASK1.  Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following. 
 
 


































QIV4_a 1PJ a. Pay is distributed fairly among my group 
members. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV4_b 1PJ b. I think the way pay is distributed among 
group members is just. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV4_c 1PJ c. I like the way pay is distributed in my
group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV4_d 1PJ d. It makes sense to distribute money across 
group members this way. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV4_e 1PJ e. I agree with the way my group members 
were paid. 




5. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the 
TASK1 session.  Please answer these questions as hone tly as possible.  To what extent 
does how much money you made... 
 


















































QIV5_a 1DJ a. ...reflect the effort you have put 
into your work? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV5_b 1DJ b. …reflect what you have 
contributed to the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV5_c 1DJ c. …reflect how hard you worked on 
the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV5_d 1DJ d. …reflect what you should have 
made? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
6. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the 
TASK1 session.  Please answer these questions as hone tly as possible.  To what extent 
























































a. …really unfair considering your 
hard work? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV6_b 1IJ b. …consistent with what you 
expected? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV6_c 1DJ c. …fair? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV6_d 1IJ d. …consistent with what you were 
told? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV6_e 1DJ e. ...appropriate for the work you 
have completed? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV6_f 1DJ f. ...justified, given your 
performance? 




7. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much 
money you made for the TASK1 session.  For each statement, decide how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay.  How satisfied are you with... 


































QIV7_a 1PSL a. …the size of your pay for performance 
on this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV7_b 1PSS b. …the pay structure used for this task? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV7_c 1PSS c. …the differences in pay across 
performance levels on the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV7_d 1PSL d. …the level of pay you earned for 
performance on this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV7_e 1PSL e. …the level of pay you earned for this 
task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV7_f 1PSS f. …the way pay was distributed among 
group members? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
8. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much 
money you made for the TASK1 session.  For each statement, decide how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay.  How satisfied are you with... 
 


































QIV8_a 1PSL a. …the size of your pay for this task? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV8_b 1PSS b. …the way pay was administered to 
group members? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV8_c 1PSS c. …the way pay was determined? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV8_d 1PSL d. …the amount of money you made for 
performing this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV8_e 1PSA e. …the information you were given 
about the pay structure? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV8_f 1PSL f. …the amount of money you made for 
this task? 





9. The statements below describe how you feel about the group with which you worked 






































QIV9_a 1GL-R a. I would prefer to be in a different group. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV9_b 1GL b. I like the people in my group. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV9_c 1GL-R c. I don’t like the other people in my 
group. 





QUESTIONNAIRE IV (CONTINUED) 
Before you start TASK2, we have a few more questions for you. Please answer these 
questions as candidly as you can.  Remember that your answers are completely 
confidential.  No one outside the project staff will ever know your answers. 
 
10. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV10_a 2POM a. The better I perform on this task, the 
more money I will make. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV10_b 2POI-
R 
b. My performance on this task will not 
affect how content I feel about this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV10_c 2POM c. How much money I make depends on 
how well I perform this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV10_d 2MOT d. I am very motivated to do well on this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV10_e 2EFT e. I want to work hard in this session. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
11. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 


































QIV11_a 2EFT a. I will probably exert a lot of effort on 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV11_b 2MOT b. I feel driven to do well on this task. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV11_c 2POI c. How good I feel about this task depends 
on how well I perform. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV11_d 2MOT d. I really want to do well. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV11_e 2SVM e. The money I can make on this task is 
important to me. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV11_f 2EP f. How well I do on this task depends on 
how much effort I put into it. 




12. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 
 



































QIV12_a 2EP-R a. The effort that I put into this task is not
related to my performance on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV12_b 2SVI b. I want to feel good about myself by 
performing well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV12_c 2POM c. It is likely that I will make more money 
if I perform well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV12_d 2SVM d. I value the money that I can earn for this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
13. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV13_a 2SVI a. I want to do the right thing by 
performing well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV13_b 2MOT b. I am motivated to perform well on 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV13_c 2POI c. The better my performance on this 
task, the better I will feel about 
myself. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV13_d 2SVM d. I want the money I can make for this 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV13_e 2POM e. If I perform well, I will make more 
money. 





14. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 





































a. I plan to take it easy while performing 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV14_b 2EP b. If I try hard, I will do well on this task. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV14_c 2MOT-
R 
c. I do not care about my performance on 
this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV14_d 2EP d. There is a good chance that my 
performance will be high on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
15. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV15_a 2EP a. If I put my mind to it, I should be able 
to perform this task well. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_b 2POI b. If I perform this task well, I will feel 
that I have done something 
worthwhile. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_c 2EFT c. I plan to work hard in this session. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_d 2POI d. It is likely that I will feel that I have 
done something worthwhile if I 
perform well on this task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_e 2EFT e. I will try really hard on this task. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_f 2POM-
R 
f. My performance on this task will not 
affect how much money I make. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV15_g 2SVM g. Getting paid for this task is quite 
valuable to me. 





16. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 


































QIV16_a 2MCR a. There is a small difference in the most 
and the least money I could make in 
this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_b 2MCC b. The maximum amount of money I can 
earn on this task is large. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_c 2FTC c. Pay for this task could be distributed to 
group members differently. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_d 2FT-R d. I really don't agree with how I will be 
paid for this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_e 2FT e. The approach to distributing pay for 
this task is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_f 2FTC f. I think my pay should be based only on 
my own performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV16_g 2MCR g. There is a large difference in the most 
and the least money I could make in 
this session. 














17. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 


































QIV17_a 2FTC a. I don't think how much I make 
should depend on my group's 
performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV17_b 2FTC b. I think pay should be distributed to 
group members differently for this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV17_c 2MCR-
R 
c. There is a small difference in the 
most and least money my group 
could make in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV17_d 2FTC d. I wish they had used a different way 
to distribute pay to group members 
in this study. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV17_e 2MCR e. There is a big difference in the most 
and least money my group could 
make in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV17_f 2MCAR f. My own performance will make a 
big difference in how much money I 
make in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 






























18. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV18_a 2MCAR a. Pay on this task is based on my 
group's performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV18_b 2MCAR b. I really want my group to do well in 
this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV18_c 2FT c. The way pay is distributed in this 
study is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV18_d 2MCAR d. How much I make in this session 
depends on my group's performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV18_e 2MCAR e. How much money I make in this 
session depends on my own 
performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 


























19. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following 
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV19_a 2MCAR a. I really want to do well in this 
session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV19_b 2MCF b. The minimum amount of money I 
can earn on this task is small. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV19_c 2FTC c. Pay for this task should be 
distributed to group members 
differently. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV19_d 2MCAR d. Pay on this task is based on my 
individual performance. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV19_e 2MCAR e. The group's performance will make  
big difference in how much money I 
make in this session. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV19_f 2FT f. Distributing pay based on 
performance is fair. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
20. Below are several statements regarding the maximum co pensation for the task you 
will be performing (TASK2). Each statement has a missing value.  Please fill in the 
blank for the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement. 
 
 
QIV20_a 2MCC a. The most money my group can make in 
this session is  
$_____________. 
QIV20_b 2MCC b. The most money I, individually, can 











21. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 
 



































QIV21_a 2CV a. I would really like to make this much 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV21_b 2CV b. I want to make this amount of money. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV21_c 2CV c. I really value this amount of money. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
22. Below are statements regarding the minimum compensatio  for the task you will be 
performing (TASK2). Each statement has a missing value.  Please fill in the blank for 






a. The minimum amount of money my group 






b. The minimum amount of money I, 
individually, can make in this session is 
$_____________. 
 
23. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with eac  of the following regarding 
the minimum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK2). 
 



































QIV23_a 2FV a. I would really like to make this much 
money. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV23_b  2FV b. I want to make this amount of money. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QIV23_c 2FV c. I really value this amount of money. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 





We have a few quick questions for you while we calculate performance. 
 




[4] Very Good 
[5] Excellent 
 




[4] Very Good 
[5] Excellent 
 
[QV3 – 2SIP] 3. Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you 





[QV4 – 2SGP] 4. Group performance is rated as Low, Average, or High.  Where do you expect 















Please answer the following questions as candidly as you can.  Remember that your 
answers are completely confidential.  No one outside the project staff will ever know your 
answers.  
 
1. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may 
have right now.  Please indicate the extent to which you are currently 
experiencing each emotion. 
 


















































QVI1_a 2SDN a. Upset [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_b 2HOP b. Hopeful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_c 2FR c. Worried [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_d 2RLF d. Relief [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_e 2FR e. Tense [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_f 2ANG1 f. Irritated [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_g 2FR g. Nervous [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_h 2HPP2 h. Enthusiastic [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI1_i 2ANG2 i. Mad [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
2. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may 
have right now.  Please indicate the extent to which you are currently 
experiencing each emotion. 
 


















































QVI2_a 2SDN a. Discouraged [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_b 2HPP1 b. Cheerful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_c 2HOP c. Eager [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_d 2SDN d. Sad [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_e 2ANG1 e. Annoyed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_f 2SDN f. Disappointed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_g 2GLT g. Guilt [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI2_h 2FR h. Anxious [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 





3. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have 
right now.  Please indicate the extent to which youare currently experiencing each 
emotion. 
 


















































QVI3_a 2HOP a. Optimistic [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_b 2HPP2 b. Excited [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_c 2HPP1 c. Joyful [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_d 2HPP2 d. Thrilled [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_e 2HPP1 e. Happy [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_f 2ANG2 f. Angry [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_g 2GLT g. Regret [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_h 2ANG1 h. Aggravated [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI3_i 2ANG2 i. Hostile [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
 
4. We would like to know how you feel about the way pa was distributed in your 
group for TASK1.  Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following. 
 


































QVI4_a 2PJ a. Pay is distributed fairly among my group 
members. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI4_b 2PJ b. I think the way pay is distributed among 
group members is just. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI4_c 2PJ c. I like the way pay is distributed in my
group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI4_d 2PJ d. It makes sense to distribute money across 
group members this way. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI4_e 2PJ e. I agree with the way my group members 
were paid. 





5. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the 
TASK1 session.  Please answer these questions as hone tly as possible.  To what extent 
does how much money you made... 
 
 



















































QVI5_a 2DJ a. ...reflect the effort you have 
put into your work? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI5_b 2DJ b. …reflect what you have 
contributed to the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI5_c 2DJ c. …reflect how hard you 
worked on the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI5_d 2DJ d. …reflect what you should 
have made? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
6. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the 
TASK1 session.  Please answer these questions as hone tly as possible.  To what extent 
is how much money you made... 
 
 




















































a. …really unfair considering 
your hard work? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI6_b 2IJ b. …consistent with what you 
expected? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI6_c 2DJ c. …fair? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI6_d 2IJ d. …consistent with what you 
were told? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI6_e 2DJ e. ...appropriate for the work 
you have completed? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI6_f 2DJ f. ...justified, given your 
performance? 





7. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much 
money you made for the TASK1 session.  For each statement, decide how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay.  How satisfied are you with... 
 
 


































QVI7_a 2PSL a. …the size of your pay for performance 
on this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI7_b 2PSS b. …the pay structure used for this task? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI7_c 2PSS c. …the differences in pay across 
performance levels on the task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI7_d 2PSL d. …the level of pay you earned for 
performance on this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI7_e 2PSL e. …the level of pay you earned for this 
task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI7_f 2PSS f. …the way pay was distributed among 
group members? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
8. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much 
money you made for the TASK1 session.  For each statement, decide how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay.  How satisfied are you with... 


































QVI8_a 2PSL a. …the size of your pay for this task? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI8_b 2PSS b. …the way pay was administered to 
group members? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI8_c 2PSS c. …the way pay was determined? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI8_d 2PSL d. …the amount of money you made for 
performing this task? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI8_e 2PSA e. …the information you were given 
about the pay structure? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI8_f 2PSL f. …the amount of money you made for 
this task? 




9. The statements below describe how you feel about the group with which you worked 
on this task.  Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following. 
 




































a. I would prefer to be in a different 
group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI9_b 2GL b. I like the people in my group. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI9_c 2GL-
R 
c. I don’t like the other people in my 
group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
10. It is possible that we will be able to pay people to do this task in the future.  The 
statements below describe your interest in continuing work on this task.  Please 
indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 



































QVI10_a IC a. I would continue working on this 
task if I were getting paid. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI10_b IC b. I am interested in doing additional 
work on this task for pay. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI10_c IC-R- c. I don't want to work on this task 
again even if I am paid to do so. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI10_d IC-R- d. Working on this task in the future 
does not interest me even if I would 
be paid to do so. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI10_e IC e. I am interested in future work on this 
task for pay. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI10_f IC-R- f. I'm not interested in working on this 
task again. 





[QVI11 - IC] 11. Would you like us to contact you if we need peopl  to work on this task in 
the future? 
[1] Yes  
[2] No   
 
 
12. When completing the tasks today, to what extent did you feel... 
 
















































QVI12_a FG a. …you were working with 
others. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI12_b FG b. …you were part of a 
group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI12_c FG c. …you completed the task 
as a member of a group. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI12_d FG d. …the task was a group 
task. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
QVI12_e FG e. …you were working 
alone. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
We just have a few additional questions about you. 





[QVI14] 14. What is your race (pick one)? 
[1] White 
[2] Black or African-American 
[3] Hispanic or Latino/Latina 
[4] Native American or Alaskan Native 
[5] Asian, Pacific Islander, or Indian (from India) 





[QVI15] 15. How old were you on your last birthday?  _______ years  
[QVI16] 16. Which of the following best describes your current relationship status (pick 
one)? 
 
[1] Never Married 





[QVI17] 17. About how much money do you spend each month? Iclude all your monthly 
expenses, such as utilities, groceries, and entertainment. $_______ 
[QVI18] 18. Are you currently employed (select one)? 
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 18a 
[2] No  ------------------ Go to End of Study  
 
[QVI18_a] 18a. How long have you been employed (in months) by your current 
organization? _______ months  
[QVI18_b] 18b. How many hours per week do you work for pay? ____ __ hours 
[QVI18_c] 18c. In what industry is your main job? 
 
[1] Agriculture, Forestry, or Fishery  
[2] Mining and Construction  
[3] Manufacturing  
[4] Public Administration  
[5] Transportation  
[6] Communications  
[7] Retail   
[8] Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate  
[9] Restaurant Service 
[10] Repair Service 
[11] Recreation Service 
[12] Other 
 
  
 
Thank you! 
 
